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Abstract
This thesis focusses on combinatorial auctions. These are auctions where
multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. Furthermore,
in a combinatorial auction, a buyer is allowed to place bids on subsets of
the available items. When multiple items are considered, it is often the case
that the value of a set of items is higher or lower than the sum of the values
of the individual items. These so-called complementarity or substitution-
effects, respectively, may be bidder specific and of considerable importance.
A combinatorial auction offers the bidders a way to express these effects in
their bids, which may also benefit the auctioneer. This thesis mainly deals
with the so-called winner determination problem, which consists of deciding
which bids to accept and which to turn down, in order to maximize the
total winning bid value. Each winning bidder thus pays his bid for the set
of items he wins. In general, however, this problem is NP -hard and difficult
to approximate. Numerous attempts to cope with this computational com-
plexity can be found in literature. One approach is to impose limitations on
what a bidder can bid for a set. This thesis can be divided into two parts,
each dealing with a special kind of combinatorial auction, in which bidder’s
preferences are restricted in some way.
The first part of this thesis deals with the so-called total quantity discount
auction. In this auction, the bidders are sellers and a bid corresponds to an
offer to sell a set of items at some price. On behalf of a buyer, the auction-
eer’s task is to accept bids such that given amounts of different items can be
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purchased at a minimal total cost. Furthermore, with his bids, each bidder
grants a discount that depends on the total amount of units the buyer pur-
chases from that bidder. More precisely, with each bid, a volume interval
is specified in which the total amount of purchased items should lie if this
bid is to be accepted. Furthermore, each bid has a unit price for each item.
Obviously, per bidder, a bid with a higher volume interval should have lower
prices, in order to result in a discount.
One theoretical result is that the winner determination problem of this auc-
tion is NP -hard. This result remains valid for some variants of this problem.
Even more, our results show that the existence of a constant-factor approx-
imation algorithm would imply P = NP . Another theoretical result is that
the LP-relaxation of a formulation for this problem can be solved by solving
a min-cost flow problem. We use this property to develop a branch-and-
bound algorithm that solves a min-cost flow problem in every node of its
search tree. This algorithm can also be used in four variants of the total
quantity discount auction. In a first variant, the market share that one or
more suppliers can obtain is constrained. Another variant allows the buyer
to procure more units than strictly needed, in order to reach a lower total
cost. In a third variant, the number of winning suppliers is limited, both in
general and per item. Finally, we investigate a multi-period variant, where
the buyer not only needs to decide what items to buy from what supplier,
but also when to do this, while considering the inventory costs.
Our empirical results are based on computational experiments on instances
involving up to 50 suppliers and 100 items. We compare the performance of
the min-cost flow based algorithm with two other algorithms: an LP-based
branch-and-bound algorithm and a branch-and-cut algorithm. It turns out
that even the large instances of the basic problem are solved to optimality
within a limited amount of time. We find that what algorithm performs
best depends on the variant and the size of the problem.
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To conclude the first part, we study so-called exclusionary side constraints.
In the total quantity discount auction, this type of constraint enforces that
only one bid per supplier can be the winning bid. We try to gain insight
in how these constraints add to the complexity by studying them in the
context of the transportation problem. In this context, an exclusionary side
constraint on a pair of supply nodes imposes that at most one of these nodes
can be used to supply a demand node. Three special cases of the transporta-
tion problem with exclusionary side constraints are considered, of which one
particularly resembles the winner determination problem of the total quan-
tity discount auction. We settle the computational complexity for all cases
considered.
In the second part of this thesis, we study the so-called matrix bid auction.
This auction limits a bidder in expressing his preferences, in the sense that
the extra value an item adds to a bid on a set is determined only by the
number of items in this set outranking this item, according to an ordering of
the items expressed by the bidder. We show how it can be verified whether
a matrix bid satisfies economic properties as free disposal, complement free-
ness, decreasing marginal valuations, and the gross substitutes property.
Moreover, we provide a procedure to check whether a given collection of
bids can be represented by a matrix bid. If this is not the case, we present
a method to approximate these bids with a matrix bid.
We also show that the winner determination problem of the matrix bid auc-
tion is NP -hard even for the special case where all bidders have an identical
ranking of the items. We present two formulations for the winner determina-
tion problem, and prove that their LP-relaxations are equally strong. One
formulation is used to develop two branch-and-price algorithms for which
the pricing problem is a shortest path problem. These algorithms are tested
on instances with up to 50 items and 100 bidders. All instances can be solved
within a reasonable amount of time, and the branch-and-price algorithms
withstand the comparison with a state-of-the-art branch-and-cut approach.
x
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift richt zich op combinatorische veilingen. Een combinatorische
veiling is een veiling waar meerdere goederen tegelijk geveild worden, en waar
het de bieders is toegestaan om biedingen uit te brengen op willekeurige
deelverzamelingen van de aangeboden goederen. Wanneer meerdere goede-
ren in beschouwing genomen worden, is het vaak het geval dat de waarde-
ring voor een verzameling van items hoger of lager is dan de som van de
waarderingen voor de individuele items. Dit noemt men respectievelijk een
complementariteits- of een substitutie-effect. Deze soms aanzienlijke effecten
kunnen verschillen van bieder tot bieder. Een combinatorische veiling laat
bieders toe deze effecten in hun biedingen uit te drukken, wat ook de vei-
lingmeester ten goede kan komen. Dit proefschrift is vooral gericht op het
zogenaamde winnaar determinatie probleem, wat erin bestaat te beslissen
welke biedingen aanvaard en welke afgewezen moeten worden zodat de to-
tale waarde van winnende biedingen gemaximaliseerd wordt. Elke winnende
bieder betaalt dan hetgeen hij geboden heeft voor de goederen die hij wint.
In het algemeen is dit probleem echter NP -lastig en is de optimale oplos-
sing ook moeilijk te benaderen. In de literatuur vindt men vele pogingen
om met die complexiteit om te gaan. Ee´n benadering is om beperkingen op
te leggen omtrent hetgeen een bieder kan bieden. Dit proefschrift kan wor-
den onderverdeeld in twee delen, waarin telkens een speciaal geval van een
combinatorisch veiling behandeld wordt waar de voorkeuren van de bieders
telkens op een bepaalde manier gelimiteerd worden.
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Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift handelt over de zogenaamde veiling met
totale hoeveelheidskorting. In deze veiling zijn de bieders verkopers en komt
een bieding overeen met een aanbod om een verzameling van goederen te
verkopen tegen een zekere prijs. In opdracht van een koper is het dan de
taak van de veilingmeester om een aantal biedingen te aanvaarden zodat
opgelegde hoeveelheden van die goederen gekocht kunnen worden tegen een
minimale totale kost. Verder verleent elke bieder in zijn biedingen een kor-
ting die afhangt van het totale aantal goederen dat de koper aankoopt bij
die bieder. Meer specifiek wordt er bij elk bod een volume interval gespeci-
ficeerd waarin de totale hoeveelheid goederen (die bij die bieder gekocht
wordt) moet liggen, vooraleer het bod aanvaard kan worden. Verder heeft
elk bod ook een eenheidsprijs voor elk goed dat door de betreffende bieder
wordt aangeboden. Om tot een korting te komen is het dan natuurlijk de
bedoeling dat bieders hun prijzen laten zakken in biedingen met een hoger
volume interval.
Een theoretisch resultaat bestaat erin dat het winnaar determinatie pro-
bleem van deze veiling NP -lastig is. Dit resultaat blijft geldig voor een aan-
tal varianten van dit probleem. Meer zelfs, onze resultaten tonen ook aan
dat het bestaan van een algoritme dat een benadering binnen een constante
factor garandeert zou impliceren dat P = NP . Een ander theoretisch resul-
taat is dat de LP-relaxatie van een formulering voor dit probleem opgelost
kan worden door een minimale kosten stroom probleem op te lossen. We
gebruiken dit resultaat om een branch-and-bound (vertak en begrens) algo-
ritme te ontwikkelen dat een minimale kosten stroom probleem oplost in elke
knoop van de corresponderende zoekboom. Dit algoritme kan ook gebruikt
worden voor vier varianten van de veiling met totale hoeveelheidskorting. In
een eerste variant is het marktaandeel dat e´e´n of meerdere bieders kunnen
behalen beperkt. Een andere variant laat toe dat de koper meer goederen
koopt dat oorspronkelijk voorzien, om op die manier een lagere totale kost
te bereiken. In een derde variant wordt het aantal winnende bieders geli-
miteerd, zowel in het algemeen als per goed. Tenslotte bestuderen we ook
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een variant die over meerdere perioden loopt en waarin de koper niet alleen
moet beslissen welke items hij bij welke bieder koopt, maar ook wanneer hij
dit moet doen, rekening houdend met voorraadkosten.
Onze empirische resultaten zijn gebaseerd op experimenten op instanties
met tot 50 bieders en 100 goederen. We vergelijken de prestaties van het
algoritme dat gebaseerd is op het minimale kosten stroom probleem met
twee andere algoritmes: een branch-and-bound algoritme gebaseerd op li-
neair programmeren en een branch-and-cut (vertak en snij) algoritme. Het
blijkt dat zelfs de grote instanties van de basisversie van het probleem op-
timaal opgelost kunnen worden in een beperkte tijd. Het is bovendien zo
dat het beste algoritme in termen van rekentijd afhangt van de variant en
de probleemgrootte.
Tot slot van het eerste deel bestuderen we de zogenaamde uitsluitings-
beperkingen. In de veiling met totale hoeveelheidskorting dwingt dit type
beperking af dat er ten hoogste e´e´n bod per bieder een winning bod kan
zijn. We proberen inzicht te krijgen in hoe deze beperkingen bijdragen tot
de complexiteit door ze te bestuderen in het kader van een transport pro-
bleem. In deze context impliceert een uitsluitingsbeperking op een paar van
aanbodknopen dat ten hoogste e´e´n van deze knopen gebruikt kan worden
om een vraagknoop te bevoorraden. Drie speciale gevallen van het trans-
portprobleem met uitsluitingsbeperkingen worden beschouwd, waarvan er
e´e´n in het bijzonder goed lijkt op het winnaar determinatie probleem van
de veiling met totale hoeveelheidskorting. We bepalen de complexiteit van
elk van deze speciale gevallen.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift bestuderen we de zogenaamde ma-
trix bod veiling. Deze veiling beperkt de bieder in het uitdrukken van zijn
voorkeuren in die zin dat de waarde dat een item toevoegt aan een bod
op een verzameling van goederen enkel mag afhangen van het aantal hoger
gerangschikte goederen in die verzameling. Die rangschikking van de goede-
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ren is door de bieder vastgelegd, en kan dus varie¨ren van bieder tot bieder.
We tonen aan hoe kan worden nagegaan of een matrix bod voldoet aan
economische eigenschappen zoals free disposal, complement freeness, afne-
mende marginale waarderingen, en de bruto substituten eigenschap. Verder
voorzien we een procedure om na te gaan of een gegeven verzameling biedin-
gen kan voorgesteld worden door een matrix bod. Voor het geval waarin dat
niet kan, presenteren we een methode om deze biedingen te benaderen via
een matrix bod.
We tonen ook aan dat het winnaar determinatie probleem van de matrix bod
veiling nog steeds NP -lastig is in het speciale geval waar elke bieder dezelfde
rangschikking van de goederen gebruikt. We presenteren twee formuleringen
voor het winnaar determinatie probleem, en bewijzen dat hun LP-relaxaties
even sterk zijn. Ee´n formulering wordt gebruikt om twee branch-and-price
(vertak en prijs) algoritmes te ontwikkelen waarvan het pricing probleem
een kortste pad probleem is. Deze algoritmes worden getest op instanties
met tot 50 goederen en 100 bieders. Alle instanties worden opgelost in een
redelijke tijd, en de branch-and-price algoritmes doorstaan de vergelijking
met een actuele branch-and-cut aanpak.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale
simultaneously to a set of buyers. In a combinatorial auction a buyer is
allowed to place bids on subsets of the items. These subsets are sometimes
called bundles. The auctioneer decides – after one or more rounds or after
a certain amount of time depending upon the design – to accept some of
the bids and to allocate the items accordingly to the bidders. This thesis
mainly deals with this decision: which bids to accept, in order to optimize
a given objective. We investigate how this problem for particular settings
can be solved.
This introductory chapter is organized in three sections. Section 1.1 provides
a general introduction to the realm of combinatorial auctions. In section 1.2,
we focus on one of the most challenging problems in this field, namely the
winner determination problem. Finally, in section 1.3, we present an outline
of the remainder of this thesis.
1
2 1.1. Combinatorial auctions
1.1 Combinatorial auctions
The main advantage of a combinatorial auction is that it allows a bidder
to express his1 preferences to a greater extent. Indeed, it may occur that
a bidder values a set of items higher than the sum of his valuations for the
individual items of this set. If this is the case, we say that these items are
complements to this bidder; if the converse is true we say these items are
substitutes. Notice that these complementarity or substitution-effects may
be bidder-specific. In a traditional auction, where items are auctioned se-
quentially, the presence of complementarity or substitution-effects can be
problematic for the bidder. Suppose for instance that a bidder is willing to
pay a price of 10 for items A and B together. The items individually are
worth far less to this bidder, say 2 per item. Suppose this bidder wins
the auction for item A, paying 4. The auction for item B however turns
out unfavorable, since some other bidder is willing to pay 7, which is more
than what our bidder had in mind. Eventually, our bidder ends up paying
4 for item A, which he valued at no more than 2. This problem is known
as the exposure problem. This problem could also have repercussions for
the auctioneer, since in future auctions, our bidder will probably drop out
earlier in a similar situation, to limit his loss. Thus, it is important for the
auctioneer not to neglect these effects. A combinatorial auction offers a way
to make use of complementarity or substitution-effects.
The popularity of combinatorial auctions (and corresponding research) has
increased in recent years. As a result, there are many examples where com-
binatorial auctions prove to be a successful way to market items. The
first steps toward implementing a combinatorial auction in practice were
taken by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) when auctioning
U.S. spectrum rights. A spectrum right is the right to use a specific band-
width of the electromagnetic spectrum for wireless communication devices
(cell phones, pagers, etc.). Obviously, sets of spectrum rights can be seen
1his can be replaced by her (and he by she)
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as complements, for instance if they cover geographically adjacent regions.
An overview of the considerations in designing the FCC spectrum auctions
over the years can be found in Cramton (2002). The airline sector also of-
fers possibilities for combinatorial auctions: landing slots (Ball, Donohue &
Hoffman 2005, Rassenti, Smith & Bulfin 1982), seats (Eso 2001) and flights
(Bleischwitz & Kliewer 2005). We also find applications of combinatorial
auctions in truckload transportation (Caplice & Sheffi 2005, Ledyard, Ol-
son, Porter, Swanson & Torma 2002, Sheffi 2004) and allocating bus routes
(Cantillon & Pesendorfer 2005). We conclude this non-exhaustive overview
by mentioning Epstein, Henr´ıquez, Catala´n, Weintraub & Mart´ınez (2002),
who use a combinatorial auction to assign catering contracts for meals in
Chilean schools.
Years of research have produced a long list of combinatorial auction mech-
anisms, containing e.g. the ascending proxy auction (Ausubel & Milgrom
2002), the primal-dual auction (de Vries, Schummer & Vohra in press),
iBundle (Parkes & Ungar 2000), PAUSE (Kelly & Steinberg 2000), and the
clock-proxy auction (Ausubel & Milgrom 2005). The most famous combi-
natorial auction is undoubtedly the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction,
which is a generalization of the Vickrey auction to a setting with multiple
items. In the Vickrey auction, bidders submit a sealed bid for the item that
is being auctioned. The highest bidder wins the item, and pays the amount
of the second highest bid. This setting gives each bidder the incentive to bid
his true valuation of the item (Vickrey 1961). In the VCG auction, bidders
must report a bid function and items are subsequently allocated in order
to maximize the total winning bid value. Each winning bidder then pays
the opportunity cost of his participation in the auction: the maximal total
winning bid value if this bidder had not participated, minus the actual total
winning bid value with his winning bid subtracted out. The VCG auction
also has the property that each bidder has the incentive to bid his true val-
uation of the items (see Ausubel & Milgrom (2005)).
4 1.1. Combinatorial auctions
Bichler, Kalagnanam, Lee & Lee (2002) outline a classification of allocation
problems based on the number of participants and the type of traded goods.
Along the former criterion, these authors discern settings with one buyer
and one seller (bilateral allocation problem), multiple buyers and sellers
(N -bilateral allocation problem), and other involved parties, beside buy-
ers and sellers (multilateral allocation problem). The latter criterion leads
to a classification in three dimensions: the number of different items in
the auction (single-item versus multi-item), the quantity for each item in
the auction (single-unit versus multi-unit) and the negotiable qualitative at-
tributes (single-attribute versus multi-attribute). Bichler et al. (2002) define
combinatorial auctions as multi-item auctions. Furthermore, we can make
a distinction between forward and reverse auctions. While forward auctions
involve a single seller and multiple buyers, a reverse auction (or procurement
auction) involves multiple sellers and one buyer. As a typical example, this
buyer wants a variety of tasks to be carried out, while sellers are in principle
willing to perform subsets of tasks. In such a setting a bid for a subset of
tasks is an offer to fulfill that subset of tasks for the stated price. The goal
of the auctioneer is to have all tasks carried out at minimal cost.
It will be clear that – compared to a traditional auction where only one item
at a time is being auctioned – combinatorial auctions bring about some ex-
tra problems. To begin with, there is the question of how bids should be
expressed. There is a variety of bidding languages available, and a trade-off
between expressiveness and simplicity is to be made here (see e.g. Nisan
(2005). Next, the bids need to be communicated to the auctioneer. If each
bidder of the n bidders expresses his preferences on all subsets of the m
items that are being auctioned (supposing that the bidders would be willing
to expose their private information like this), this results in O(n2m) pieces
of information to be submitted to the auctioneer. Bid submission and the
relation between the extensiveness of this communication and the allocation
are studied in e.g. Nisan & Segal (2006). Further, the problem to decide
which bids to accept and which bids to turn down is known as the winner
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determination problem. This allocation decision depends of course on the
auctioneer’s objective. In this thesis we assume that the objective is to max-
imize the total value of the winning bids. Each winning bidder thus pays
his bid for the set of items he wins. Notice that in general, the payment of
a bidder need not be equal to his bid. We refer for instance to the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves auction. Since the winner determination problem is the main
focus of this thesis, a more thorough introduction to this problem is given in
section 1.2. Finally, many other auction design questions (how many rounds
will be held? what feedback will be given to the bidder? etc.) and incentive
issues (will bidders bid their actual valuation? can free rider problems be
avoided? etc.) are worth considering.
In this work, we use the private valuation model, introduced by Vickrey
(1961). In this model, each bidder can express his valuation for any subset
of the items in terms of “money”. Moreover, these values do not depend
on the private information of other bidders. Furthermore, we assume that
there are no externalities present in the valuation of a bidder. This means
that the valuation of a bidder for a set depends only on the items in that
set. Thus, a bidder does not care to which particular bidder the other items
would be allocated. We also assume that bids are normalized, in the sense
that any bidder’s bid on the empty set is zero.
This thesis relies heavily on important results achieved in various domains.
However, these results are often not discussed in great detail in this text.
Therefore, we refer to Garey & Johnson (1979) and Ausiello, Crescenzi,
Gambosi, Kann, Marchetti-Spaccamela & Protasi (1999) for an excellent
overview on fundamental concepts and findings in complexity theory. Nat-
urally, this work is also built on decades of research on auctions in general.
A fine introduction to auction theory can be found in Klemperer (2000) and
Milgrom (2004). The most fascinating results in operations research and
combinatorial optimization can be found in Winston (2004) and Nemhauser
& Wolsey (1988). Finally, for a thorough discussion on combinatorial auc-
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tions, integrating contributions on many interesting aspects from both the-
ory and practice, we refer to the book edited by Cramton, Steinberg &
Shoham (2005).
1.2 The winner determination problem
In a combinatorial auction in its most general form, bidders can bid what-
ever amount they please on any subset of items in which they are interested.
The problem of deciding which bidders should get what items in order to
maximize the total winning bid value is called the winner determination
problem. Furthermore, we assume that at most one bid per bidder can be
accepted. Indeed, a bidder’s bid for the whole set of items he wins might
well be smaller than the sum of bids for the underlying subsets. Suppose for
instance a bidder j expresses the following bids: bj({1}) = 3, bj({2}) = 2,
and bj({1, 2}) = 4. Accepting both the bid on item 1 and the bid on item
2 leads to a combined bid of 2 + 3 = 5, whereas this bidder intended to bid
no more than 4 for the combination of items 1 and 2.
The following formulation is most commonly used to represent this problem
(for a single-unit setting). It makes use of the following notation, which we
use throughout this thesis. We use B to represent the set of bidders indexed
by j and G for the set of items indexed by i. We use bj(S) to denote the bid
by bidder j on the set of items S ∈ Ωj ⊆ 2G, where Ωj is the set of sets in
which bidder j is interested. The binary variable y(S, j) indicates whether
bidder j wins the set S (y(S, j) = 1), or not (otherwise).
maximize
∑
j∈B
∑
S∈Ωj
bj(S)y(S, j) (1.1)
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subject to ∑
S∈Ωj :S⊇{i}
∑
j∈B
y(S, j) 6 1 ∀i ∈ G (1.2)
∑
S∈Ωj
y(S, j) 6 1 ∀j ∈ B (1.3)
y(S, j) ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ∈ Ωj ,∀j ∈ B (1.4)
The first set of constraints (1.2) enforces that no item can be auctioned more
than once. The second set of constraints (1.3) ensures that there is at most
one winning bid per bidder. It is pointed out by de Vries & Vohra (2003)
that the latter set of constraints can be dropped, if the bid functions are
superadditive for all bidders j (i.e. bj(S)+bj(T ) 6 bj(S∪T ), with S, T ∈ Ωj).
The winner determination problem is shown to be NP -hard, even if every
bidder bids only on subsets of size 2 and all bids have a value equal to
1 (Van Hoesel & Mu¨ller 2001). This result is based on a reduction from
the three-dimensional matching problem (see Spieksma (1999)). Moreover,
Sandholm (2002) shows that the winner determination problem cannot be
approximated within a ratio of max(K²−1,m²−1/2) in polynomial time for
any fixed ² > 0 (unless P=ZPP ), where K is the number of subsets of G
on which a bid has been made, and m is the number of items. This result
holds even if every item occurs in at most two bids and all prices are equal
to 1.
Numerous attempts to cope with this computational complexity can be
found in literature. From the auctioneer’s point of view, these attempts
can be subdivided in three categories, of which we give a short overview
hereunder. A first group of attempts (called decentralized approaches) boils
down to shifting the burden of solving the winner determination problem
(at least partially) to the bidder. In this approach, each time a new bid
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is expressed, the bidder should also indicate how this bid can lead to an
improved allocation. Another way to tackle the complexity consists of re-
stricting the subsets on which bids can be placed. In a third approach, bids
can be submitted on all possible subsets, but there are restrictions on what
a bidder can bid for these sets. The distinction between restricting the sub-
sets and restricting the preferences is also used in Mu¨ller (2005).
1.2.1 Decentralized approaches
In the decentralized approaches, there is no auctioneer who collects the bids
from all bidders and then decides which bidder is to get what items. Instead,
the auctioneer merely proposes an initial allocation, leaving it up to the bid-
ders to come up with a new allocation that generates a higher total winning
bid value (and is obviously also more satisfying for the bidder proposing this
allocation).
In the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM, see Banks, Ledyard &
Porter (1989)) a bidder can submit a bid on a subset, if that bid increases the
total winning bid value over the bids it drives out of the current allocation.
To this end, the bidder is allowed to incorporate one or more unsuccessful
bids from other bidders into his own bid. This is done iteratively, until an
allocation is found for which no bidder expresses a higher bid within some
amount of time since the last bid was made.
Kelly & Steinberg (2000) present the Progressive Adaptive User Selection
Environment (PAUSE) procedure, which consists of two multi-round stages.
In the first stage, the items are auctioned individually in simultaneous auc-
tions over a number of rounds. In each round of the second stage, each
bidder submits an allocation of all items, incorporating bids of other bid-
ders if necessary. Thus, such a bid suggests not only which items are desired
by the submitting bidder, but also to which bidder(s) the other items can
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be allocated. In both stages, there are requirements on the improvement a
new bid creates and there is an activity rule for the bidders.
In a decentralized approach, the auctioneer only needs to check the valid-
ity of each bid, which is a computationally tractable problem. However,
the burden of complexity has been shifted to the bidder, who now faces
the problem of deciding whether he can create a bid that beats the current
allocation. Although this problem may still be NP -complete, the idea is
that it is easier to solve in practice than the general winner determination
problem, because a bidder is often only interested in a limited number of
items. Additionally, the bidder no longer needs to reveal his entire valuation
function to the auctioneer, which is often beneficial for privacy reasons.
1.2.2 Restricted-subset approaches
Unlike the decentralized approaches, the restricted-subset approaches stick
to a combinatorial auction where the auctioneer is solely responsible for
finding an optimal allocation. In order to reduce the complexity of the win-
ner determination problem, bids can be submitted only on a limited set of
combinations of items.
Rothkopf, Pekec¸ & Harstad (1998) found that if the family of subsets on
which a bidder can bid is limited to hierarchical subsets, meaning that ev-
ery two subsets are disjoint or one is a subset of the other, that then the
winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time. The prob-
lem of finding an optimal allocation for a combinatorial auction where a
linear order exists among the items and bidders can only bid on subsets of
consecutive items, is also shown to be polynomially solvable. If the first
item in the ordering is considered the successor of the last (i.e. a circular
order), then the winner determination problem remains solvable in polyno-
mial time. Furthermore, Rothkopf et al. (1998) prove that a combinatorial
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auction where bidders can bid on subsets of a cardinality of at most two
has a polynomially solvable winner determination problem. However, the
results of Rothkopf et al. (1998) assume a combinatorial auction where a
bidder is allowed to win multiple subsets.
Nisan (2000) elaborates on some of the results of Rothkopf et al. (1998)
by stating explicitly that the LP-relaxation of a set packing formulation
(i.e. (1.1)-(1.4), without constraints (1.3)) results in an integral solution
for the special cases with hierarchical subsets and linearly ordered items.
These results follow from the fact that a set packing formulation with a to-
tally unimodular constraint matrix defines a polyhedron where all extreme
points are integral (see Nemhauser & Wolsey (1988)).
Tennenholtz (2002) presents a combinatorial network auction, which he
proves is computationally tractable. In this auction, the items are assumed
to be arranged in a tree, where every node corresponds to an item. The idea
is that bids can be submitted only on subsets of items that form a path in
the network. When the underlying tree is a path, this auction reduces to
the combinatorial auction with linearly ordered items (see Rothkopf et al.
(1998)). If the items are structured in a directed acyclic graph and the bids
are allowed on any directed subtree, the winner determination problem al-
ready becomes NP -hard again (Sandholm 2002).
In the above approaches, the auctioneer decides in advance on which combi-
nations the bidders are allowed to bid. While bidders may sometimes agree
on what combinations are interesting from an economical point of view, it
may also be the case that some bidders experience synergies between some
kind of items, while others have totally different kinds of synergies. Obvi-
ously, in general this approach can lead to inefficiencies, because bidders may
not be allowed to bid on the combinations they want. The task of deciding
to which subsets the auction is restricted can therefore be tricky for the auc-
tioneer, especially given the fact that the appearance of fairness should be
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upheld. Park & Rothkopf (2005) try to avoid this difficulty by proposing an
auction in which the bidders themselves determine the allowable combina-
tions. While in principle, bids on all subsets are allowed, the bidders are to
assign priorities to various combinations and then may use as many of these
(from the highest priority first) as is computationally manageable. Although
limiting the number of bids a bidder can express does not make the winner
determination problem polynomially solvable (see Rothkopf et al. (1998)),
it does increase the size of problems that can be solved within a reasonable
amount of time.
Gu¨nlu¨k, Lada´nyi & de Vries (2005) describe an auction that is comparable to
the auction of Park & Rothkopf (2005), since in each round, the bidders can
submit bids on any single item and on a limited number of combinations of
items, which they can compose themselves. For each bidder, a pair of bids
from a different round, as well as a pair of bids from a same round that
overlap, cannot both be awarded. The authors present a branch-and-price
algorithm based on a multi-unit adaptation of formulation (1.1)-(1.4). In
their approach, the pricing problem is a vertex packing problem. Although
in general this problem is NP -hard, the pricing problem can be solved in
a reasonable amount of time for the FCC spectrum auctions. This particu-
lar auction is a simultaneous ascending auction with package bidding, where
bidders compete for licenses for spectrum use (e.g. radio, wireless telephone,
etc.). Since the bidders are not allowed to submit too many package bids
in any round, the pricing problem remains computationally manageable, al-
lowing the branch-and-price algorithm to solve instances with up to 99 items
within 10 minutes.
1.2.3 Restricted-preference approaches
Instead of limiting the sets for which a bid can be placed, a restricted-
preference method imposes limitations to what a bidder is allowed to bid
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on a bundle. A common restriction on a bidder’s preferences is that they
should be non-decreasing, i.e. the valuation for a set S1 can not be higher
than the valuation for a set S2 if S1 is a subset of S2. Another restriction
can be that the preferences should be supermodular. This means that the
sum of valuations for two sets should not be higher than the sum of the val-
uation of the union of both sets and the valuation of the intersection of both
sets. If there are only two bid functions a bidder can have, both of them
non-decreasing, integer valued and supermodular, then de Vries & Vohra
(2003) point out that the winner determination problem of this auction can
be solved in polynomial time. The authors also mention that if each bidder’s
bid function satisfies the gross substitutes property (see Kelso & Crawford
(1982) and section 6.3.4), the LP-relaxation of (1.1)-(1.4) provides an inte-
gral optimal solution.
If a bidder has a sequence of valuations p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pm, where pj
specifies his valuation for the j-th item he wins, regardless of what that
item might be, he has a so-called downward sloping symmetric bid function
(Nisan 2000). Notice that this means that the bidder values all items as if
they are identical and the bid is therefore only determined by the number
of items in the set. Nisan (2000) proves that if all bidders have a bid func-
tion of this kind, the LP-relaxation of (1.1)-(1.4), without constraints (1.3)
yields an integral optimal solution. Notice that this assumes that bidders
are allowed to win multiple bids. A more general structure is captured in so-
called matrix bids with order, which are intensively investigated in chapter 6.
Tennenholtz (2002) presents a quantity-constrained auction where all bids
consist of a series of desired items, each with a price the bidder is willing to
pay for this item, and a maximal number of items that he wishes to win. No-
tice that this is a subadditive valuation function, since a bidder will not pay
extra for anything exceeding his quantity limit. Tennenholtz (2002) shows
that the winner determination problem for this auction is computationally
tractable. Furthermore, this author presents a quantity-constrained auction
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with binary combinatorial bundles and an almost-additive auction, which
he proves also to be computationally tractable.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis consists of two parts, in each of which we inves-
tigate a combinatorial auction in which bidder’s preferences are restricted
in some way. In chapters 2 to 5, we study a reverse auction, which we call
the total quantity discount auction. A forward auction, the so-called matrix
bid auction, is the topic of study in chapters 6 and 7.
In chapter 2, we study a procurement problem where a buyer needs to pur-
chase multiple units of different items at a minimal total cost. The suppliers
use a discount policy based on the total amount of units the buyer purchases.
We show how this problem can be solved by means of an auction, namely the
total quantity discount auction. Despite the fact that we prove the resulting
winner determination problem to be NP -hard and difficult to approximate,
we find that this problem has an interesting property with respect to solving
it efficiently.
Four variants of the total quantity discount auction are discussed in chapter
3. In a first variant, the market share that one or more suppliers can ob-
tain is constrained. Another variant allows the buyer to procure more units
than strictly needed, in order to reach a lower total cost. We also consider
a setting where the buyer needs to pay a disposal cost for the extra units
bought. In a third variant, the number of winning suppliers is limited, both
in general and per product. Finally, we investigate a multi-period variant,
where the buyer not only needs to decide what items to buy from what
supplier, but also when to do this, while considering the inventory costs.
In chapter 4, we discuss three exact algorithms (min-cost flow based branch-
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and-bound, linear programming based branch-and-bound, and branch-and-
cut) and investigate their performance on randomly generated instances in-
volving 50 suppliers and 100 items. It turns out that even the large instances
of the basic problem are solved to optimality within a limited amount of
time. However, we find that different algorithms perform best in terms of
computation time for different variants. The results described in chapters
2, 3, and 4 form the basis of a paper to appear in EJOR (Goossens, Maas,
Spieksma & van de Klundert 2007).
Chapter 5 can be seen as an interlude in this thesis. In this chapter, we
take a closer look at the so-called exclusionary side constraints. In the to-
tal quantity discount auction, this type of constraint enforces that only one
bid per supplier can be the winning bid. We try to gain insight in how
these constraints add to the complexity by studying it in the context of the
transportation problem. Three special cases of the transportation problem
with exclusionary side constraints are considered, of which one particularly
resembles the total quantity discount auction. A research report is based on
this chapter (Goossens & Spieksma 2005).
In chapter 6, we study the matrix bid auction. This auction limits a bid-
der in expressing his preferences, in the sense that the extra value an item
adds to a bid on a set is determined only by the number of items in this
set outranking this item, according to an ordering of the items expressed
by the bidder. We show how it can be verified whether a matrix bid sat-
isfies economic properties as free disposal, complement freeness, decreasing
marginal valuations and the gross substitutes property. Finally, we provide
a procedure to check whether a given collection of bids can be represented
by a matrix bid. If this is not the case, we present a method to approximate
these bids with a matrix bid. This chapter has been published as a research
report (Goossens & Spieksma 2006b).
In chapter 7, we present and compare two formulations for the winner de-
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termination problem of the matrix bid auction. To solve this problem, we
develop two branch-and-price algorithms for which the pricing problem is
a shortest path problem. These algorithms are tested on randomly gener-
ated instances with up to 50 items and 100 bidders. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of the computational results. The findings discussed in
this chapter have also been published as a research report (Goossens &
Spieksma 2006a).
To conclude this thesis, we elaborate on a number of topics for future re-
search in chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
The total quantity discount
auction
It is a widespread economic phenomenon that the price of an item depends –
among many other things – on the amount ordered. Indeed, there are many
reasons for suppliers to offer discounts based on the volume sold to a buyer.
Consequently, when it comes to procuring amounts of different items from
different suppliers, it makes sense to consider various alternatives. In fact,
choosing the right suppliers to deliver the right products has become a major
concern in many large companies. In this chapter, we investigate a combi-
natorial auction tailored to solve a procurement problem where bidders use
a specific discount policy. We call this auction the total quantity discount
auction. In section 2.1, we describe the discount structure and illustrate
how this auction works. In section 2.2 we motivate why this discount policy
is relevant by providing a number of real-life examples. Section 2.3 gives
an overview of related research on procurement and discount structures. A
mathematical formulation for the winner determination problem of the to-
tal quantity discount auction is given in section 2.4, while in section 2.5, we
discuss a number of interesting properties of this problem.
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2.1 Description of the total quantity discount auc-
tion
The total quantity discount auction is a reverse auction, meaning that there
is one buyer that needs a number of items and several suppliers compete
for the right to provide items. The total quantity discount auction is also
a multi-item, multi-unit auction, since the buyer can require many different
items, and also multiple units of each item. The auction is cleared in a sin-
gle round and the outcome determines which bidders are allowed to supply
what items such that the buyer pays a minimal total amount. In this way,
the auction solves the procurement problem faced by the buyer.
Let’s assume that the buyer is interested in a number of items, and has a
quantity for each of these items that he needs to purchase, from one or more
suppliers. To compete for (a part of) this request, each bidder (or supplier)
needs to submit one or more bids, consisting of a lower and and upper bound
of a volume interval, and prices for each item the supplier is willing to offer.
The idea is that this bid is only valid if the buyer purchases a total amount
of units that lies within the ranges of the volume interval.
Naturally, a bidder can submit multiple bids, however, we assume that the
corresponding volume intervals do not overlap. By submitting multiple bids,
the supplier can offer a discount that depends on the total quantity the buyer
orders from that supplier. Obviously, a supplier is assumed not to increase
his prices in a higher volume interval. Thus, it is the total amount of units
(possibly of various items) that determines the discount a supplier is willing
to grant. Notice however that the discount rate in each interval might vary
among the items. This discount structure is called total quantity discount
(TQD). Notice that to reach the quantity the buyer requires for an item, the
buyer may purchase from multiple suppliers, although he can accept only
one bid per supplier. Clearly, this is an all-unit discount policy, since the
prices in a volume interval apply to all units bought from the corresponding
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supplier (as opposed to an incremental discount policy, where only the items
purchased in surplus of some threshold give rise to a discount). A discus-
sion and classification of various quantity discount policies can be found in
Munson & Rosenblatt (1998).
We assume that a preselection of suppliers has been made, excluding those
suppliers who do not attain the required standards with respect to quality,
reliability and other relevant considerations from the auction (see Degraeve,
Labro & Roodhooft (2000) for a discussion of these considerations). Thus,
we assume that the only remaining criterion upon which the further sup-
plier selection decision is based, is the price these suppliers charge for the
various items. Given a demand for each item, the winner determination
problem for the total quantity discount auction is to determine which items
should be purchased from what supplier in order to satisfy the demand for
each item at minimal total cost for the buyer. We will refer to this prob-
lem as the TQD problem. In the collection of winning bids that supports
this solution, at most one bid of each bidder can be present. Obviously,
for each winning bid, the constraints on the lower and upper bound of the
total volume purchased from the corresponding supplier should be respected.
As an example, we consider a buyer who is throwing a party and wishes to
purchase pizza. The pizzas come in three kinds: pizza hawai (H), pizza al
ovo (AO), and pizza tirolese (T); the buyer needs four of each kind. There
are two pizza delivery companies, “Mamma Mia” and “Mangia e via”, who
express the following bids.
Mangia e via:
< [1, 5]; pH = 9, pAO = 10, pT = 8 >
< [6, 12]; pH = 8, pAO = 8.5, pT = 7 >
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Mamma Mia:
< [1, 12]; pH = 7, pAO = 8, pT = 9 >
If the buyer orders up to 5 pizzas, “Mangia e via” will charge 9 for a pizza
hawai, 10 for a pizza al ovo and 8 for a pizza tirolese. However, if 6 pizzas
or more are ordered, the buyer can make use of the second bid, where prices
drop to 8, 8.5 and 7 respectively. “Mamma Mia” has made only one
bid, charging 7 for a pizza hawai, 8 for a pizza al ovo and 9 for a pizza
tirolese. The optimal solution for the buyer would be to accept the bid by
“Mamma Mia” and the second bid by “Mangia e via”. This would allow
him to order 2 pizzas al ovo and 4 pizzas tirolese from “Mangia e via” and
4 pizzas hawai and the other 2 pizzas al ovo from “Mamma Mia”, at a total
cost of 89.
The total quantity discount policy is a way to price a set of items: the
cardinality of the set of all items ordered determines in which interval the
buyer is, and the all-unit discount policy leads to prices that imply comple-
mentary effects. Therefore, the total quantity discount auction is indeed a
combinatorial auction.
2.2 Motivation
One of the main advantages of the total quantity discount auction is that its
winner determination problem has a special structure that can be exploited
when constructing an exact algorithm (see section 2.5 and chapter 4). On
the other hand, the TQD auction restricts the preferences that can be ex-
pressed by a bidder. To illustrate that this restriction can be quite natural in
procurement settings, we now describe three recent examples, documented
in literature, where suppliers set their prices using a total quantity discount
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policy. These cases are from the dairy, the chemical, and the telecommuni-
cation industry.
A procurement problem where a dairy producer needs to purchase a num-
ber of bull semen straws from one or more breeding companies in order to
inseminate (a part of) its herd is discussed by McConnel & Galligan (2004).
Each breeding company offers semen straws from a number of bulls, and
grants a volume discount, based on the total amount of semen straws the
dairy producer purchases from that breeding company. Furthermore, if a
volume interval is reached, the corresponding discounted prices apply to all
semen straws purchased from that breeding company. Thus, the breeding
companies apply a total quantity discount policy. Each available bull has
a score on a number of traits that are of importance to the producer. The
number of semen straws needed from each particular bull is however not
known in advance. The diary producer only specifies a total number of se-
men straws needed and a number of trait goals that should be satisfied by
the portfolio of semen straws on average. Furthermore, in order to reduce
the risk of inbreeding, there is a constraint that limits the purchased amount
of semen straws from any bull to a given percentage of the portfolio. Mc-
Connel & Galligan (2004) develop a mixed integer program, which also takes
into account the possibility to order more straws than needed in order to
reach a higher discount interval. The authors use this formulation to solve
a real-life instance involving a demand of 1500 semen straws to be satisfied
from 52 available bulls across three breeding companies. These companies
specify no more than three volume intervals.
Crama, Pascual & Torres (2004) investigate another procurement problem,
characterized by a total quantity discount policy. In this problem, a chem-
ical company needs to purchase a number of ingredients from one or more
suppliers. Also in this case, the suppliers express the discount as a func-
tion of the total quantity of ingredients purchased. Since only one single
discount rate for all ingredients is used, this policy should be considered
22 2.3. Related work on discounts and procurement
as a special case of the total quantity discount policy used in our problem.
Crama et al. (2004) however face the additional problem of deciding how to
use the purchased ingredients to manufacture the desired quantities of the
endproducts, since there are several alternative recipes, each with different
ingredient requirements to produce an endproduct. The authors present a
number of mixed integer models which they solve by branch-and-bound, in
order to come to a solution for a real-life case where 25 different ingredients
can be purchased from 8 suppliers in order to manufacture more than 30
distinct products.
A procurement problem in the telecom industry is described by van de Klun-
dert, Kuipers, Spieksma & Winkels (2005). Consider a telecommunication
company that needs to acquire capacity to accommodate its international
calls. This capacity is offered by various so-called carriers, i.e., for each des-
tination, each carrier offers capacity, priced in eurocents per minute. Prices
of carriers differ, and – which is particularly relevant for our setting – each
carrier uses an interval structure to arrive at a certain price. In other words,
the total amount of call-minutes handled by a certain carrier determines
the price. Moreover, the carriers use all-unit discounts. The problem is to
acquire the right amount of capacity for each destination at minimal cost.
A solution approach based on explicit enumeration of all interval selections
is presented by van de Klundert et al. (2005) and used to solve instances
with 5 carriers and up to 5000 destinations.
2.3 Related work on discounts and procurement
Procurement problems involving discount policies have been studied by
many authors. Katz, Sadrian & Tendick (1994), and also Sadrian & Yoon
(1994) discuss a procurement problem where they distinguish between pur-
chases on a commitment basis and purchases on an as-ordered basis. They
stress the importance of sourcing flexibility and model explicitly the fact
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that not all future items should be purchased via committed contracts. In
addition, they explicitly consider the number of vendors for each item, and
the percentages of the total supply given to each of the vendors. In their
discount policy, a supplier discounts the price of each item by the same
percentage based on the total dollar value of all items purchased from the
supplier, whereas our policy allows a different discount percentage for each
item.
Austin & Hogan (1976) is an early reference to procurement problems char-
acterized by a lower and upper bound for each supplier between which the
ordered amount needs to lie, provided that that supplier is used. In this
paper, the government needs to purchase a given amount of aviation fuel
from one or more suppliers, where prices differ depending on how the fuel
is transported. This problem differs from our setting in that the items con-
sidered are independent and there are no discounts. The authors solve the
problem using a branch-and-bound algorithm, exploiting the network struc-
ture of the core problem.
Davenport & Kalagnanam (2002) report on a volume discount auction in
which discounts are based on quantities for each individual item. Further-
more, they use an incremental discount policy, meaning that the discounts
apply only to the additional units above the threshold of the volume inter-
val. Hohner, Rich, Ng, Reid, Davenport, Kalagnanam, Lee & Chae (2003)
describe a web-based implementation of this procurement auction at Mars
Incorporated.
Eso, Ghosh, Kalagnanam & Lada´nyi (2005) also elaborate on the work of
Davenport & Kalagnanam (2002). They study a volume discount auction
with piece-wise linear supply curves, allowing discontinuities and all-unit dis-
counts. However, they do require additive separable supply curves, which
boils down to assuming that the prices charged by a supplier for different
commodities are independent. This makes their problem not truly combi-
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natorial, since synergies or substitutability between different items cannot
be reflected in the total price charged by the suppliers. As a result, a total
quantity discount structure is not possible in their setting. The authors
formulate a column generation based heuristic that provides near-optimal
solutions to the bid evaluation problem.
Another procurement auction with marginal decreasing piecewise-constant
supply curves is described in Kothari, Parkes & Suri (2003). This auction
also allows all-unit discounts, but it deals only with a single item. Kothari
et al. (2003) present fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for the
winner determination problem and the computation of the corresponding
payments of this auction.
Kim & Pardalos (2001) made a study of piecewise linear network flow prob-
lems, in which they identify a number of categories and for which they show
how they can be transformed to fixed charge network flow problems. In par-
ticular, the category with sawtooth arc cost functions is of interest to our
research, since it contains the TQD problem with a single item. However,
the authors do not consider a setting that could allow for total quantity
discounts over multiple items.
The TQD problem is also related to the so-called deal splitting problem in-
troduced by Shachnai, Shmueli & Sayegh (2004). In this problem, a buyer
needs to split an order of multiple units from a set of heterogeneous items
among a set of sellers, each having bounded amounts of the items, so as
to minimize the total cost of the deal. Two variants of the deal splitting
problem can be discerned, depending on whether the seller offers packages
containing combinations of the items or whether the buyer can generate such
combinations using seller-specified price tables. Shachnai et al. (2004) show
that for both variants an exact solution can be found in pseudo-polynomial
time if the number of heterogeneous items is fixed. Moreover, they develop
polynomial-time approximation schemes for several subclasses of instances
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of practical interest.
2.4 Mathematical formulation
To state a mathematical formulation of the winner determination problem
of the TQD auction, we use the following notation. We define G as the set
of m items, indexed by i, and B as the set of n suppliers, indexed by j. For
each item i in G, we define di as the amount of item i to be procured. Each
supplier j in B expresses maxj bids, which we index by k. Since each bid
defines exactly one volume interval, we can also use the index k to denote
the volume interval. In this way, for each supplier j ∈ B, ljk and ujk define
the minimum and maximum number of items respectively that needs to be
ordered according to bid k by supplier j. For simplicity, we assume that
the bids are ordered by increasing lower bound of the corresponding volume
interval. In this way, we have a sequence of intervals Zj = {1, ...,maxj},
indexed by k, with ljk < ljk′ if k < k′. Finally, for each supplier j ∈ B, for
each interval k ∈ Zj and each item i ∈ G, let cijk be the price for one unit
of item i purchased from supplier j according to his k-th bid.
We assume that these parameters satisfy the following assumptions:
∀j ∈ B, k 6= k′ ∈ Zj : [ljk, ujk) ∩ [ljk′ , ujk′) = ∅, (2.1)
∀j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj \ {maxj}, i ∈ G : cijk > ci,j,k+1, (2.2)
∀j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj , i ∈ G : cijk > 0, ljk > 0, ujk > 0, di > 0. (2.3)
Assumption (2.1) states that bids by the same supplier should not have
overlapping intervals. The requirement that prices should not increase from
one interval to the next is expressed in the second assumption. The last as-
sumption reflects that all prices and all quantities ordered are non-negative.
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We define the decision variable xijk as the amount of item i purchased from
supplier j according to the prices stated in his k-th bid. Further, we define a
binary decision variable yjk which is 1 if bid k is selected for supplier j and
0 otherwise. This leads to the following formulation of the TQD problem,
referred to as TQDF.
minimize ∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
cijkxijk (2.4)
subject to ∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xijk = di ∀i ∈ G (2.5)
∑
k∈Zj
yjk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B (2.6)
∑
i∈G
xijk − yjkljk > 0 ∀j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj (2.7)∑
i∈G
xijk − yjkujk 6 0 ∀j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj (2.8)
xijk > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj (2.9)
yjk ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ B, k ∈ Zj (2.10)
The objective function (2.4) states that the amount of items i ordered from
supplier j according to bid k, times the corresponding price must be min-
imal. Constraints (2.5) make sure that the demand for each item is met,
while constraints (2.6) guarantee that at most one bid per supplier is se-
lected. Constraints (2.7) and (2.8) ensure that if a bid k is selected as a
winning bid, the total amount of units purchased from supplier j is between
the bounds of the corresponding interval. If bid k is not selected, these
constraints ensure that xijk = 0. Constraints (2.9) state that only a non-
negative amount can be purchased, while constraints (2.10) define yjk as a
boolean variable. Notice that this formulation allows to order nothing from
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a supplier. Notice also that we do not require integrality of the x-variables;
if the demands and the lower and upper bounds of each volume interval are
integral, then, assuming the existence of a feasible solution, there always
exists an optimal solution of TQDF with integral x-values (see section 2.5).
Let us now discuss how this formulation relates to known classes of integer
programming formulations. The TQD problem is related to fixed charge
network flow problems (see Nemhauser & Wolsey (1988)). In fact, when
omitting constraints (2.6) from the formulation above, the resulting prob-
lem can be formulated as a (special) fixed charge network flow problem.
Indeed, when one builds a network involving a source with supply
∑
di, a
‘demand’ node for each item i with demand di, and an ‘interval’ node for
each interval of each supplier, the variable xijk in the formulation above
represents nothing else but the flow on the arc from an ‘interval’ node to a
‘demand’ node. In particular, this implies that inequalities that are valid for
this formulation of the fixed charge network flow problem are also valid for
TQDF. However, due to the presence of constraints (2.6), the TQDF for-
mulation is more general than a fixed charge network flow problem. Notice,
though, that in the objective function (2.4), there is no fixed cost associated
to choosing some interval of some supplier, i.e., in terms of the fixed charge
network flow problem, the fixed cost of using an arc is 0.
Finally, one can view the TQD problem as a direct generalization of the
ordinary, well-known, transportation problem: given a set of demand nodes,
each with demand di, given a set of supply nodes each with a supply between
a given lower bound lk and upper bound uk, given costs per item for each
combination of demand node and supply node, and finally, given a collection
of subsets of the supply nodes such that at most one node of each subset is
allowed to supply a positive amount, find a solution of minimum cost. TQD
belongs to this class of generalized transportation problems; as far as we are
aware, this problem has not been investigated before. Sun (2002) studies a
special case of this generalized transportation problem where for each de-
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mand node i, pairs of supply nodes are given such that at most one supply
node of each pair is allowed to supply demand node i. These constraints are
called exclusionary constraints and form the topic studied in chapter 5.
2.5 Properties of the TQD problem
In this section we establish the complexity of the TQD problem (section
2.5.1). We also show that the LP-relaxation of TQDF can be solved by
solving a min-cost flow problem (section 2.5.2).
2.5.1 On the complexity of the TQD problem
We show that the TQD problem is a hard problem to solve when aiming for
optimal solutions.
Theorem 1. The decision version of the TQD problem is strongly NP -
complete.
Proof. We define TQD’ as the decision version of the TQD problem, where
the question is whether it is possible to buy the required items at a given
total purchasing cost K. Obviously, TQD’ is in NP , since given a solution
it suffices to check the constraints and the value of the solution, which can
easily be done in polynomial time. The reduction is from the 3-dimensional
matching (3DM) problem.
The decision version of the 3DM problem is described as follows: given a set
M ⊆ X ×Y ×Z of triples, where each of the sets X, Y and Z has exactly q
elements, is there a matching in M that contains q triples? Every instance
of 3DM can be reduced to a TQD’ instance in polynomial time. Suppose
that the 3q elements of the sets X, Y , and Z correspond to 3q items and
that each 3-element subset in M corresponds to a supplier, so n = q and
m = 3q. Each supplier has 2 bids. The first bid has an interval with a lower
bound of 0 and an upper bound of 2. The price of each item in this bid is 1.
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The interval of the second bid has a lower bound of 3 and an upper bound
of ∞. The price of each item in this bid is also 1, except for the three items
in the 3-element subset corresponding to the supplier, each of which have
a price of 0. Each item needs to be purchased exactly once, i.e., di = 1,
∀i. The question is whether the TQD’ problem can be solved with a total
purchasing cost of 0.
Further, every yes-instance of 3DM corresponds to a yes-instance of TQD’.
A solution of 3DM consists of q 3-element subsets, corresponding to q sup-
pliers in the TQD’ problem. Purchasing from each of these suppliers exactly
the 3 items represented by the 3-element subset enables us to reach every
supplier’s second interval, where these 3 items can be bought at price 0.
Since every element of X ∪ Y ∪ Z occurs exactly once in the solution of
3DM, every item will also be purchased exactly once in the TQD’ solution.
Therefore, if 3DM has a solution, it can easily be transformed to a solution
of TQD’.
Vice versa, every yes-instance of TQD’ also corresponds to a yes-instance
of 3DM. A solution of the TQD’ problem consists of a number of selected
suppliers, together providing every item exactly once at a total cost of 0. If
a supplier would provide less than 3 items, the quorum to get in the second
interval would not be met, so the cost would not be 0. If the supplier would
provide more, the cost would also be strictly positive, because all but these
3 items still have a price of 1 in the second interval. Providing more than
one of the 0-priced items would violate the demand constraint stating that
each item is to be supplied exactly once. Therefore every selected supplier
provides precisely 3 items, namely those that have a price of 0 in the sec-
ond interval and since 3q items need to be provided, q suppliers must be
selected. Therefore, for each of the q suppliers selected in the solution of
the TQD’ problem, there is a corresponding 3-element set in M . Moreover,
these q triples define a matching, since every item is bought exactly once.
As a consequence, the decision version of the TQD problem is strongly NP -
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complete. ¤
In fact, we can also make the following statement on the approximability of
the TQD problem:
Theorem 2. No polynomial-time approximation algorithm with constant
worst-case ratio exists for the TQD problem (unless P = NP ).
Proof. Assume that a ρ-approximation algorithm for the TQD problem
exists. Consider now an instance of 3DM with M ⊆ X × Y × Z, and let us
build an instance of the TQD problem as in the proof of Theorem 1 with a
price of ρ+1 for any item bought in the first interval, or bought in the second
interval when not belonging to one of the three items of that supplier. Ob-
serve that this instance of the TQD problem either has an optimal solution
with cost 0 (namely when the 3DM-instance has a matching), or it has an
optimal solution with cost at least ρ+ 1 (when there is no matching in the
3DM instance). Thus, if there is a 3DM-matching the ρ-approximation algo-
rithm must return a zero-cost solution, which contradicts the NP -hardness
of 3DM. Hence such an algorithm cannot exist unless P = NP . ¤
Consider the following special case of the TQD problem, where the prices
stated in each bid are determined by the prices in the bid with the lowest
interval and a common discount rate δ. This discount rate δ determines the
price ci,j,k of item i in bid k as a function of the price in bid 1 as follows:
cijk = (1− δ)k−1ci,j,1 ∀i, j and ∀k > 1 (2.11)
We claim that this special case of the TQD problem is still a hard problem.
Theorem 3. The decision version of the TQD problem with a common
discount rate δ is strongly NP -complete.
Proof. In order to show this problem is NP -complete, we modify the re-
duction used in Theorem 1 as follows. As in Theorem 1, each supplier has 2
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intervals, the first interval ranges from 0 to 2 items, the second from 3 to an
unlimited amount of items. The prices of all items in the first interval are
2, except for the three items in the 3-element subset corresponding to the
supplier, each of which have a price of 1. Since all suppliers use a common
discount rate δ, the prices in the second interval are (1 − δ) for the three
items in the 3-element subset, and 2(1− δ) for the other items. Each item
still needs to be purchased exactly once. The question is now whether this
TQD problem can be solved with a total purchasing cost of m(1− δ). The
same reasoning as in Theorem 1 can be applied to verify that every yes-
instance of 3DM corresponds to a yes-instance of the TQD problem with
common discount rate and vice versa and that indeed the decision version
of the TQD problem with a common discount rate is strongly NP -complete.
¤
Finally, consider the variant of the TQD problem where the amounts pur-
chased must be at least as large as the demands di. In such a setting, it
might happen that buying more than what is strictly needed reduces the
total cost. We refer to this problem as the more-for-less variant of the TQD
problem (see section 3.2). For the special case of this variant where only
one item needs to be purchased, Chauhan, Eremeev, Romanova, Servakh &
Woeginger (2005) show that there exists a fully polynomial-time approxi-
mation scheme. We claim that this variant remains a hard problem.
Theorem 4. The decision version of the more-for-less variant of TQD prob-
lem is strongly NP -complete.
Proof. In the more-for-less setting, the buyer is allowed to purchase more
than di units of any item i in order to reduce the total cost. We can however
use the same reduction as in Theorem 3. Indeed, let each supplier have 2
bids, the first with an interval ranging from 0 to 2 items, the second with
an interval from 3 to an unlimited amount of items. Once again, the prices
of all items in both the first and second interval are 1, except for the three
items in the 3-element subset corresponding to the supplier, each of which
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have a price of (1− δ). The question remains whether it is possible to solve
this TQD problem with a total purchasing cost of m(1 − δ). Clearly this
can not be achieved by purchasing more than m units, which allows us to
conclude that every yes-instance of 3DM corresponds to a yes-instance of
the more-for-less variant and vice versa. Hence, the decision version of the
more-for-less variant of the TQD problem is strongly NP -complete. ¤
2.5.2 Min-cost flow and the winner determination problem
We now show that the LP-relaxation of TQDF can be solved by solving
a min-cost flow problem. In fact, even in the more general case where for
some suppliers the winning bids are prespecified, the LP-relaxation of the
resulting model can still be found by solving a min-cost flow problem. We
will use this result to construct an exact algorithm in chapter 4.
Let us first state a model which assumes that for an arbitrary given subset
of suppliers, referred to as D (D ⊆ B), a bid and its corresponding interval,
say s(j) ∈ Zj , has been selected, while for the remaining suppliers no bid
has been selected. We refer to the following formulation as GENTQDF.
minimize∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
cijkxijk (2.12)
subject to ∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xijk = di ∀i ∈ G (2.13)
∑
k∈Zj
yjk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \D (2.14)
∑
i∈G
xijk − yjkljk > 0 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (2.15)
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∑
i∈G
xijk − yjkujk 6 0 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (2.16)∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j) − lj,s(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ D (2.17)∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j) − uj,s(j) 6 0 ∀j ∈ D (2.18)
xijk > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (2.19)
xi,j,s(j) > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D (2.20)
xijk = 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, k 6= s(j) (2.21)
0 6 yjk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (2.22)
Observe that if D = ∅, the resulting model is the LP-relaxation of TQDF,
whereas if D = B, we arrive at the situation where an interval has been
selected for each supplier (see van de Klundert et al. (2005)). Introducing
D allows us to develop an enumerative algorithm solving only min-cost flow
problems (see chapter 4).
Theorem 5. GENTQDF can be polynomially transformed to min-cost flow.
Proof. We organize the proof by first showing that an optimal solution of
GENTQDF has a structural property. Then we construct a min-cost flow
instance and show the correspondence between optimal solutions of this in-
stance and GENTQDF.
Claim: There exists an optimal solution (x∗, y∗) of GENTQDF in which for
each j ∈ B \D:
x∗ijk = 0 ∀i ∈ G,∀k 6= maxj , and
y∗ij = 0 ∀k 6= maxj .
(2.23)
Thus, the claim states that there exists an optimal solution in which all x-
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and y-variables equal 0, except those corresponding to the highest interval
of each supplier. In other words, items are bought only at the lowest prices
of each supplier.
Argument: given some feasible solution (x, y) of GENTQDF, we show how
to modify (x, y) to (x∗, y∗) such that (x∗, y∗) is a feasible solution of GEN-
TQDF satisfying (2.23) and such that the cost of (x∗, y∗) does not exceed
the cost of (x, y).
For each i ∈ G and each j ∈ B \D, we set
x∗i,j,maxj =
maxj∑
k=1
xijk, and (2.24)
x∗ijk = 0 for k = 1, ...,maxj − 1. (2.25)
Further, for each j ∈ B \D, we set
y∗j,maxj = yj,maxj +
∑maxj−1
k=1
∑
i∈G xijk
uj,maxj
, and (2.26)
y∗jk = 0 for k = 1, ...,maxj − 1. (2.27)
All other variables remain the same, that is
x∗ijk = xijk ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, k ∈ Zj . (2.28)
It is obvious that the costs of (x∗, y∗) cannot exceed the costs of (x, y)
since the total amount of items has remained the same for each supplier,
while in (x∗, y∗) all items are purchased in the highest interval (and we have
ci,j,maxj 6 cijk ∀i, j, k, see (2.2)). Let us now argue that (x∗, y∗) is a feasible
solution of GENTQDF.
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Evidently, (x∗, y∗) satisfies (2.13), (2.17), (2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21).
To show that (x∗, y∗) satisfies ((2.14)) and ((2.22)), we need to show that
y∗j,maxj 6 1 for j ∈ B \ D. Observe that for k = 1, ...,maxj − 1 we have∑
i∈G xijk/ujk 6 yjk (using the feasibility of (x, y) with respect to ((2.16)))
and thus
∑
i∈G
xijk
ui,maxj
6 yjk for k = 1, ...,maxj − 1.
Summing over k = 1, ...,maxj−1 implies that
∑maxj−1
k=1 (
∑
i∈G xijk)/uj,maxj 6∑maxj−1
k=1 yjk and together with the feasibility of (x, y) with respect to (2.14),
this leads to (x∗, y∗) satisfying (2.14) and (2.22).
Consider now for some j ∈ B \ D constraints (2.15), written alternatively
as
∑
i∈G xijk > ljkyjk for k = 1, ...,maxj . In case k < maxj , the right-hand
side equals 0 (since y∗jk = 0 for k < maxj by construction) and feasibility
follows. In case k = maxj , we have, using feasibility of (x, y), that∑
i∈G
xi,j,maxj > lj,maxjyj,maxj . (2.29)
Also it is true that
maxj−1∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
xijk >
∑maxj−1
k=1
∑
i∈G xijk
uj,maxj
lj,maxj . (2.30)
Summing (2.29) and (2.30) yields:
∑
i∈G
x∗i,j,maxj =
∑
i∈G
(xi,j,maxj +
maxj−1∑
k=1
xijk)
> lj,maxj (yj,maxj +
maxj−1∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
xijk
uj,maxj
) = lj,maxjy
∗
j,maxj . (2.31)
Thus (x∗, y∗) satisfies constraints (2.15).
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To verify that (x∗, y∗) satisfies constraints (2.16), observe that for j ∈ B \D
and for k = 1, ...,maxj − 1, we have
∑
i∈G x
∗
ijk = 0 and y
∗
jk = 0 (this follows
by construction of x∗ and y∗). Finally, in case k = maxj we have∑
i∈G
xi,j,maxj 6 uj,maxjyj,maxj , and (2.32)
maxj−1∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
xijk =
∑maxj−1
k=1
∑
i∈G xijk
uj,maxj
uj,maxj . (2.33)
Summing (2.32) and (2.33) yields
∑
i∈G
x∗i,j,maxj =
∑
i∈G
(xi,j,maxj +
maxj−1∑
k=1
xijk)
6 uj,maxj (yj,maxj +
maxj−1∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
xijk
uj,maxj
) = uj,maxjy
∗
j,maxj , (2.34)
which shows that constraints (2.16) are also satisfied by (x∗, y∗) and allows
us to conclude that (x∗, y∗) is indeed a feasible solution of GENTQDF.
Property 2.23 allows us to simplify formulation (2.12)-(2.22) to the following
formulation, in which the y-variables no longer appear.
minimize∑
i∈G
∑
j∈D
ci,j,s(j)xi,j,s(j) +
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B\D
ci,j,maxjxi,j,maxj
(2.35)
subject to ∑
j∈D
xi,j,s(j) +
∑
j∈B\D
xi,j,maxj = di ∀i ∈ G (2.36)∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j) − lj,s(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ D (2.37)
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∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j) − uj,s(j) 6 0 ∀j ∈ D (2.38)∑
i∈G
xi,j,maxj − uj,maxj 6 0 ∀j ∈ B \D (2.39)
xi,j,maxj > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \D (2.40)
xijk = 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \D, k 6= maxj (2.41)
xijk = 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, k 6= s(j) (2.42)
Let us now build the network. We have three sets of nodes: there is a node
for each supplier (a ‘supplier node’), there is a node for each item (an ‘item
node’) and there is a single source node. The supply of the source node
equals
∑
i∈G di and the demand of each item node equals di. All other de-
mands are 0. Furthermore, there is an arc from the source node to each
supplier node. If this supplier is in D, the corresponding lower and upper
bounds of this arc are lj,s(j) and uj,s(j); if this supplier is not in D, the lower
and upper bounds are 0 and uj,maxj . The choice for a lower bound of 0 for
suppliers not in D, even if lj,1 is strictly positive, may seem surprising at
first sight. It can however be verified that because the y-values are relaxed
in GENTQDF, lj,1 no longer constrains the x-values. The cost of an arc
between the source node and each supplier node equals 0. There are also
arcs from each supplier node to each item node. These arcs are not con-
strained by lower or upper bounds, but do have a cost equal to ci,j,s(j) if
the corresponding supplier is in D and equal to ci,j,maxj if this supplier is
not in D. This completes the description of the min-cost flow instance. A
schematic representation is given in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: GENTQDF as min-cost flow
A solution of this min-cost flow instance is characterized by flows fji on each
arc from supplier j to item i. It corresponds to a solution of GENTQDF as
follows:
xi,j,s(j) = fji ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, (2.43)
xi,j,maxj = fji ∀i ∈ G, j /∈ D, (2.44)
yj,s(j) = 1 ∀j ∈ D, (2.45)
yj,maxj =
∑
i∈G
fji
uj,maxj
∀j /∈ D. (2.46)
All other x- and y-variables of GENTQDF are set equal to 0.
Given (2.23), we conclude that an optimal solution of the min-cost flow
problem in Figure 2.1 corresponds to an optimal solution of GENTQDF.
It can now easily be seen that an optimal solution of GENTQDF also cor-
responds to an optimal flow in the min-cost flow problem. Thus, we have
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shown how GENTQDF can be polynomially transformed to min-cost flow. ¤
Notice that property (2.23) hints that TQDF is a rather weak formulation.
Indeed, when solving the LP-relaxation, only the prices in the bidder’s most
interesting bid are considered. Moreover, only the upper bound of this bid
is respected; constraints (2.7) do not force the solution towards reaching the
lower bound in any way. Notice also that as a consequence of Theorem 5,
the LP-relaxation of TQDF can be found by solving a min-cost flow prob-
lem. This result is the foundation for an exact algorithm to be discussed in
chapter 4.
2.6 Conclusion
We presented a multi-item, multi-unit combinatorial auction, tailored for a
procurement problem where suppliers adopt a discount that depends on the
total quantity ordered. We discussed a number of examples from various do-
mains where suppliers use this discount policy in practice and we compared
our auction with other approaches used to solve procurement problems with
discounts. We showed that the winner determination problem that results
from this auction is NP -hard, and that this is also the case for a number of
special cases of this problem. Furthermore, we argued that no polynomial-
time algorithm for the TQD problem can achieve a constant worst-case ratio
(unless P = NP ), which contrasts with the case of a single item for which
Chauhan et al. (2005) established NP -hardness and gave a fully polyno-
mial time approximation scheme. Finally, we proved that (a generalization
of) the linear programming relaxation of a straightforward formulation of
the problem can be solved by solving a min-cost flow problem. Thus, we
showed that a combinatorial algorithm solves the LP-relaxation of the TQD
problem.
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Chapter 3
Variants of the TQD auction
When procuring items, other considerations besides the price can be rele-
vant. Although the total quantity discount auction does not incorporate
criteria like quality or reliability, we now consider a number of variants of
the TQD problem that are common in both procurement practice and liter-
ature. A first variant adds constraints on the amount of items the buyer is
willing to purchase from a supplier (section 3.1). In another variant (section
3.2), the buyer is allowed to buy more units of any item than strictly needed,
while the third variant (section 3.3) imposes a restriction on the number of
winning suppliers (suppliers that end up selling some amount of any of the
items are called winning suppliers). Finally, a variant that incorporates a
multi-period perspective with inventory costs is described (section 3.4). We
show that results similar to that of Theorem 5 hold for each of these variants.
3.1 Market share constraints
Suppose that the buyer wants to impose upper and/or lower bounds on the
amount of an item that must be ordered from a supplier. Forcing that some
supplier j must be allocated an amount of at least qij and at most Qij of
item i can be done by adding the following constraint to GENTQDF:
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qij 6
∑
k∈Zj
xijk 6 Qij . (3.1)
On a more global level the buyer could provide bounds on the total allocation
for a supplier, across all items. Forcing the total amount of items purchased
from a supplier j to lie between wj and Wj can be done by adding the
following constraint to GENTQDF:
wj 6
∑
i∈G
∑
k∈Zj
xijk 6Wj . (3.2)
These market share constraints are often mentioned in literature (see Dav-
enport & Kalagnanam (2002), Eso et al. (2005), Hohner et al. (2003), Katz
et al. (1994)). Notice that none of these extra constraints invalidate prop-
erty (2.23). Constraints (3.1) can easily be implemented in the min-cost flow
graph by changing the lower and upper bounds of the arcs from supplier j
to item i. Constraints (3.2) can be realized via the lower and upper bounds
of the arcs from the root node to supplier j. Thus, we obtain the following
statement:
Theorem 6. GENTQDF with constraints (3.1) and/or (3.2) can be poly-
nomially transformed to min-cost flow.
3.2 More-for-less
As described in section 2.5.1, it can be advantageous to obtain more of some
item i than the required amount di, since this might allow the buyer to use
the cheaper prices of a higher interval (see also Crama et al. (2004), Sadrian
& Yoon (1994)). If we wish to allow this, constraints (2.13) in GENTQDF
should be replaced by
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xijk > di ∀i ∈ G. (3.3)
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Notice that for the special case where D = ∅, all units are already bought
in the highest intervals in an optimal solution of GENTQDF (see (2.23)).
Therefore, there is no need to buy more than di of any item i, and an optimal
solution can be found by solving the min-cost flow problem in Figure 2.1.
In general however, we can formulate the following result:
Theorem 7. GENTQDF with constraints (2.13) replaced by (3.3) can be
polynomially transformed to min-cost flow.
Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 3.1. It has supplier and item nodes,
with demands and connecting arcs like in Figure 2.1. The lower and upper
bounds and the costs for these arcs are the same as in Figure 2.1 but in
order not to overload the figure, they have been omitted. There is however
also a dummy node, corresponding to the additional units of any item i that
are bought once the demand di is fulfilled. The dummy node has a demand
of M , being at least
∑
j∈D lj,s(j). The supply of the source node is increased
by this same amount M . Furthermore, there is an arc from the source node
to the dummy node with cost 0 and an upper bound of M . Notice that
any flow in the network in Figure 2.1 is still a feasible flow in the network
in Figure 3.1. There are also arcs from each supplier j ∈ D to the dummy
node. These arcs have a cost equal to the price of the supplier’s cheapest
item in its selected interval s(j). In Figure 3.1, we refer to this item as q(j),
i.e. q(j) = argmini ci,j,s(j). Notice that this is the item of which we will buy
additional units from that supplier to reach the threshold of a higher inter-
val; it would be pointless to buy a more expensive item instead to achieve
this. There are no arcs to the dummy node from suppliers not in D. Since
for these suppliers the items are already bought at their lowest prices (see
(2.23)), there is no use in buying additional items.
Observe that in GENTQDF it can happen that because of the interval se-
lections made for suppliers in D, no feasible solution exists. This is the case
if the demands di are not high enough to reach the required lower bounds of
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Figure 3.1: GENTQDF with more-for-less as min-cost flow
the selected intervals. In the more-for-less variant of GENTQDF, however,
this is no longer possible since it is allowed to buy more than the amounts
di. Indeed, these extra amounts correspond to the flows on the arcs from
suppliers in D to the dummy node. If we refer to the flow from a supplier
j to the dummy node as fjd, then a solution of the min-cost flow model in
Figure 3.1 corresponds to a solution of GENTQDF with constraints (2.13)
replaced by (3.3) as follows:
xi,j,s(j) = fji ∀i ∈ G \ {q(j)}, j ∈ D, (3.4)
xq(j),j,s(j) = fj,q(j) + fjd ∀j ∈ D, (3.5)
xi,j,maxj = fji ∀i ∈ G, j /∈ D, (3.6)
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yj,s(j) = 1 ∀j ∈ D, (3.7)
yj,maxj =
∑
i∈G
fji
uj,maxj
∀j /∈ D. (3.8)
¤
Until now, we implicitly made the assumption that the buyer can simply
buy more than what is demanded and enjoy a higher discount without any
further consequence. However, as described in Crama et al. (2004), in prac-
tice, overbuying often leads to an extra cost for the buyer. The buyer may
for instance need extra storage capacity. Furthermore, the buyer may not be
able to use the additional items as profitably as the items of the original de-
mand, or even be forced to pay a cost for the disposal of these items. Let us
assume that pi is this non-negative cost the buyer incurs for each additional
unit of item i, in addition to the purchasing cost. Let us define x′ijk as the
amount of item i that is bought in addition to the demand in the k-th inter-
val of supplier j. We can now generalize more-for-less GENTQDF as follows:
minimize∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
(cijkxijk + (cijk + pi)x′ijk) (3.9)
subject to∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xijk = di ∀i ∈ G (3.10)
∑
k∈Zj
yjk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \D (3.11)
∑
i∈G
(xijk + x′ijk)− yjkljk > 0 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (3.12)∑
i∈G
(xijk + x′ijk)− yjkujk 6 0 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (3.13)
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∑
i∈G
(xi,j,s(j) + x
′
i,j,s(j))− lj,s(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ D (3.14)∑
i∈G
(xi,j,s(j) + x
′
i,j,s(j))− uj,s(j) 6 0 ∀j ∈ D (3.15)
xijk > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (3.16)
x′ijk > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (3.17)
xijk = x′ijk = 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, k 6= s(j) (3.18)
0 6 yjk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \D, k ∈ Zj (3.19)
Consider a min-cost flow network like the one in Figure 3.1, but with the
difference that the cost on the arcs from supplier j ∈ D to the dummy node
equals cq(j),j,s(j) + pq(j), with
q(j) = argmin
i
(ci,j,s(j) + pi). (3.20)
Let us now argue how a solution of this min-cost flow network corresponds
to a solution of generalized more-for-less GENTQDF. It is clear that for
suppliers not in D, it remains pointless to buy any additional item, since
the buyer can already get the lowest possible price by ordering in the highest
intervals. Notice that property (2.23) thus remains valid. For suppliers for
which a winning bid has been prespecified, it can be necessary to buy ad-
ditional items, namely if the demands di are insufficiently high to reach the
lower bounds of the selected intervals. In this case, the buyer will obviously
buy the cheapest additional item, namely the item for which ci,j,s(j) + pi is
minimal. Notice that this is exactly how we defined q(j). It is now easy to
see that a solution f of the min-cost flow network corresponds to a solution
of generalized more-for-less GENTQDF as follows:
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xi,j,s(j) = fji ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, (3.21)
xi,j,maxj = fji ∀i ∈ G, j /∈ D, (3.22)
x′q(j),j,s(j) = fjd ∀j ∈ D, (3.23)
yj,s(j) = 1 ∀j ∈ D, (3.24)
yj,maxj =
∑
i∈G
fji
uj,maxj
∀j /∈ D. (3.25)
All other x-, x′- and y-variables are set equal to 0. Hence we have proven
the following theorem:
Theorem 8. The generalization of more-for-less GENTQDF can be poly-
nomially transformed to min-cost flow.
3.3 Limited number of winning suppliers
Another important consideration apart from cost minimization is to make
sure that the demand is not procured from too many suppliers (see also Dav-
enport & Kalagnanam (2002), Eso et al. (2005), Hohner et al. (2003), Katz
et al. (1994), Sadrian & Yoon (1994)). Otherwise, overhead costs increase
due to managing this large amount of suppliers. Limiting the total number
of winning suppliers can be done for the order as a whole (section 3.3.1) or
per item (section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Limited total number of winning suppliers
In order to model the requirement that a limited number of suppliers is
selected, we need to understand exactly when a supplier receives a positive
amount. This happens when yjk = 1 for some k, except possibly when
k = 1, and lj,1 = 0; the latter situation refers to the case where interval 1,
with a lower bound of 0, is selected. Then a supplier might receive nothing,
while there is a y-variable with a positive value. To handle this situation, we
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‘split’ each bid with an interval that has a lower bound of 0 and a positive
upper bound into two bids: one bid with an interval with a lower bound and
an upper bound of 0 (the dummy bid), and one bid with an interval with
a lower bound of 1 and an upper bound equal to the original upper bound
(interval 1). Notice that by setting this lower bound to 1, we assume that the
demands and the lower and upper bounds are or can be scaled to integers.
Thus, we have redefined interval 1 by excluding the option of a zero amount
of items. Moreover, we let yj,1 correspond to this new interval 1. Obviously,
selecting a supplier’s dummy bid comes down to not selecting this supplier
at all, in which case the supplier can simply be removed from the problem.
Selecting another bid of a supplier implies that this is a winning supplier.
This approach leads to a set D, containing only winning suppliers. In fact,
without loss of generality, we can now focus on constraining the winning
suppliers not in D, and limit their number to K by adding the following
constraint to GENTQDF:
∑
j∈B\D
∑
k∈Zj
yjk 6 K. (3.26)
If we assume that the highest volume interval of every supplier in B \D has
the same upper bound, we can prove a similar result to that of Theorem 5.
We refer to this common upper bound as umax. Given the fact that in most
real-life applications suppliers pose no upper bound at all to the amount of
items they are willing to sell, this assumption is quite reasonable.
Theorem 9. If umaxj = umax ∀j ∈ B \D, then GENTQDF with constraint
(3.26) added can be polynomially transformed to a min-cost flow problem.
Proof. First, notice that property (2.23) remains valid in this setting.
Indeed, given the x-values, we can find y-values for each supplier j ∈ B \D
and each volume interval k ∈ Zj satisfying constraints (2.15) and (2.16) in
the following interval:
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[
∑
i∈G xijk
ujk
,
∑
i∈G xijk
ljk
]. (3.27)
Naturally, in order to fulfill constraints (2.22), the y-values cannot exceed
1. It is easy to verify that shifting items from a supplier’s highest interval
to one or more lower intervals can never decrease the total y-value of this
supplier. Therefore, constraint (3.26) will never force the optimal solution
of GENTQDF away from the highest intervals and property (2.23) still holds.
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Figure 3.2: GENTQDF with a limited number of winning suppliers as min-cost
flow
We can now construct a min-cost flow network (see Figure 3.2). Compared
to Figure 2.1, an extra node, referred to as node E, is added. The arc from
the root node to node E has an upper bound of Kumax, and the arcs from
node E to the supplier nodes have upper bounds of umax.
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Let dmin be the minimal amount of items that needs to be purchased
from suppliers not in D in order to have a feasible solution, i.e., dmin =
max(
∑
i∈G di −
∑
j∈D uj,s(j), 0). The min-cost flow problem can only be in-
feasible if this demand dmin is too high for the upper bounds on the arcs,
i.e., if dmin > Kumax. In this case however, GENTQDF with constraint
(3.26) is infeasible as well. Indeed, even when choosing the y-values as low
as possible, namely as fj/umax, we fail to meet constraint (3.26):
∑
j∈B\D
∑
k∈Zj
yjk =
∑
j∈B\D
fj/umax
> dmin/umax
> K.
If there exists a feasible flow f to the min-cost flow problem, then we can
always find a solution to GENTQDF with constraint (3.26) by setting the
x- and y-variables as in (2.43)-(2.46). From Theorem 5, it is clear that this
solution satisfies (2.13)-(2.22). Let dmax be the maximal amount of items
that can be purchased from suppliers not in D in order to keep the solution
feasible, i.e., dmax =
∑
i∈G di −
∑
j∈D lj,s(j). Obviously, a feasible flow will
have dmax 6 Kumax. Therefore, the resulting y-variables will also satisfy
(3.26), as shown below:
∑
j∈B\D
∑
k∈Zj
yjk =
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B\D
fj,i/umax
6 dmax/umax
6 K.
Notice that this proof no longer holds when each supplier j has an arbitrary
value for umaxj . For instance, if we set the upper bound on the arc from
the source to node E equal to the sum of the K highest upper bounds, then
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it may happen that there exists a feasible flow f such that the correspond-
ing x- and y-variables according to (2.43)-(2.46) are no feasible solution to
GENTQDF. Indeed, consider the setting in Figure 3.3, assuming K = 1. A
flow of 2 to node E, splitting into flows of 1 to supplier 1 and supplier 2 is
feasible to the min-cost flow model. However, its corresponding y-values in
GENTQDF, 0.5 and 1 respectively, clearly violate constraint (3.26). Analo-
gously, setting the upper bound of the arc to node E equal to the sum of the
K lowest upper bounds results in the existence of a solution of GENTQDF
for which the corresponding flow is no feasible solution of the min-cost flow
model.
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Figure 3.3: Necessity of common umaxj
Property (2.23) is crucial for the possibility to use min-cost flow to solve LP-
relaxations of GENTQDF-type formulations. For instance, one could also
argue that the number of winning suppliers must be at least a minimum
number, say L. Indeed, depending on too few suppliers could move the
buyer in a vulnerable position if one of these suppliers is unable to supply
as agreed. This could be encoded by adding the following constraint to
GENTQDF:
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
yjk > L. (3.28)
Property (2.23) is however no longer valid in this setting, since constraint (3.28)
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pushes the optimal solution away from the highest intervals. Indeed, moving
the items towards one or more lower intervals can increase the total y-value
of each supplier. This is illustrated by the following example.
Supplier A Supplier B Supplier C
Interval 1-10 1-10 1-5 6-10
Unit cost 5 1 3 2
Consider a setting where 14 units of one single item need to be bought from
three suppliers with volume intervals and costs as indicated in the table
above. Also, we wish to order from at least 2 suppliers (L = 2). Solving
GENTQDF for this example results in the following optimal solution:
xA = 0 yA = 0
xB = 10 yB = 1
xC1 = 0.4 yC1 = 0.4
xC2 = 3.6 yC2 = 0.6
It is clear that property (2.23) is not valid for this solution, since it makes
use of supplier C’s lowest interval. Especially the fact that the optimal so-
lution makes use of more than one interval per supplier, prevents us from
following a similar reasoning as in Theorem 5 to transform this variant to a
min-cost flow problem.
3.3.2 Limited number of winning suppliers per item
Suppose now that the buyer is interested in limiting the number of win-
ning suppliers for one or more specific items only. Forcing that item i can
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be supplied by at most Qi suppliers can be done by adding the following
constraints to TQDF:
zij 6
∑
k∈Zj
xijk 6Mijzij ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B (3.29)
∑
j∈B
zij 6 Qi ∀i ∈ G (3.30)
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B. (3.31)
We introduced a new binary variable zij which is 1 if supplier j procures
at least 1 unit of item i and 0 otherwise. This is guaranteed by constraints
(3.29) and (3.31). In constraint (3.29), the parameter Mij can be set equal
to min(di, umaxj ). Constraints (3.30) state that no more than Qi suppliers
should procure item i. We refer to TQDF with constraints (3.29)-(3.31)
added as TQDF’.
We now generalize TQDF’ by assuming that for some suppliers an interval
is prespecified. Additionally, we assume that some zij variables get value
1 beforehand, some zij variables get value 0, whilst for others no value is
prespecified. When also the y- and z-variables are relaxed, so that they can
take any value between 0 and 1, this results in a relaxation of this general-
ization of TQDF’, to which we refer as GENTQDF’.
It can easily be verified that property (2.23) remains valid for GENTQDF’.
Indeed, also in this setting we can improve any solution that makes use of
intervals other than the highest by shifting items bought in these intervals
to the highest interval. As we argued in Theorem 5, it is always possible
to adjust the y-variables in such a way that the solution remains feasible.
Furthermore, this shift has no influence at all on the z-variables, since the
x-variables are summed over all intervals in constraints (3.29).
We can now construct a min-cost flow network like in Figure 2.1. However,
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for this variant, the arc from a supplier j to an item node i has a lower bound
of 1 and an upper bound of Mij if supplier j is chosen to be one of the Qi
suppliers that will be procuring item i. On the other hand, if supplier j is
chosen not to be part of the winning suppliers for item i, the arc from node j
to node i is deleted. A solution of this min-cost flow problem is characterized
by flows fji on each arc from supplier j to item i. This solution corresponds
to the x- and y-variables of the optimal solution of GENTQDF’ as indicated
in (2.43) to (2.46). The z-variables in GENTQDF’ follow from the min-cost
flow solution as follows:
zij =
fji
Mij
∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B. (3.32)
Indeed, constraints (3.30) force the z-variables towards the lowest value they
can get, which is
∑
k∈Zj xijk/Mij . However, from property (2.23), it follows
that
∑
k∈Zj xijk equals xi,j,s(j) for suppliers in D and xi,j,maxj for those
not in D, which is exactly fji (see (2.43) and (2.44)). Thus we obtain the
following statement:
Theorem 10. GENTQDF’ can be polynomially transformed to min-cost
flow.
3.4 Multi-period procurement
A lot of research on quantity discount policies has been done in the context
of lot sizing problems (see e.g. Xu, Lu & Glover (2000)). Lot sizing prob-
lems typically deal with when to order what amount of items and include
inventory costs. Whereas in the basic TQD auction we assumed a single-
period perspective, we generalize to an auction that handles a multi-period
procurement problem in this variant. Indeed, it no longer suffices for the
buyer to decide what items to purchase from what supplier, but the buyer
also needs to decide when to order what items, taking into account the in-
ventory costs.
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We define P as a series of r periods, indexed by p. For each item i, dip is
now the demand for item i in period p. We also define hip as the cost of
holding one unit of item i in inventory at the end of period p. Each bid k
is valid only in a period p and consists of a lower bound ljkp and an upper
bound ujkp, and values cijkp as the price of purchasing one unit of item i in
period p according to bid k by supplier j. In order to model this variant, we
need to generalize the x- and y-variables with an extra index p, referring to
the period in which the item is bought. We also generalize the set D to Dp,
being the set of suppliers for which an interval has been prespecified for the
period p. We refer to this interval as s(j, p). We also introduce the variable
vip as the inventory of item i at the end of period p. The generalized formu-
lation, to which we refer as multi-period GENTQDF then looks as follows:
minimize
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
∑
p∈P
cijkpxijkp +
∑
i∈G
∑
p∈P
hipvip
(3.33)
subject to
vi,1 =
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xi,j,k,1 − di,1 ∀i ∈ G (3.34)
vip = vi,p−1 +
∑
j∈B
∑
k∈Zj
xijkp − dip ∀i ∈ G, p ∈ P (3.35)
∑
k∈Zj
yjkp 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \Dp, p ∈ P (3.36)
∑
i∈G
xijkp − yjkpljkp > 0 ∀j ∈ B \Dp, k ∈ Zj , p ∈ P (3.37)∑
i∈G
xijkp − yjkpujkp 6 0 ∀j ∈ B \Dp, k ∈ Zj , p ∈ P (3.38)
56 3.4. Multi-period procurement
∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j,p),p − lj,s(j,p),p > 0 ∀j ∈ Dp (3.39)∑
i∈G
xi,j,s(j,p),p − uj,s(j,p),p 6 0 ∀j ∈ Dp (3.40)
xijkp > 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B \Dp, k ∈ Zj , p ∈ P (3.41)
xijkp = 0 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ Dp, k 6= s(j, p), p ∈ P (3.42)
0 6 yjkp 6 1 ∀j ∈ B \Dp, k ∈ Zj , p ∈ P (3.43)
Generalizing from (2.23), we claim that there exists an optimal solution
(x∗, y∗) of multi-period GENTQDF in which for each p ∈ P and for each
j ∈ B \Dp :
x∗ijkp = 0 ∀i ∈ G, k 6= maxj , and
y∗jkp = 0 ∀k 6= maxj .
(3.44)
Notice that this claim can be proven in a similar way as (2.23).
Let us now construct a min-cost flow problem similar to the one in Fig-
ure 2.1, but now there are supplier nodes (j, p) for each supplier j in each
period p. Also, there are item nodes for each item in each period. Each
item node (i, p), corresponding with item i in period p, has a demand of
dip. The source node has a supply equal to
∑
i∈G
∑
p∈P dip. There are arcs
from a supplier node (j, q) to an item node (i, r) if q 6 r. These arcs have
a cost equal to ci,j,s(j,q),q +
∑r−1
p=q hip if the corresponding supplier is in Dq
and equal to ci,j,maxj ,q +
∑r−1
p=q hip if this supplier is not in Dq. A schematic
representation is given in Figure 3.4. However, in order not to overload the
figure, only one supplier and one item are drawn. Also, we assume that for
this supplier no interval is prespecified for any period.
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Figure 3.4: Multi-period GENTQDF as min-cost flow
A solution of the min-cost flow network in Figure 3.4 is characterized by
flows fjp from the source node to each supplier node (j, p) and by flows fjpiq
from supplier node (j, p) to item node (i, q). This solution can be written
as a solution of multi-period GENTQDF as follows:
xi,j,s(j,p),p =
r∑
q=p
fjpiq ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ D, p ∈ P , (3.45)
xi,j,maxj ,p =
r∑
q=p
fjpiq ∀i ∈ G, j /∈ D, p ∈ P , (3.46)
yj,s(j,p),p = 1 ∀j ∈ Dp, ∀p ∈ P , (3.47)
yj,maxj ,p =
fjp
uj,maxj ,p
∀j /∈ Dp, ∀p ∈ P . (3.48)
All other x- and y-variables of multi-period GENTQDF are set equal to 0.
The v-variables can now be computed from the x-variables using 3.34 and
3.35.
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Theorem 11. Multi-period GENTQDF can be polynomially transformed to
min-cost flow.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we recognized that in practice, the price of the items is often
not the only criterion upon which the supplier selection decision is based. In
chapter 2, we assumed that a preselection of suppliers was made, excluding
those suppliers from the auction, who do not satisfy whatever criterion the
buyer deems important. However, with this approach, a number of the
buyer’s concerns cannot be dealt with. A buyer may wish to place bounds
on the market share that a bidder can or should obtain. The buyer may
also want to purchase more units of any item than originally planned, if
this leads to a lower total cost. We also consider a setting where the buyer
needs to pay a disposal cost for the extra units bought. Furthermore, the
buyer may want to impose a maximum number of winning suppliers (per
item or in total) to avoid large overhead costs. Finally, in practice, the buyer
is often confronted with a procurement problem that keeps recurring over
time. In this setting, the buyer also needs to decide when the items should
be purchased, finding a balance between discounts and holding costs. We
extended the winner determination problem of the total quantity discount
auction to take into account these concerns. We also showed that for each
of these variants, property (2.23) still holds, which will turn out to be useful
for solving the winner determination problem in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Exact algorithms for the
TQD auction
In this chapter we describe the three exact algorithms used to solve the
winner determination problem of the TQD auction and its variants. We
discuss an LP based branch-and-bound algorithm (section 4.1), a min-cost
flow based branch-and-bound algorithm (section 4.2), and a branch-and-
cut algorithm (section 4.3). We use these algorithms to solve a number
of generated instances and discuss the resulting computational results in
section 4.4.
4.1 LP based branch-and-bound
Branch-and-bound is probably the most widely used technique for solving
integer programming problems. To find an optimal integral solution, it
typically does a stepwise partitioning of the solution space. The branch-
and-bound algorithm can be represented by a tree. In the root node, a
relaxation of the original problem is solved. A relaxation is a simplification
of the problem, for instance by discarding a number of constraints. If this
relaxation does not render an integral solution, the solution space needs to
be partitioned in two or more mutually exclusive subsets. Each of these
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subsets is represented by child node. This partitioning phase is what we call
branching.
If a node results in an integral solution, no further partitioning is needed.
Either, this solution is better than the best solution found so far (i.e. the
incumbent) and thus replaces it as incumbent, or it is not, in which case it
can be discarded (pruned). If a fractional solution is found, the node needs
to be partitioned further unless we can show that none of its descendants
can result in a solution better than the incumbent. This can be done by
computing a bound on the best solution that can be reached from this node.
The objective function value of the node is an example of such a bound. If
a node turns out to be infeasible, it can be pruned as well.
If all generated nodes are considered, the algorithm ends and the incumbent
is an optimal solution. Thus, a branch-and-bound algorithm implicitly enu-
merates all possible solutions. Of course, the less nodes are generated, the
less computation time will typically be needed to find the optimal solution.
Notice that this is to a great extent determined by the way in which the
partitioning is done and by the choice of which node to consider next. Fur-
thermore, a tight bound will allow nodes to be pruned quickly, but may also
require a lot of computation time. A thorough discussion of branch-and-
bound can be found in Wolsey (1998), Johnson, Nemhauser & Savelsbergh
(2000), and Linderoth & Savelsbergh (1999).
We apply the branch-and-bound approach to the TQD problem, by relaxing
the integrality constraints (2.10), such that in each node a linear program-
ming problem is solved. We refer to this algorithm as the linear programming
based branch-and-bound algorithm and implemented it using Ilog Cplex 8.1.
To decide on which variable to branch, Ilog Cplex uses strong branching.
Strong branching selects a branching variable after evaluating the actual
objective degradations that occur when forcing variables to integer values.
A variable y with fractional LP value yˆ is tested by temporarily introduc-
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ing a lower bound dyˆe and subsequently an upper bound byˆc, and solving
the relaxations. In order to reduce the required computation time, only a
restricted subset of the variables with fractional values are considered, and
a limited number of simplex iterations are performed to estimate the effect
on the objective function. Strong branching and other branching rules are
discussed in more detail in Achterberg, Koch & Martin (2005). In order
to select the node that is to be analyzed first, Ilog Cplex uses best bound
search, which means that the node with the best objective function will be
selected (generally near the top of the tree).
In order to solve the variants of the TQD auction, it suffices to add or alter
the relevant constraints in the formulation, as discussed in chapter 3. The
branch-and-bound algorithm can still be performed on the resulting model.
Notice however that for the setting with a limited number of suppliers per
item, constraints (3.31) should be relaxed.
4.2 Min-cost flow based branch-and-bound
In this section, we discuss a branch-and-bound algorithm, where in every
node of the branching tree a min-cost flow problem needs to be solved. This
algorithm is based on Theorem 5, which states that GENTQDF can be poly-
nomially transformed to min-cost flow. In the root node, the LP relaxation
of the TQD problem is solved as explained in section 2.5.2. If this results in
a fractional solution, we branch by selecting a bidder and creating a branch
for every bid by this bidder. In the resulting child nodes, we enforce that this
bid is a winning bid. In this way, however, we cannot impose that nothing
at all is ordered from this bidder, unless he has a bid with a lower bound of
zero. Therefore, for bidders without a bid with a lower bound of zero, we
create a dummy bid with a lower and an upper bound of zero, and an index
of zero. Selecting this bid then enforces that the corresponding supplier is
not to be used in the solution.
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In order to select a supplier, we compute for each supplier, the sum of its
x-values. We now find the bid for which this sum lies between its lower and
upper bound, or, if no such bid exists, the bid for which the sum lies closest
to either its upper or lower bound. We refer to the interval of this bid as the
LP-interval. We can now compute for each supplier its priority as the num-
ber of volume intervals minus the index of the LP-interval. Thus, suppliers
that express a lot of bids but receive little in the LP-relaxation, are accorded
a high priority. We use this priority to build up the search tree, as we start
with the supplier with the highest priority, creating branches from the root
node for each of its intervals. In the node from the first branch, we fix the
LP-interval of the supplier with the highest priority. In the next branch of
that level, we fix the interval directly above this interval; in the following
branch and still within this level, we fix the interval directly below it and so
on (provided that these intervals exist). In the following level of the branch-
ing tree we continue with the supplier with the second highest priority, again
branching on its intervals as just explained, and so on (see Figure 4.1). If a
supplier has only one interval, with a lower bound of zero, there is no need
to create a node in the branching tree for this supplier, since we can fix his
interval right away. In this way, every level in the branching tree corresponds
to a supplier, and there is a branch for every volume interval of that supplier.
In each node, the LP relaxation given the intervals fixed by the branch-
ing decisions, is used as an upper bound of the best solution that can still
be reached further down the tree. To traverse the tree, we use a standard
depth-first search strategy, such that the supplier with the highest prior-
ity and its bid lying closest to the LP solution are explored first. Notice
that the tree is completely determined after solving the root node. We ex-
perimented with recomputing the priorities in each node and thus building
the tree dynamically, but it turned out that this did not reduce the size
of the tree enough to compensate for the extra time needed to recompute
the priorities. We experimented with other priority settings based on the
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Figure 4.1: Branching tree for min-cost flow based branch-and-bound
sum of the x-values and the number of bids, but the choice described above
seems to work best. A partial explanation for this observation can be that
in the current priority setting, suppliers who receive little are explored first.
Given a good solution, the other branches of this supplier should be elimi-
nated by the resulting bound. Finally, we use the solution of the previously
solved min-cost flow problem as a starting solution for the next min-cost
flow problem that needs to be solved (according to the depth first strategy).
Since these problems differ only by some bounds and prices that have been
changed, this results in a considerable decrease of the computation time.
The branching tree for both the market share and the more-for-less variant
is very similar. In the first variant, we prune the tree by deleting those bids
with volume intervals that fall outside the range imposed by the market-
share constraints. Afterwards, we can adapt the upper and lower bounds of
the highest and lowest interval respectively according to the market share
constraints. As a result, the branching tree will typically have less nodes at
comparable depths in the market share variant than in the basic case. In the
more-for-less variant on the other hand, the branching tree will in general
have more nodes at comparable depths compared to its counterpart in the
basic case, because less nodes are infeasible in the more-for-less setting. The
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branching tree for the variant that limits the number of winning suppliers
to K differs from the branching tree of the basic case, because for every
supplier, we need a dummy interval to impose that this supplier is not to
be used in the solution (see also section 3.3). Thus, whereas suppliers with
only one interval, which has a lower bound of zero, are left out of the tree
completely in the basic case, they now appear in the tree with two branches,
representing the decision to buy from that supplier or not. On the other
hand, a node needs no further branching as soon as K suppliers have been
selected.
The min-cost flow based branch-and-bound algorithm has been programmed
in C and compiled using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0. To solve the min-cost
flow problems, we have used the network solver of Ilog Cplex 8.1.
4.3 Branch-and-cut
Branch-and-cut is in fact a combination of branch-and-bound and a cut-
ting plane algorithm. When confronted with a fractional solution, a cutting
plane algorithm tries to find a valid inequality that is violated by this frac-
tional solution. The problem of finding such a violated valid equality (if it
exists) is known as the separation problem. By repeatedly adding violated
constraints, the algorithm converges towards an optimal integral solution.
Cutting plane algorithms were first proposed by Gomory (1963); they tend
to converge slowly. Moreover, without a special structure, the separation
problem may be hard to deal with. For a further discussion of the separa-
tion problem, we refer to Wolsey (1998) or Nemhauser & Wolsey (1988).
A cutting plane method can be very useful when combined with a branch-
and-bound algorithm. Indeed, cutting planes can be used to strengthen
the linear programming relaxations used for bounding. This makes it a
much more powerful method than branch-and-bound alone. Whereas cut-
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ting planes can result in a considerable reduction in the size of the tree,
finding adequate cutting planes can also be very time consuming. This ex-
plains why many branch-and-cut algorithms do not perform a cut generation
phase in every node of the branching tree. A more thorough discussion of
branch-and-cut can be found in e.g. Mitchell (2002).
We implemented the branch-and-cut algorithm by simply using the default
settings of the MIP solver of Ilog Cplex 8.1. These default setting include
the use of so-called flow cover cuts (see Nemhauser & Wolsey (1988)) that
are valid for the TQD problem and its variants.
4.4 Computational results
In this section we discuss the choices that were made to construct the in-
stances on which the algorithms have been tested. We continue with com-
putational results for the TQD problem and its variants and evaluate the
performance of our algorithms.
4.4.1 Structure of the instances
In order to test the performance of the exact algorithms, two types of in-
stances have been generated: completely random instances and instances
with a special structure, inspired by the instances studied by van de Klun-
dert et al. (2005). All instances have 10, 20, or 50 suppliers and 40 or 100
items. Furthermore, each supplier has a maximum of 3 or 5 bids. For all
instances, the total demand for an item is a random number between 1000
and 10000 units. For instances with 40 items, the upper bound increase
from one interval to the next is a random number between 10000 and 50000,
while for instances with 100 items, the upper bound increase is a random
number between 10000 and 100000.
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For structured instances, we first determine a base price for each item, ran-
domly picked between 3 and 7. The price for an item in a supplier’s first
interval is then computed by adding a random number in the interval [−2, 2]
to the base price. Furthermore, for each supplier j there is a discount rate
δjk ∈ [0, 0.1] for every interval k > 1, which determines the price cijk of item
i in interval k as a function of the price in interval k − 1 as follows:
cijk = (1− δjk)ci,j,k−1 ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B and ∀k > 1 (4.1)
For random instances, the cost of purchasing an item from a supplier in its
first interval is a random number between 2 and 8. The price for this item
in each of the next intervals is computed by discounting the price in the
previous interval by a percentage picked randomly between 0 and 75%.
The key difference between the random and the structured instances is that
for the former instances prices can drop drastically from one interval to the
next, whereas for the latter this decrease in price is limited to 10%. Further-
more, for the structured instances, an item that is expensive at one supplier
will very likely be expensive at the other suppliers too. For the random
instances however, this is not necessarily the case as prices for an item can
differ in a wider range between the various suppliers. Finally, the discount
percentage one receives when moving from one interval to the next can dif-
fer substantially between the items for the random instances, while it is the
same for all the items for the structured instances.
In the variant with the market share constraints, only global constraints (as
in (3.2)) are included. For the instances with 10 suppliers, 5 suppliers are
picked randomly and between 5 and 20 percent of the total demand needs to
be purchased from each of those suppliers. For instances with 20 suppliers,
we pick 10 suppliers and force between 5 and 15 % of the total demand
to go to each of them and for the instances with 50 suppliers this becomes
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15 suppliers with each 5 to 10 % of the total demand. The more-for-less
variant needs no extra modifications, apart from allowing to buy more than
what is demanded. For the third variant, the number of winning suppliers
is limited to 5 for all instances. If an instance has no solution with only 5
winning suppliers, the interval thresholds are doubled for each supplier until
a solution exists.
4.4.2 Results
The results of our experiments are summarized in tables 4.1 to 4.4. The in-
stances are coded with ‘S’ for structured and ‘R’ for random instances. The
first number indicates the number of bidders, the second number reflects the
number of items and the third number is the maximal number of bids per
supplier. For each of these types of instances, 10 instances were generated
and solved with the three algorithms. This resulted in computation times
(in seconds) and a number of nodes searched in the branching tree for each
algorithm, averaged per type of instance in the tables. All computations
were done on a Pentium IV 2 GHz computer, with 512 Mb RAM.
In Table 4.1, the results for the winner determination problem of the basic
TQD auction are presented. Each algorithm solves all instances in a reason-
able amount of time; random instances seem to be harder to solve than the
structured ones. The min-cost flow based algorithm clearly performs best in
terms of computation time for all instances with 10 or 20 suppliers. However,
instances with 50 suppliers prove to be harder to solve with this algorithm.
The solution time per node is undoubtedly the smallest with the min-cost
flow approach (about 10 times smaller than with the linear programming
based branch-and-bound algorithm and 100 to up to 2000 times smaller than
with the branch-and-cut approach). However, the min-cost flow approach
also needs to investigate more nodes than the other two exact algorithms.
Comparing the LP based approach with the min-cost flow based approach
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learns that the former is faster if it needs to explore at least 10 times less
nodes. The branch-and-cut approach clearly searches the least amount of
nodes, but to achieve this it needs a time-consuming cut generation process.
The results show that it pays to generate cuts when the number of suppliers
is large.
The results of our experiments with the variant with market share con-
straints are summarized in Table 4.2. As in the basic case, the random
instances require more computation time than the structured ones. Market
share constraints are problematic for the branch-and-cut algorithm, whose
computation times sometimes even double compared to the basic case. The
linear programming based branch-and-bound algorithm deals with these
constraints much better, since it manages to solve the instances faster than in
the basic case. The results show, however, that the min-cost flow algorithm
is the obvious algorithm to deal with instances of this variant. Especially
for the instances with 50 suppliers, adding market share constraints causes
the computations times to slump compared to the basic case. Moreover, less
nodes need to be searched, which can be explained by the construction of
the branching tree as described in section 4.2.
Table 4.3 shows the results for the more-for-less variant. It turns out that in
none of the structured instances purchasing extra items leads to a lower to-
tal cost. In the random instances however, it is profitable in more than 85%
of the instances to buy more than strictly needed. This is explained by the
fact that discounts are substantially larger for the random cases than for the
structured instances (see section 4.4.1). As in the basic case, it seems to be
the case that the LP based algorithm is outperformed by the min-cost flow
based approach, as long as the latter does not require over 10 times more
nodes than the former. Thus, the min-cost flow based algorithm performs
best on all instances with 10 or 20 suppliers, but for the instances with 50
suppliers, it is advisable to use the linear programming based branch-and-
bound algorithm. Compared to the basic case, the min-cost flow algorithm
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needs to explore slightly more nodes, resulting in a higher computation time.
Apart from the random instances with 50 suppliers, which seem very difficult
for all algorithms, this increase in computation time remains very modest.
The linear programming based branch-and-bound algorithm is not affected
too much either. The branch-and-cut algorithm however deals poorly with
this variant.
Finally, Table 4.4 describes the results for the variant that limits the number
of winning suppliers. This constraint proved to be binding for more than 98%
of the structured instances but less than 50% of the random instances. For
the random instances, the prices drop sharper from one interval to the next,
which makes it more interesting to go for the higher intervals. This leads
to an optimal solution with less suppliers than for the structured instances.
This explains why a constraint limiting the number of winning suppliers less
often affects the random instances. As for the computation times, branch-
and-cut seems the best option for the structured instances. For the random
instances, the picture is less clear. The instances with 10 suppliers are best
solved with the min-cost flow algorithm, although this algorithm is left far
behind by the other two for the instances with 20 suppliers. For these in-
stances, branch-and-bound based on linear programming outperforms the
other algorithms for instances where suppliers can have up to 5 volume in-
tervals. Branch-and-cut is the fastest approach to solve random instances
with 20 suppliers and up to 3 volume intervals per supplier. Notice that no
instances with 50 suppliers are mentioned in this table, because the com-
putation times for these problems were impractically high for all algorithms.
4.5 Conclusion
We described three exact algorithms for solving the winner determination
problem of the total quantity discount auction and its variants. One algo-
rithm is based on our result that the problem can be solved by solving a num-
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ber of min-cost flow problems; the other two algorithms are a branch-and-cut
and an linear programming based branch-and-bound algorithm. The algo-
rithms were tested on fairly large randomly generated instances of the basic
problem and three variants.
Our computational results show that all three algorithms came to an exact
solution in a reasonable amount of time. However, it also became clear that
each algorithm has instances for which it performs best. In general, the
min-cost flow based algorithm works best for instances where the number of
suppliers does not exceed 20 (which seems to correspond to most practical
cases). It works especially well for the variant where we imposed constraints
on the market share a supplier is allowed to obtain. The branch-and-cut
algorithm outperforms the other algorithms on large instances in terms of
suppliers of the basic case and on the structured instances of the variant
that requires a limited amount of winning suppliers. Finally, the linear pro-
gramming based branch-and-bound algorithm is at its best with the large
instances of the variant where the buyer is allowed to purchase more than
strictly needed.
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lp b&b mcf b&b branch&cut
Instances time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes
S-10-40-3 0.08 29.3 0.01 116.6 0.09 0.3
S-10-40-5 0.11 52.5 0.02 161.1 0.15 10.9
S-10-100-3 0.11 17.2 0.02 69.8 0.12 0.2
S-10-100-5 0.36 74.3 0.14 501.6 0.55 3.2
S-20-40-3 0.16 73.5 0.07 389.2 0.12 0.5
S-20-40-5 0.58 207.3 0.38 1,887.8 0.50 4.7
S-20-100-3 0.57 128.8 0.30 749.6 0.34 1.3
S-20-100-5 1.07 155.1 0.67 1,512.8 1.17 2.1
S-50-40-3 1.92 719.0 5.61 16,671.8 0.51 2.7
S-50-40-5 7.81 2,087.2 32.93 85,210.4 2.99 16.5
S-50-100-3 4.67 696.1 21.81 26,595.3 1.45 2.1
S-50-100-5 24.41 2,614.0 159.77 168,181.3 10.45 14.7
R-10-40-3 0.07 24.3 0.01 54.9 0.09 2.1
R-10-40-5 0.31 160.7 0.07 428.9 0.59 30.5
R-10-100-3 0.10 10.1 0.02 46.9 0.14 2.6
R-10-100-5 0.78 160.0 0.31 845.1 1.50 31.7
R-20-40-3 0.25 121.6 0.14 700.5 0.29 9.5
R-20-40-5 1.56 659.9 0.45 2,155.6 1.81 68.5
R-20-100-3 1.05 235.0 0.59 1,249.6 0.83 8.1
R-20-100-5 5.34 882.8 3.18 3,938.2 6.81 70.1
R-50-40-3 6.17 2,411.0 10.31 28,975.3 1.67 81.6
R-50-40-5 18.41 4,303.1 18.60 48,876.6 14.18 140.9
R-50-100-3 38.47 6,289.1 97.29 103,885.7 8.84 43.8
R-50-100-5 122.49 11,451.2 241.39 237,953.3 61.71 216.8
Table 4.1: Computational results for the basic case
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lp b&b mcf b&b branch&cut
Instances time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes
S-10-40-3 0.08 25.3 0.01 55.6 0.12 0.7
S-10-40-5 0.12 34.4 0.01 51.3 0.21 2.7
S-10-100-3 0.14 17.6 0.03 102.0 0.18 0.9
S-10-100-5 0.39 58.5 0.07 223.7 0.82 2.9
S-20-40-3 0.20 56.4 0.05 233.6 0.29 0.8
S-20-40-5 0.91 255.8 0.10 453.8 1.68 17.4
S-20-100-3 0.78 136.6 0.13 267.1 0.86 2.5
S-20-100-5 2.08 268.8 0.35 672.4 3.47 9.3
S-50-40-3 1.07 196.1 0.24 622.5 1.18 5.7
S-50-40-5 5.47 790.7 0.31 858.5 9.36 71.9
S-50-100-3 3.58 290.4 1.21 1,185.0 2.86 5.8
S-50-100-5 15.00 807.3 2.85 3,002.7 20.08 63.7
R-10-40-3 0.08 24.0 0.01 67.9 0.15 7.5
R-10-40-5 0.30 125.1 0.04 248.5 0.80 20.4
R-10-100-3 0.14 15.1 0.02 40.7 0.20 0.2
R-10-100-5 1.04 213.2 0.20 546.7 2.46 27.0
R-20-40-3 0.32 132.7 0.12 484.5 0.60 21.6
R-20-40-5 1.50 505.7 0.24 1,062.4 2.91 62.2
R-20-100-3 1.27 253.6 0.26 453.0 1.81 26.5
R-20-100-5 8.44 1,226.5 5.50 9,671.1 11.95 105.2
R-50-40-3 1.15 214.0 0.19 526.5 2.38 25.8
R-50-40-5 7.32 2,099.7 0.56 1,552.2 19.18 273.7
R-50-100-3 3.69 287.5 2.12 2,046.3 7.66 34.1
R-50-100-5 27.79 1,731.3 15.55 15,900.1 59.75 228.9
Table 4.2: Computational results for variant 1 (market share constraints)
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lp b&b mcf b&b branch&cut
Instances time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes
S-10-40-3 0.06 27.9 0.02 118.7 0.14 0.4
S-10-40-5 0.11 50.6 0.02 166.8 0.49 23.2
S-10-100-3 0.12 17.5 0.02 69.8 0.29 6.8
S-10-100-5 0.40 75.3 0.16 513.3 2.48 66.5
S-20-40-3 0.17 71.3 0.07 389.9 0.45 5.2
S-20-40-5 0.61 219.3 0.43 1,997.3 4.42 148.7
S-20-100-3 0.63 135.7 0.32 749.9 2.08 43.4
S-20-100-5 1.26 185.8 0.74 1,545.9 11.47 164.2
S-50-40-3 1.98 739.7 5.57 16,724.3 8.90 261.9
S-50-40-5 9.88 2,491.3 36.90 94,865.4 147.56 2,500.0
S-50-100-3 5.65 832.3 22.39 26,625.3 28.42 523.7
S-50-100-5 32.31 3,365.0 171.14 172,466.7 271.80 3,006.0
R-10-40-3 0.06 21.6 0.02 55.5 0.10 0.1
R-10-40-5 0.17 82.9 0.05 428.5 0.67 18.5
R-10-100-3 0.10 9.3 0.01 45.6 0.17 0.2
R-10-100-5 0.50 91.5 0.24 1,068.9 2.49 42.6
R-20-40-3 0.24 117.0 0.13 793.8 0.60 15.9
R-20-40-5 0.91 343.9 0.47 3,167.6 3.55 89.8
R-20-100-3 1.00 241.4 0.53 1,369.0 1.85 17.6
R-20-100-5 4.46 801.6 3.11 10,389.8 25.09 434.8
R-50-40-3 10.51 4,615.8 15.91 59,066.0 35.16 1,195.8
R-50-40-5 25.54 6,714.3 39.33 171,566.6 169.82 1,511.1
R-50-100-3 79.93 14,059.4 130.42 206,668.9 274.82 6,035.4
R-50-100-5 398.31 45,945.3 446.85 798,002.9 2,036.07 17,577.4
Table 4.3: Computational results for variant 2 (more for less)
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lp b&b mcf b&b branch&cut
Instances time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes time [s] #nodes
S-10-40-3 0.29 372.0 0.26 1,786.3 0.17 3.4
S-10-40-5 0.41 421.1 0.32 2,135.7 0.27 8.1
S-10-100-3 1.23 603.4 0.73 2,017.0 0.35 8.0
S-10-100-5 2.65 1,007.4 1.43 4,115.9 1.17 16.5
S-20-40-3 3.00 2,763.0 6.70 30,788.1 0.34 2.4
S-20-40-5 2.39 1,345.2 15.48 66,377.0 1.07 27.3
S-20-100-3 16.76 5,083.6 23.83 44,780.9 1.63 17.3
S-20-100-5 7.15 1,597.2 20.02 36,588.2 2.73 12.8
R-10-40-3 0.06 25.6 0.03 229.6 0.09 2.1
R-10-40-5 0.26 181.9 0.43 2,697.7 0.57 35.9
R-10-100-3 0.13 26.6 0.10 302.7 0.11 0.0
R-10-100-5 0.74 195.9 0.71 2,040.6 1.33 28.5
R-20-40-3 0.37 252.7 2.06 9,812.6 0.30 8.5
R-20-40-5 1.08 578.6 5.73 25,467.2 1.63 61.2
R-20-100-3 2.38 730.9 7.07 13,881.7 0.91 9.5
R-20-100-5 4.19 920.6 26.47 48,444.9 6.49 66.6
Table 4.4: Computational results for variant 3 (limited nr. of winning suppliers)
Chapter 5
Exclusionary side constraints
In the total quantity discount auction (see chapters 2 to 4), the buyer’s
task is to select exactly one volume interval for each supplier from whom
he wishes to purchase. The choice for a specific volume interval therefore
excludes the possibility to purchase items at the prices of any other volume
interval this supplier may have. In this chapter, we take a closer look at
these so-called exclusionary side constraints and we investigate how they
contribute to the complexity of the TQD auction. In order to get a clearer
view on these constraints, we study them in the context of the transportation
problem, which is a well-known and efficiently solvable problem.
5.1 The transportation problem with exclusionary
side constraints
The ordinary transportation problem can be described as follows: given a
number of supply nodes each with a certain supply of items, a number of
demand nodes each with a certain demand for items, and a unit transporta-
tion cost for each pair consisting of a supply node and a demand node, send
the items from the supply nodes to the demand nodes at a minimum cost.
In this chapter we consider the variant where for each demand node a set
of pairs of supply nodes is given such that at most one supply node of each
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given pair is allowed to send items to that demand node. Following the
literature, we refer to this problem as the transportation problem with ex-
clusionary side constraints (TPESC).
The transportation problem with exclusionary side constraints can be for-
mulated as follows. Let there be a set S of supply nodes, each with a supply
of si, i ∈ S, and a set D of demand nodes, each with a demand of dj ,
j ∈ D. For each pair consisting of supply node i ∈ S and demand node
j ∈ D, a unit cost cij > 0 is given. Finally, for each demand node j ∈ D,
a (possibly empty) set of pairs of supply nodes, called Fj , is given; thus
Fj = {(i1, i2)| (i1, i2) ∈ S × S, i1 6= i2}. We assume that all data are inte-
gral. The problem is to send all supply to the demand nodes at minimum
cost, such that each demand node j ∈ D receives items from at most one
supply node for each pair of supply nodes present in Fj . Obviously, if Fj = ∅
for all j ∈ D, the ordinary transportation problem arises. Notice that we
assume that total supply equals total demand, that is
∑
i∈S si =
∑
j∈D dj .
For a mathematical formulation, we refer to Sun (2002). When we use the
phrase “the feasibility version of TPESC”, we refer to the situation where
(i) the (given) bipartite network between supply nodes and demand nodes
is not necessarily complete, (ii) no costs are specified, and (iii), the question
to answer is whether a feasible solution (using only edges from the network)
exists.
As far as we are aware, this problem has first been introduced by Cao (1992),
who described an application in storage management of containers. In this
application, arriving containers must be positioned in rows of a storage yard,
such that the costs of operations (searching, loading, retrieving) are min-
imized. Differences in size, ownership, or content may disallow containers
to be stored in the same row, giving rise to exclusionary side constraints.
A branch-and-bound approach was described to solve the problem. Other
branch-and-bound approaches are described and tested in Sun (2002), while
evolutionary algorithms have been proposed and tested by Cao & Uebe
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(1995), and Syarif & Gen (2003). These contributions suggest that those
authors believe that the problem is NP -hard, although no formal statement
of this result seems to have been made.
In this chapter, we confirm this thesis by showing that the feasibility ver-
sion of TPESC is NP -complete. More specifically, we establish for each of
three relevant special cases of TPESC its complexity status. One special
case concerns the setting where all Fj , j ∈ D are equal and is related to the
winner determination problem of the TQD auction, discussed in chapters 2
to 4. We refer to this case as TPESC with identical exclusionary sets (see
Section 5.2). In section 5.3, we investigate TPESC with a single exclusion-
ary set, i.e. a setting where all sets Fj except one are empty. Finally, in
Section 5.4 we discuss another special case, where the number of suppliers
is fixed.
5.2 TPESC with identical exclusionary sets
In this section we focus on the TPESC with identical exclusionary sets.
This special case arises in the total quantity discount auction (see chapters
2 to 4). For the reader’s convenience, we now briefly recapitulate the TQD
auction and its winner determination problem. Consider a buyer procuring
given amounts of different items from different suppliers by means of a com-
binatorial auction. Suppliers can participate in this auction by submitting
at least one bid, consisting of prices charged for each individual item, and a
volume interval on the total number of sold items, within which these price
are valid. Each of the suppliers thus uses a so-called total quantity discount
policy to set the prices for the different items. The resulting winner deter-
mination problem is to decide which bids to accept, in order to acquire the
given amounts of each of the different items at minimum total cost. Thus, a
solution for this problem prescribes how many units of each item are ordered
from each supplier.
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Observe that the winner determination problem of the TQD auction (as the
TPESC problem) is a generalization of the ordinary transportation problem.
Indeed, by associating a demand node with each item (with its demand equal
to the amount that needs to be bought), and by associating a supply node
with appropriate lower and upper bounds with each volume interval of each
supplier, the TQD winner determination problem boils down to selecting
supply nodes (at most one from each supplier) and finding the right amount
of units of each item to be transported. In case a supplier can only deliver
a fixed number of items, that is, there is only one supply node for each sup-
plier with coinciding upper and lower bound, the ordinary transportation
problem arises. One important aspect in this generalization of the trans-
portation problem is the fact that for each demand node, a set of supply
nodes is given (namely the nodes corresponding to the intervals of a sin-
gle supplier) from which at most one can be used to actually supply that
demand node; this corresponds to our Fj sets, with j ∈ D. Observe that
if a supplier uses more than two intervals, this is easily accommodated by
having an element in the exclusionary set for each pair of volume intervals
(which gives rise to a polynomial number of elements in the exclusionary
set). Also, observe that these sets are the same for all demand nodes, in
other words, we are dealing with an instance of TPESC with identical F -sets.
Let us now formulate our results for this special case of TPESC. We first
prove that the problem with |D| = 2, that is, the case of two demand nodes,
is weakly NP -hard, then we exhibit a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
for this case, and finally we show that the feasibility version of the problem
with |D| = 3 is strongly NP -complete.
Theorem 12. The feasibility version of TPESC with identical exclusionary
sets is NP -complete, even if |D| = 2.
Proof. We prove the theorem by presenting a reduction from Even-Odd
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Partitioning (EOP) to TPESC. EOP is proved to beNP -complete in Garey,
Tarjan & Wilfong (1988).
EOP
Input: n pairs of positive integers (x2i−1, x2i), i = 1, . . . , n.
Question: does there exist a partition of {1, . . . , 2n} into disjoint subsets A
and B with |A ∩ {2i − 1, 2i}| = |B ∩ {2i − 1, 2i}| = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n, and
with
∑
i∈A xi =
∑
i∈B xi?
For each integer in the input of EOP, we construct a supply node with sup-
ply equal to the value of the integer, that is, we set S = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} with
si = xi for i = 1, . . . , 2n. There are two demand nodes, each having demand
d1 = d2 = 12
∑2n
i=1 xi. We set F1 = F2 = {(2i − 1, 2i)| i = 1, . . . , n}, imply-
ing that at most one supply node per pair is allowed to send items to that
demand node. Each supply node is connected to each demand node. This
completes the description of the instance of TPESC.
A yes-answer to the EOP instance directly corresponds to a feasible solution
of the TPESC instance. Also, by observing the fact that the two demand
nodes have identical exclusionary constraints, it is clear that in any feasible
solution of the TPESC instance, each supply node sends its entire supply to
precisely one of the demand nodes which in turn corresponds to a yes-answer
of the EOP instance.
Of course, this result does not rule out the existence of a pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm for TPESC with common exclusionary sets and two demand
nodes. We will now describe such an algorithm.
We first construct a graph G = (V,E). There is a node in G for each sup-
ply node in the TPESC instance. Let there be an edge between each pair
of nodes for which there is an exclusionary constraint in F . The resulting
graph can be partitioned into a number of connected components (Vi, Ei),
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i = 1, . . . , c, such that there is no exclusionary constraint between two ver-
tices in different sets Vi. Thus, any two vertices that are connected by an
edge are part of the same component. For each component i, there are only
two possible ways of dividing the supply of the nodes of that component
over the two demand nodes (as observed earlier, the fact that the two de-
mand nodes have identical exclusionary constraints and that total supply
equals total demand, implies that in any feasible solution, each supply node
sends its entire supply to precisely one of the demand nodes). Indeed, if we
pick an arbitrary node of each component and call it the primal node of the
component, we can either assign its supply to the first demand node or to
the second. This choice determines to which demand nodes the supply of
the other nodes of that component must be sent. Notice that we assume
here that there exists a feasible way of sending the supply of the supply
nodes of a component to the demand nodes, that is, we assume there is no
contradiction caused by the exclusionary sets. In a preprocessing phase, we
can find out whether a feasible way exists by verifying 2-coloredness of each
component.
Suppose that assigning the supply of the primal node of component i to the
first demand node results in a total supply of wi being sent to the first de-
mand node by the component i, and a remaining supply of ri =
∑
j∈Vi sj−wi
being sent to the second demand node. Further, let pi1 (pi2) correspond to
the total cost corresponding to component i, when the supply of the pri-
mal node is being sent to the first (second) demand node. We partition
the set of components into two subsets as follows: C1 = {i|wi > ri}, and
C2 = {i|wi < ri}. This allows us to define decision variables xi such that, for
i ∈ C1: xi = 1(0) if the supply of the primal node is being sent to the first
(second) demand node, and for i ∈ C2: xi = 1(0) if the supply of the primal
node is being sent to the second (first) demand node. We can formulate the
TPESC problem with identical exclusionary sets and two demand nodes as
follows:
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minimize∑
i∈C1
[pi1xi + pi2(1− xi)] +
∑
i∈C2
[pi2xi + pi1(1− xi)] (5.1)
subject to∑
i∈C1
[wixi + ri(1− xi)] +
∑
i∈C2
[rixi + wi(1− xi)] = d1 (5.2)∑
i∈C1
[rixi + wi(1− xi)] +
∑
i∈C2
[wixi + ri(1− xi)] = d2 (5.3)
xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , c. (5.4)
Let us now define for i ∈ C1: ai = wi − ri, pi = pi1 − pi2, and for i ∈ C2:
ai = ri − wi, pi = pi2 − pi1, and we define U = d1 −
∑
i∈C1 ri −
∑
i∈C2 wi.
Rewriting (5.1)-(5.4) using these definitions gives us the following equivalent
integer program:
minimize
c∑
i=1
pixi (5.5)
subject to
c∑
i=1
aixi = U (5.6)
xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , c. (5.7)
Notice that when constraint (5.6) is satisfied, both the first and the second
demand node receive their required supply of d1 respectively d2. Also ob-
serve that the definitions above imply that ai > 0. In fact, we can eliminate
those variables xi which have as coefficient ai = 0 (since, in an optimal so-
lution we set, in case ai = 0: xi = 1 if pi 6 0, else we set xi = 0). Thus,
henceforth we will assume that ai > 1. Furthermore, we assume that U > 0,
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since no solution exists if U < 0.
This problem is a generalization of the change making problem (see Martello
& Toth (1990)), since there is a cost pi associated to each variable xi. Fur-
thermore, there are bounds equal to 1 on the variables. Wright (1975)
developed a dynamic program for the change-making problem. The follow-
ing modified version of this algorithm, to which we refer as algorithm DP,
provides an optimal solution for formulation (5.5)-(5.7).
Let fq(z) be the optimal solution value of a sub-instance of (5.5)-(5.7), con-
sisting of components 1, . . . , q and a right-hand side of z, with 1 6 q 6 c
and 0 6 z 6 U . If no solution exists for a combination of values q and z,
then fq(z) =∞. It is clear that
f1(z) =

0 if z = 0;
p1 if z = a1;
∞ if z 6= a1.
Now, fq(z) can be computed by considering increasing values of q from 2 to
c and, for each q, increasing values of z from 0 to U as
fq(z) =
{
fq−1(z) if z = 0, 1, . . . , aq − 1;
min(fq−1(z), fq−1(z − aq) + pq) if z = aq, . . . , U.
The optimal solution value of formulation (5.5)-(5.7) is then given by fc(U).
The time complexity of algorithm DP is O(cU), which proves that TPESC
with two demand nodes with identical exclusionary constraints can be solved
in pseudo-polynomial time. We have shown the following:
Theorem 13. Algorithm DP is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for
TPESC with identical exclusionary constraints and two demand nodes.
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We now argue that it is unlikely that this algorithm can be extended to the
case of three demand nodes by showing that TPESC with identical exclu-
sionary sets and three demand nodes is strongly NP -hard.
Theorem 14. The feasibility version of TPESC with identical exclusionary
sets is strongly NP -complete, even if |D| = 3.
Proof. We prove the theorem by presenting a reduction from Graph 3-
colorability (see Garey & Johnson (1979)) to TPESC.
Graph 3-colorability
Input: a graph G = (V,E).
Question: is G 3-colorable, that is, does there exist a coloring of the vertices
of G such that two connected vertices receive different colors, and such that
no more than three different colors are used?
We build an instance of TPESC by having a supply node for every vertex
of V , by having a supply node for every edge of E, and by having a single
dummy node d. Thus S = V ∪E ∪{d}. Each supply node corresponding to
a vertex or an edge of G has sj = 1, j ∈ S \{d}, the supply corresponding to
the dummy node equals sd = 2(|V |+ |E|). There are three demand nodes,
each having demand dj = |V |+ |E|. Let the two endpoints of an edge e ∈ E
be denoted by ve and we, and let pe be the supply node in S corresponding to
this edge e. For each edge e in G there are three pairs of supply nodes in the
set of exclusionary constraints, i.e. F = {(ve, we), (ve, pe), (we, pe)|e ∈ E}.
Further, each supply node is connected to each demand node. This com-
pletes the description of an instance of TPESC.
Suppose that G admits a 3-coloring. We associate a different color to each
of the three demand nodes. Next, we send the unit supply of each supply
node corresponding to a vertex v ∈ V to the appropriate demand node (the
one with v’s color in the coloring). The unit supply of a supply node corre-
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sponding to an edge e ∈ E is sent to the demand node not receiving supply
from supply nodes ve and we (obviously, there is always one such node). We
use the supply from the dummy node to satisfy all demand from the demand
nodes exactly. Observe that we have satisfied the exclusionary constraints,
and hence: we have a feasible solution to TPESC.
Suppose there is a feasible solution to TPESC. Consider a triple of supply
nodes (ve, we, pe) associated to edge e. Due to the choice for F , it follows
that the supply of each of these three supply nodes is sent to a unique de-
mand node. Thus, the supply of supply nodes that correspond to adjacent
vertices in G, goes to different demand nodes. Since there are three demand
nodes, we have found a 3-coloring.
5.3 TPESC with a single exclusionary set
In this section we deal with a special case of TPESC, namely the problem
that arises when exactly one F -set is nonempty. As we shall see, already
this restricted version is hard to approximate, even for two demand nodes.
First, we sketch an application of this special case of TPESC.
When a company decides to store its items, it basically has the choice be-
tween constructing its own private warehouse and renting a public ware-
house. Assuming that there are seasonal changes in the need for storage
space, Ballou (1998) shows that it is advisable to make use of both options.
This leaves the company with the problem of where to store what items, min-
imizing the total cost. One can imagine that the public warehouse imposes
constraints on what items can be stored together (e.g. hazardous materi-
als), whereas these constraints could be non-existing in a private warehouse,
since this warehouse can be built specifically according to the (safety) needs
of the company. This practical application boils down to a TPESC with
only two demand nodes, where only one has a nonempty F -set (namely the
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demand node corresponding to the public warehouse).
We now show that it is difficult to find a good approximation algorithm for
TPESC with a single exclusionary set.
Theorem 15. TPESC with a single exclusionary set does not admit a
polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm unless P = NP ,
even if |D| = 2.
Proof. We prove the theorem by presenting a reduction from Independent
Set (IS) to TPESC.
Independent Set
Input: a graph G = (V,E) and an integer K 6 |V |.
Question: does there exist an independent set of cardinality at least K, that
is, a subset V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| > K, such that no two vertices in V ′ are joined
by an edge in E?
For each vertex j ∈ V we construct a supply node with supply sj = 1;
there is an additional supply node q with supply sq = K. There are two de-
mand nodes; the first one has demand d1 = K, the second one has demand
d2 = |V |. The cost of an edge between supply node q and the first demand
node equals c > 0, all other edges have cost 0. The first demand node has
a set of exclusionary constraints F1 = {(k, l)| k, l ∈ V ∧ (k, l) ∈ E}. The
second demand node has no exclusionary constraints, that is, F2 = ∅.
We now show that the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm with a con-
stant performance ratio for TPESC would imply P = NP .
Suppose that the instance of IS has a yes-answer, that is, there exists an
independent set V ′ of cardinality at least K. In this case, given the con-
struction of F1, there exist K supply nodes corresponding to nodes from the
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set V ′ that satisfy the exclusionary constraints. It is now easy to see that
a solution where the supply of these nodes is sent to the first demand node
and where the other nodes supply the second demand node, is a feasible
solution to TPESC that has zero cost.
In case that the instance of TPESC admits a zero cost solution, apparently
no edge between supply node q and the first demand node is used. Hence,
the demand of this node is fulfilled by K supply nodes that correspond ver-
tices in G that form an independent set of size K.
Thus a polynomial-time algorithm with a constant performance ratio for
TPESC would find a zero cost solution if one exists, and hence would be
able to distinguish between the yes-instances and the no-instances of IS.
5.4 TPESC with a fixed number of supply nodes
In this section we show that if the number of supply nodes is not part of
the input, a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm exists to solve the problem.
Observe that this contrasts with the case of a fixed number of demand nodes
(in particular Theorem 15), where the case of two demand nodes renders a
problem that does not allow a polynomial-time algorithm with a constant
performance ratio (unless P = NP ).
Theorem 16. TPESC with a fixed number of supply nodes can be solved
with a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm.
Proof. We prove the theorem by presenting a dynamic programming al-
gorithm for TPESC with a fixed number of supply nodes. To facilitate the
exposition, let m = |S|, n = |D|, and let L be the largest number in the
input. As a state in the dynamic program, we use (f1, f2, . . . , fm) where fi
denotes the amount of items sent by supply node i to all demand nodes.
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Observe that the number of states is bounded by (L + 1)m. Further we
define Hj , 1 6 j 6 n, as the set of states that can be reached after hav-
ing fulfilled the demand of the demand nodes 1, 2, . . . , j, and we start with
H0 = {(0, 0, . . . , 0)}. In iteration j, we deal with demand node j that has de-
mand dj , 1 6 j 6 n. We enumerate all possible integral ways of distributing
demand dj over the m supply nodes. Notice that we use here the fact that if
a solution exists, there exists one with integral flows. Let us define Ej as the
set of m-vectors that correspond to a feasible way of distributing demand
dj over the m supply nodes. In the absence of exclusionary constraints, i.e.,
if Fj = ∅, then
|Ej | =
(
dj +m− 1
m− 1
)
.
By enumerating all
(
dj +m− 1
m− 1
)
potential ways of distributing demand
dj over the m supply nodes, and next verifying, for each way, whether it is
feasible with respect to the exclusionary constraints (whose number |Fj | is
bounded by
(
m
2
)
), we can find in O(m2(dj +m)m), the set Ej . Now, we
can compute Hj as follows:
Hj = {f + g| f ∈ Hj−1, g ∈ Ej}.
States in which a value fi exceeds si are omitted since they cannot lead to a
feasible solution. Finally, we need to inspect whether (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ Hn.
If so, a solution is found, else no solution exists. The complexity of this
algorithm is O(n · Lm ·m2(L+m)m), which, in case of a fixed m leads to a
pseudo-polynomial time algorithm. Notice that when arbitrary costs cij are
given, we can, by keeping track of the cost of an element of Ej , compute the
cost of a state, thereby finding the cost of an optimal solution.
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It is not hard to see that Theorem 16 is best possible in the sense that one
easily verifies that the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for TPESC
even with two supply nodes would imply P = NP . Indeed, the well-known
partition problem is easily seen to be a special case of the feasibility version
of TPESC with two supply nodes.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed that the feasibility version of TPESC is NP -
complete, even if there are only two demand nodes. For the special case
where all exclusionary constraints are identical in each demand node, we
showed that in case of two demand nodes the feasibility version of TPESC
is (weakly) NP -complete and a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm exists. In
case of three demand nodes, this problem becomes strongly NP -complete.
If only one single demand node has exclusionary constraints, the existence
of a polynomial-time algorithm with a fixed performance ratio would imply
P = NP , even in the case of two demand nodes. Finally, we also investi-
gated a setting with a fixed number of supply nodes. For this special case, we
showed that in case of two demand nodes the feasibility version of TPESC
is (weakly) NP -complete and a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm exists.
Table 5.1 gives an overview of our results.
Our results settle the complexity status of the transportation problem with
exclusionary side constraints and motivate the use of heuristics and branch-
and-bound approaches (Cao 1992, Sun 2002, Cao & Uebe 1995, Syarif &
Gen 2003) for solving large instances.
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TPESC with identical TPESC with TPESC with
exclusionary sets a single a fixed number
exclusionary set of supply nodes
|D| = 2 |D| > 3 |D| > 2 |S| > 2
Weakly NP -hard; Strongly No polynomial-time Weakly NP -hard;
Pseudo-pol. NP -hard constant-factor Pseudo-pol.
time algorithm approximation time algorithm
(unless P = NP )
Table 5.1: The complexity status of TPESC
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Chapter 6
The matrix bid auction
This chapter focusses on a combinatorial auction where a bidder can express
his preferences by means of a so-called ordered matrix bid. This matrix bid
auction was developed by Day (2004) and allows bids on all possible sub-
sets, although there are restrictions on what a bidder can bid for these
sets. Therefore, the matrix bid auction can be classified in the restricted-
preference approach (see chapter 1). In the first section, we give an overview
of how this auction works and we discuss some of its properties. We elabo-
rate on the relevance of the matrix bid auction in section 6.2. In section 6.3,
we develop methods to verify whether a given matrix bid satisfies a number
of properties related to microeconomic theory. Finally, in section 6.4, we
investigate how a collection of arbitrary bids can be represented as a matrix
bid.
6.1 Description of the matrix bid auction
The matrix bid auction is a multi-item, single-unit combinatorial auction.
This means that for each item that is auctioned, only one unit of this item
is available. In the matrix bid auction, each bidder must submit a strict
ordering (or ranking) of the items in which he is interested. Furthermore,
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we assume that for each bidder, the extra value an item adds to a set is de-
termined only by the number of higher ranked items in that set, according
to the ranking of that bidder.
The ordering of the items is denoted by rij , which is item i’s position in
bidder j’s ranking, for each i ∈ G and j ∈ B. This ordering should be strict
in the sense that for each bidder j, ri1j 6= ri2j for any pair of distinct items
i1 and i2. For instance, if rij = 2, item i is bidder j’s second highest ranked
item. Furthermore, each bidder j specifies values bijk, which correspond to
the value the bidder is prepared to pay for item i given that it is the k-th
highest ranked item in the set that bidder j is awarded. The bijk values
allow to determine the value bidder j attributes to any set S ⊆ G. Indeed,
bidder j’s bid on a set S is denoted as bj(S) and can be computed as:
bj(S) =
∑
i∈S
bi,j,k(i,j,S) (6.1)
where k(i, j, S) is the ranking of item i amongst the items in the set S,
according to bidder j’s ranking. Notice that equation (6.1) assumes that
no externalities are involved, i.e. a bidder’s valuation depends only on the
items he wins, and not for instance on the identity of the bidders to whom
the other items are allocated. The winner determination problem is, given
the bids bj(S) for each set S and each bidder j, to determine which bidder is
to receive which items, such that the total winning bid value is maximized.
Notice that we assume that each bidder pays what he bids for the subsets
he wins.
Observe that the value for index k of item i in bidder j’s bid can never
be higher than the rank rij . This allows us to arrange the values bijk as
a lower triangular matrix for each bidder j, where the rows correspond to
the items, ordered by decreasing rank and the columns correspond to values
for k. Hence the name matrix bid (with order). Notice also that bidder j’s
ranking rij does not necessarily reflect a preference order of the items. If
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an item is highly ranked, this merely means that its added value to a set
depends on less items than the added value of a lower ranked item. Fur-
thermore, we make no assumption regarding the bijk values. Indeed, these
values may be negative, e.g. to reflect the disposal cost of an unwanted item.
Specifying a sufficiently large negative value can also keep the bidder from
winning this item in the first place.
As a frivolous example, we consider the following matrix bid, where a bidder
expresses his preferences for an ice cream. There are two flavors of ice
cream (vanilla and banana), and also hot chocolate and strawberry sauce
are available.
vanilla ice 4
banana ice 5 2
hot chocolate -5 0 3
strawberry sauce -5 0 3 -1
Consider now the value this bidder j attributes to vanilla ice with hot choco-
late. Observe that for this choice of S, vanilla ice is the highest ranked item
(that is, k(vanilla ice, j, S) = 1), and hot chocolate is the second highest
ranked item (that is, k(hot chocolate, j, S) = 2). We find using (6.1):
bj(S) = bvanilla ice,j,k(vanilla ice,j,S) + bhot chocolate,j,k(hot chocolate,j,S)
= b1,j,1 + b3,j,2
= 4 + 0 = 4.
Thus, this matrix bid can be interpreted as follows: bidder j feels that he
needs at least one scoop of ice cream of one of the two available flavors,
although he prefers banana. Indeed, no combination without ice cream will
result in a positive valuation, because the bidder charges a (disposal) cost
of 5 if he gets one or both toppings without ice cream. Furthermore, the
bidder is not willing to pay as much for the second scoop of ice cream as
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for the first. The highest bid this bidder places is 9, for the combination of
vanilla and banana ice with any one of the two toppings.
Despite the fact that we adopt a restriction on the preferences a bidder
can express, the winner determination problem of the matrix bid auction
remains NP -hard (Day 2004). In section 7.1, we elaborate on the compu-
tational complexity of this problem.
6.2 Motivation
There are three reasons for investigating a combinatorial auction with ma-
trix bids. Shortly sketched, these reasons are: capturing structure, allowing
faster computation, and finding a compact way of representing preferences.
We now explore these arguments in more detail.
First, bids in any practical combinatorial auction are likely to posses some
structure. In literature, we find references of both theoretical structures (see
e.g. Rothkopf et al. (1998), Nisan (2000), and Leyton-Brown & Shoham
(2005)) and structures in practice (see e.g. Bleischwitz & Kliewer (2005)
and Goossens et al. (2007)). Capturing and understanding this structure is
important, not only since it allows to develop algorithms that can be more
efficient than algorithms for a general combinatorial auction, but also be-
cause it improves our understanding of various properties of an auction. The
matrix bid auction, where the incremental value an item adds to a bid on
a set is determined only by the number of higher ranked items in that set,
imposes one such structure. Thus, the matrix bid auction offers a way of cap-
turing structure that may be present in combinatorial auctions. Day (2004)
illustrates that this structure encompasses the following six types of bidders.
Additive preference bidder: For every item i, the bidder has a price pi.
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The bidder’s valuation for a set S is then
∑
i∈S pi.
Single-minded bidder: This bidder is interested in one particular set S
for which he is willing to pay a price p. These single minded bids (S, p)
are also known as flat bids or atomic bids (Nisan 2000).
Nested flat bidder: This bidder is a generalization of the single-minded
bidder and expresses a chain of q exclusive single-minded bids (S1, p1),
(S2, p2), ... (Sq, pq) such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ ... ⊂ Sq.
Nested k-of bidder: The k-of bid function consists of a bid (k, S, p), which
is a bid of p on any subset of S of at least size k. Multiple k-of bids
(k1, S, p1), (k2, S, p2), ..., (kq, S, pq) on the same set S can be repre-
sented in a single matrix bid, provided that all k-values are different.
This bid function is also known as the general symmetric bid function,
in which the bidder specifies prices p1, p2, ..., pm where pk is the price
the bidder is willing to pay for the k-th item won (see Nisan (2000)
and section 1.2.3). The bidder’s valuation for a set S is then
∑|S|
i=1 pi.
Partition bidder: This bidder partitions the items into a number of groups
of substitutes. The bidder gives a ranking of the groups and prices
he is willing to pay for receiving exactly one item from each group,
given that exactly one item from each higher ranked group has been
received. This bid function can be generalized to accommodate an
arbitrary given demand for each group of substitutes.
Add-on bidder: This bid function consists of a bid for an essential item,
and extra prices the bidder is willing to pay for each number of items
from a set of add-on items in which the bidder is interested.
Any auction whose bidders are from these types is a combinatorial auction
with matrix bids.
Second, matrix bid auctions allow for a faster computation due to the restric-
tion on the preferences that is assumed. Indeed, Day & Raghavan (2006)
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solve the winner determination problem of the matrix bid auction using a
formulation based on the assignment problem (see section 7.2), and compare
this with solving the winner determination problem of a general combinato-
rial auction using the set packing formulation (see (1.1)-(1.4)). The authors
conclude that the computation time for the general combinatorial auction
is higher and grows much faster than for the matrix bid auction. More-
over, they manage to solve the winner determination problem for matrix
bid auctions with 72 items, 75 bidders and over 1023 bids, whereas for the
general combinatorial auction, the largest instances that can be solved have
16 items, 25 bidders, and less than 109 bids. Although this comparison
is somewhat distorted since it does not use a state-of-the-art method (e.g.
CABOB, see Sandholm, Suri, Gilpin & Levine (2005)) to solve the winner
determination problem for the general auction, it does give an indication of
the size of the matrix bid auctions that can be solved in practice. We will
come back to computational issues extensively in chapter 7.
Finally, the matrix bid auction also offers a compact way of representing
preferences. Indeed, each bidder only needs to communicate an ordered list
of m items and m(m+1)2 matrix bid entries, which is far less than bids for
each of the 2m possible sets of items in a general combinatorial auction. We
do recognize that choosing a ranking of the items and filling the matrix bid
with appropriate values might not be a trivial task for the bidder. However,
in section 6.4.1, we develop a procedure that recognizes whether a given
collection of bids can be translated into a matrix bid. If this is not the case,
the algorithm in section 6.4.2 presents a way to approximate this collection
of bids by a matrix bid, in a way that does not expose the bidder to paying
more than he stated for any set of items.
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6.3 Recognizing matrix bid properties
Bid functions may or may not posses various micro-economic properties,
which may have consequences for the complexity and/or the approximabil-
ity of the winner determination problem. For instance, if bid functions
are submodular (see section 6.3.3), a greedy algorithm produces a 1/2-
approximation (Lehmann, Lehmann & Nisan 2001). Therefore, it is in-
teresting to see how ordered matrix bids relate to such properties. More
specifically, in this section we discuss the relationship between the bid func-
tion implied by a matrix bid and micro-economic concepts as free disposal
(6.3.1), complement freeness (6.3.2), decreasing marginal valuations (6.3.3),
and the gross substitutes property (6.3.4). In particular, we show how to
verify efficiently whether a given matrix bid satisfies each of these proper-
ties. Since this section deals only with the bid function of a single bidder,
the index j that is used to indicate the bidder will be dropped. In literature,
many of the economic concepts discussed in this section are in terms of a
valuation function. Although for some auctions (e.g. the VCG auction), it
has been shown that it is in the bidder’s best interest to bid his true val-
uation, in general, a bidder’s bid and his valuation need not be identical.
Indeed, strategic considerations may motivate a bidder to express bids that
differ considerably from his valuation. Nevertheless, in this section, we ig-
nore this issue and assume equivalence between the notions bid function and
valuation function. This is common practice in studies on bidding languages
(see e.g. Nisan (2005)). We refer to Gul & Stacchetti (1999) and Cramton
et al. (2005) for the definitions used in this section.
6.3.1 Free disposal
In microeconomics, it is often assumed that agents prefer more to less. In the
context of an auction, this means that a bidder is always willing to receive
one or more items for free (see also section 3.2). Consequently, a seller will
never get stuck with unsold items and can therefore dispose of any number
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of items at no cost. Free disposal is a very common assumption in literature
on combinatorial auctions (Lehmann et al. 2001, Nisan 2000) and can be
defined as follows.
Definition 1. A bid function b satisfies the free disposal property if
b(S) 6 b(T ) ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ G. (6.2)
Notice that this definition is equivalent with the definition of a monotone
non-decreasing function. Alternatively stated, this definition implies that
disposing an item from a set cannot increase the value of the resulting set.
In combinatorial auctions where a bidder does not communicate bids on
every possible subset of items, but rather only on a limited number of sub-
sets of his liking, allocating all items may be problematic for the auctioneer.
In its strictest sense, the lack of free disposal would mean that buyers do
not accept anything extra beyond what they bid on. Using this interpreta-
tion, even finding a solution to the winner determination problem where all
items are allocated is NP -complete (Sandholm, Suri, Gilpin & Levine 2002).
However, many other approaches allow the auctioneer to allocate all items,
without disposal cost. Nisan (2005) assumes that bids of each bidder satisfy
the free disposal property. Moreover, if a bidder did not express a bid on a
set S, the auctioneer can construct a new bid b(S) equal to the highest bid
over all subsets of S. Obviously, the newly created bids also satisfy the free
disposal property. A similar approach is followed by Leyton-Brown, Shoham
& Tennenholtz (2000), since they allow the auctioneer to create additional
bids with value zero for any subset of items, which can then be combined
with any of the bids expressed by the bidders (which also satisfy the free
disposal property).
The concept of free disposal is, however, also relevant in a combinatorial
auction where bidders do express bids on every possible subset, as in the
matrix bid auction. In this case, assuming bid functions that satisfy free
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disposal guarantees the existence of a total winning bid value maximizing
allocation in which all items are awarded to some bidder.
Obviously, not every matrix bid satisfies the free disposal property. For
instance, the matrix bid that was used in section 6.1 does not allow free dis-
posal, since b(hot chocolate) < b(∅). The matrix framework indeed allows
the bidder to take into account a disposal cost which can vary across the
items and may lead to one or more sets with a negative valuation. However,
imposing that each entry in the matrix bid is non-negative is not sufficient
to attain the free disposal property. This is illustrated by the matrix bid
below, as b(y) = 3 > 2 = b(x, y).
item x 1
item y 3 1
Verifying free disposal can be done in polynomial time for a given matrix
bid, as witnessed by the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Verifying whether a matrix bid b satisfies the free disposal
property can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. We will show that solving a shortest path problem on an acyclic
graph involving O(m3) nodes and O(m4) arcs determines whether a matrix
bid b satisfies the free disposal property (6.2). The graph can be described
as follows.
The graph contains a source and a sink, and nodes indexed by (i, s, t). The
index i refers to item i and ranges from 1 to m. The index t ranges from
1 to ri, while s ranges from 0 to t. There are arcs from each node (i, s, t)
to (i′, s, t + 1) and to (i′, s + 1, t + 1), for all items i′ ranked lower than i
(recall that we consider a single bidder). Furthermore, there is an arc from
the source to each node (i, 0, 1) and (i, 1, 1), and there is an arc from each
node (except the source) to the sink. Let the cost on the arc from (i, s, t)
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to (i′, s, t+ 1) be equal to bi′,t+1 and let the cost on the arc from (i, s, t) to
(i′, s + 1, t + 1) be equal to bi′,t+1 − bi′,s+1. Analogously, the arcs from the
source to each node (i, 0, 1) and (i, 1, 1) have a cost equal to bi,1 and zero
respectively. Arcs to the sink have a cost equal to zero. This completes the
description of the graph. Notice that this graph is acyclic and contains a
number of nodes and arcs that is polynomial in the number of items (O(m3)
and O(m4) respectively). Figure 6.1 illustrates this graph; arcs with no in-
dication of their cost have a cost equal to 0.
(i,s,t)
(i’,s,t+1)
(i’,s+1,t+1)
source
bi’,t+1 – bi’,s+1
bi’,t+1
(i,0,1)
(i,1,1)
(i’,0,1)
(i’,1,1)
sink
bi’,1
bi,1
ri<ri’
Figure 6.1: Graph used to verify free disposal
The graph described above should be interpreted as follows. Each node
(i, s, t) corresponds to a state where s and t items ranked at least as high as
item i are present in set S and set T ⊇ S respectively. Selecting an arc from
(i, s, t) to (i′, s, t+ 1) corresponds to adding item i′ to set T as the (t+ 1)-
th best item, but not to S, whereas an arc from (i, s, t) to (i′, s + 1, t + 1)
corresponds to adding item i′ to both set S and set T , as the (s+1)-th and
(t+ 1)-th best item respectively. In this way, each path from source to sink
determines sets S and T , and, vice versa, there is a path from the source to
the sink for each possible S and T . Notice that the arcs are such that S will
always be a subset of T .
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We now show that the length of a path from source to sink in this graph
equals b(T ) − b(S). Each path from source to sink consists of two types
of arcs: those arcs that add items i to the set T (and not to S), and
those arcs that add items i to both S and T . The former arcs give rise
to the term
∑
i∈T\S bi,k(i,T ), whereas the latter arcs give rise to the term∑
i∈S⊆T (bi,k(i,T ) − bi,k(i,S)). Recall from section 6.1 that k(i, A) denotes the
rank of item i in the set A. Thus, the length of the path equals
∑
i∈T\S
bi,k(i,T ) +
∑
i∈S⊆T
(bi,k(i,T ) − bi,k(i,S)) =
∑
i∈T
bi,k(i,T ) −
∑
i∈S
bi,k(i,S)
= b(T )− b(S).
Thus, verifying the free disposal property (see definition 1) for a given ma-
trix bid can be done by solving a shortest path problem in this graph, which
takes polynomial time. Concluding, a shortest path in our graph with non-
negative length is equivalent to free disposal. ¤
6.3.2 Complement free
Although the difficulty to deal with complementarity or substitution effects
in a bidder’s valuation in a classic sequential auction is a major motiva-
tion for researching combinatorial auctions in the first place, assuming the
absence of complementarities is quite common in microeconomic theory.
Lehmann et al. (2001) state that “in most of microeconomic theory, the
consumers are assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal utilities”. In their
work, they assume that the valuation of a union of disjoint sets is never
higher than the sum of the valuations of the individual sets. This notion
can be formalized as follows and is also known as subadditivity.
Definition 2. A bid function b is complement free (or subadditive) if
b(S ∪ T ) 6 b(S) + b(T ) ∀S, T : S ∩ T = ∅. (6.3)
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Although the winner determination problem for bidders with a complement
free bid function remains NP -hard (Lehmann et al. 2001), there exists a
polynomial time algorithm that finds a O( 1logm)-approximation if, given ex-
ternal prices for all items, a bidder can determine in polynomial time for
which set his valuation b exceeds the sum of the prices of the items in that
set the most (Dobzinski, Nisan & Schapira 2005). If a bidder can only
determine his valuation for a given set in polynomial time, then the approx-
imation ratio decreases to O(m−1/2) (Dobzinski et al. 2005).
A sufficient condition to have a complement free matrix bid is that the bik
values are non-increasing in the rows (i.e. bik 6 bi,k+1 ∀i, k). Indeed, for
each item i, the valuation of the union of two sets will only make use of
bik values with a value of index k at least as high as the value used in the
valuation of the individual sets. Having non-increasing bik values is not a
necessary condition though, as is illustrated by the following example of a
complement free bid function.
item x 0
item y 2 1
item z 2 1 2
We now show how we can verify in polynomial time whether a matrix bid
is complement free.
Theorem 18. Verifying whether a matrix bid b satisfies the complement
free property can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Given definition 2, it suffices to establish the existence of sets of
items S and T , such that S ∩T = ∅ and b(S)+ b(T )− b(S ∪T ) < 0, to find
out whether a matrix bid b is not complement free. We show that this can
be done by solving a shortest path problem, by adapting the construction
described in Theorem 17.
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Consider a graph containing a source, a sink, and nodes, indexed by (i, s, t).
The index i refers to item i, with 1 6 i 6 m. Both indices s and t range
from 0 to ri, insofar 0 < s+ t 6 ri. There are arcs from each node (i, s, t) to
(i′, s+1, t) and to (i′, s, t+1), for all items i′ ranked lower than i. Further-
more, there is an arc from the source to each node (i, 1, 0) and (i, 0, 1), and
there is an arc from each node (except the source) to the sink. Let the cost
of the arc from (i, s, t) to (i′, s + 1, t) be equal to bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+t+1 and let
the cost of the arc to (i′, s, t+1) be equal to bi′,t+1−bi′,s+t+1. The arcs from
the source to each node (i, 1, 0) and (i, 0, 1), and also all arcs to the sink
have a cost equal to zero. Notice that this graph is acyclic. Figure 6.2 illus-
trates this graph; arcs with no indication of their cost have a cost equal to 0.
(i,s,t)
(i’,s+1,t)
(i’,s,t+1)
source
bi’,s+1 – bi’,s+t+1
bi’,t+1 – bi’,s+t+1
(i,1,0)
(i,0,1)
(i’,1,0)
(i’,0,1)
sink
ri<ri’
Figure 6.2: Graph used to verify complement freeness
Each node (i, s, t) in the graph represents the state where s and t items
ranked at least as high as item i are present in sets S and T respectively.
Each path from source to sink determines what items are to be added to
sets S and T , and the arcs are such that these sets will always be disjoint.
If such a path contains an arc from (i, s, t) to (i′, s+ 1, t), this corresponds
to item i′ being present in set S as the (s+ 1)-th best item. If an arc from
(i, s, t) to (i′, s, t + 1) is present in the path, this means that item i′ is in
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set T as the (t + 1)-th best item. We now show that the length of a path
from source to sink in this graph equals b(S) + b(T )− b(S ∪ T ). Each path
from source to sink consists of two types of arcs: those arcs that add item
an item i to the set S, and those arcs that add an item i to T . Given the
choice of the costs of the arcs, the length of a path equals
∑
i∈S
(bi,k(i,S) − bi,k(i,S∪T )) +
∑
i∈T
(bi,k(i,T ) − bi,k(i,S∪T ))
=
∑
i∈S
bi,k(i,S) +
∑
i∈T
bi,k(i,T ) −
∑
i∈S∪T
bi,k(i,S∪T )
= b(S) + b(T )− b(S ∪ T ).
Thus, if a shortest path in this graph has a non-negative length, then the
matrix bid b is complement free, and vice versa. Since the graph is acyclic
and contains a number of nodes and arcs that is polynomial in the number
of items (O(m3) and O(m4) respectively), verifying whether a matrix bid is
complement free can be done in polynomial time. ¤
Complement free valuations find their natural counterpart in substitute free
valuations, for which b(S ∪ T ) > b(S) + b(T ) for all disjoint sets S and T .
This property is also known as superadditivity. The set packing formulation
of the winner determination problem (see (1.1)-(1.4)) can be written more
succinctly if all bid functions are superadditive (de Vries & Vohra 2003). In
this case, there is no need to prevent a bidder from winning multiple bids.
Furthermore, the auctioneer only needs to take into account the highest bid
for each set.
Notice that having bik values that are non-decreasing in the rows is a suf-
ficient condition for a matrix bid to be superadditive. Non-decreasing bik
values in the rows is, however, not a necessary condition, which is illustrated
by the matrix bid below.
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item x 0
item y 1 2
item z 2 3 2
Verifying whether a matrix bid satisfies the substitute free property can
also be done in polynomial time. Using the same graph as in theorem 18,
a longest path with non-positive length implies superadditivity of the given
matrix bid. Since this graph has no cycles, its longest path can be found in
polynomial time.
Corollary 1. Verifying whether a matrix bid b satisfies the substitute free
property can be done in polynomial time.
6.3.3 Decreasing marginal valuations
In many practical applications, and also in most of microeconomic theory,
it is assumed that the more items an agent has, the less he values an extra
item. This concept is called decreasing marginal valuations. It is also an
assumption in chapters 2 to 4, where a buyer expects a discount from its
suppliers if a larger volume was purchased.
Definition 3. A bid function b has decreasing marginal valuations if
b(T ∪ {x})− b(T ) 6 b(S ∪ {x})− b(S) ∀S ⊆ T, x ∈ G. (6.4)
Moulin (1988) showed that a (bid) function has decreasing marginal valua-
tions if and only if it is submodular.
Definition 4. A bid function b is submodular if
b(S ∪ T ) + b(S ∩ T ) 6 b(S) + b(T ) ∀S, T ⊆ G. (6.5)
Lehmann et al. (2001) show that a valuation where the items have decreasing
marginal valuations is also complement free (assuming that this valuation
function satisfies free disposal and normalization). The authors also pro-
vide an example that illustrates that the converse is not true. Indeed, a
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complement free valuation function may still have so-called hidden comple-
mentarities. When we consider a bidder’s valuation for a set of items A,
given that this bidder already acquired some set of items W (W ∩ A = ∅),
complementarities may still arise. In other words, even if a bid function
b is complement free, this is not necessarily the case for marginal bids b′,
defined by b′(A) = b(A|W ) = b(A ∪W )− b(W ). If we want to enforce that
the marginal bids are complement free as well, the bid function b is required
to be submodular (Lehmann et al. 2001). This phenomenon may play a role
in an auction with multiple rounds.
Lehmann et al. (2001) also show that the winner determination problem for
bidders with a submodular bid function remainsNP -hard, but that a greedy
algorithm produces a 1/2-approximation. This algorithm simply assigns the
items one by one (in no particular order) to the bidder with the highest
marginal value for that item, given the other items that bidder already
acquired. The following example with two items (x and y) and two bidders
(A and B) shows that this approximation is tight, even for submodular
matrix bids.
bidder A bidder B
item x 1 item x 1
item y 1 0 item y 0 0
The optimal total winning bid value for the auctioneer in this auction is 2,
by allocating item x to bidder B and item y to bidder A. However, the
greedy algorithm can generate a total winning bid value of 1, by starting
with allocating item x arbitrarily to bidder A and ending up with marginal
bids of zero for item y. Khot, Lipton, Markakis & Mehta (2005) show that
if each bidder can determine his valuation for a given set in polynomial time
and if this valuation function is submodular, it is NP -hard to approximate
the optimal solution by a factor better than e−1e . This result assumes that,
given external prices for all items, bidders cannot determine in polynomial
time (in the number of items and bidders) for which set their valuation ex-
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ceeds the sum of the prices of the items in that set the most.
Day (2004) suggests that a matrix bid with bik values that are non-increasing
in both the rows and the columns represents a bid function with decreas-
ing marginal valuations. Notice from the example below that this is not
necessarily the case (with S = {x, z} and T = {y, z}).
item x 7
item y 6 5
item z 5 1 0
Furthermore, not all bid functions with decreasing marginal valuations can
be represented as a matrix bid, as can be easily verified for the submodular
bid function b that produces the following bids on each subset of the item
set {x, y, z}: b({}) = 0, b({x}) = 1, b({y}) = 2, b({z}) = 3, b({x, y}) = 3,
b({y, z}) = 3, b({x, z}) = 3 and b({x, y, z}) = 3.
We can, however, verify whether a matrix bid represents a valuation func-
tion with decreasing marginal valuations in polynomial time.
Theorem 19. Verifying whether a matrix bid b has decreasing marginal
valuations can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Using the equivalence result by Moulin (1988), it is sufficient to
establish the existence of sets of items S and T , for which b(S) + b(T ) −
b(S∪T )−b(S∩T ) < 0, in order to find out whether a matrix bid is not sub-
modular. We show that the existence of such sets can be verified by solving
a shortest path problem, again by adapting the construction described in
Theorem 17.
Consider a graph containing a source, a sink, and nodes, indexed by (i, s, t, c).
The index i refers to item i, with 1 6 i 6 m. The indices s, t and c
range from 0 to ri, though no nodes are needed if both s and t are 0.
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There are arcs from each node (i, s, t, c) to (i′, s + 1, t, c), (i′, s, t + 1, c)
and (i′, s + 1, t + 1, c + 1), for all items i′ ranked lower than i. Further-
more, there are arcs from the source to each node (i, 1, 0, 0), (i, 0, 1, 0)
and (i, 1, 1, 1), and there are arcs from each node but the source to the
sink. Let the cost on the arc from (i, s, t, c) to (i′, s + 1, t, c) be equal to
bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+t−c+1 and let the cost on the arc to (i′, s, t + 1, c) be equal to
bi′,t+1 − bi′,s+t−c+1. The arcs from (i, s, t, c) to (i′, s+ 1, t+ 1, c+ 1) have a
cost equal to bi′,s+1 + bi′,t+1 − bi′,s+t−c+1 − bi′,c+1. The arcs from the source
to each node (i, 1, 0, 0), (i, 0, 1, 0) and (i, 1, 1, 1), and also all arcs to the sink
have a cost equal to zero. Figure 6.3 illustrates this acyclic graph; arcs with
no indication of their cost have a cost equal to 0.
(i,s,t,c)
(i’,s+1,t,c)
(i’,s,t+1,c)
source
bi’,s+1 – bi’,s+t-c+1
bi’,t+1 – bi’,s+t-c+1
(i,0,1,0)
(i,1,1,1)
(i’,1,0,0)
(i’,0,1,0) sink
ri<ri’
(i,1,0,0)
(i’,1,1,1)
(i’,s+1,t+1,c+1)
bi’,s+1 + bi’,t+1 – bi’,s+t-c+1 - bi’,c+1
Figure 6.3: Graph used to verify decreasing marginal valuations
The graph should be interpreted as follows. Each node (i, s, t, c) stands for
a state where s, t, and c items ranked at least as high as item i that are in
sets S, T , and S ∩T respectively. Each path from source to sink determines
what items are to be added to sets S and T , and there is a path from source
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to sink for each possible S and T . If the arc from (i, s, t, c) to (i′, s+1, t, c) is
included in the path, this means that item i′ is in set S as the (s+1)-th best
item, whereas the arc to (i′, s, t+1, c) corresponds to item i′ being in set T ,
as the (t+ 1)-th best item. The arc from (i, s, t, c) to (i′, s+ 1, t+ 1, c+ 1)
corresponds to adding item i′ to both S and T , where c + 1 is the number
of items in S ∩ T ranked at least as high as i′.
We now show that the length of a path from source to sink corresponds to
b(S)+ b(T )− b(S ∪T )− b(S ∩T ). Each path consists of three types of arcs:
those arcs that add an item i to S and not to T , those that add an item i
to T and not to S, and those that add an item i to both S and T . Given
the choice of the costs of these arcs, the length of the path equals
∑
i∈S\T
(bi,k(i,S) − bi,k(i,S∪T )) +
∑
i∈T\S
(bi,k(i,T ) − bi,k(i,S∪T ))
+
∑
i∈S∩T
(bi,k(i,S) + bi,k(i,T ) − bi,k(i,S∪T ) − bi,k(i,S∩T ))
=
∑
i∈S
bi,k(i,S) +
∑
i∈T
bi,k(i,T ) −
∑
i∈S∪T
bi,k(i,S∪T ) −
∑
i∈S∩T
bi,k(i,S∩T )
= b(S) + b(T )− b(S ∪ T )− b(S ∩ T ).
Thus, if the shortest path in this graph has a non-negative length, then
the matrix bid has decreasing marginal valuations, and vice versa. Since
the graph contains a number of nodes and arcs that is polynomial in the
number of items (O(m4) and O(m5) respectively), it is clear that verifying
whether a matrix bid b has decreasing marginal valuations can be done in
polynomial time. ¤
If a bid function b satisfies the property that b(S∪T )+b(S∩T ) > b(S)+b(T )
for all sets S and T , we call b supermodular, or, equivalently, b is said to have
increasing marginal valuations. It is pointed out by de Vries & Vohra (2003)
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that if there are only two bid functions a bidder can have, both of them non-
decreasing, integer valued and supermodular, then the corresponding winner
determination problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Notice that having bik values that are non-decreasing in the rows is no suf-
ficient condition for a matrix bid to be supermodular. Choosing S = {x, z}
and T = {y, z} in the matrix bid below illustrates this.
item x 1
item y 1 2
item z 0 5 6
The same graph as described in theorem 19 can be used to verify whether a
matrix bid is supermodular. Indeed, a longest path from source to sink with
a non-positive length implies that the matrix bid is supermodular. Since
the graph is acyclic, its longest path can be found in polynomial time.
Corollary 2. Verifying whether a matrix bid b has increasing marginal val-
uations can be done in polynomial time.
6.3.4 Gross substitutes property
The gross substitutes property was introduced by Kelso & Crawford (1982)
in the context of a labor market, and applied to auctions by e.g. Bevia,
Quinzii & Silva (1999), and Bikhchandani & Mamer (1997). The gross
substitutes property departs from a price vector p containing prices that are
to be paid for each item i. Given a valuation function b, we can define the
demand set D(p) of the corresponding bidder given the current price vector
p as
D(p) = {argmax
S⊆G
(b(S)−
∑
i∈S
pi)}. (6.6)
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The gross substitutes property requires that a bidder will continue to de-
mand items for which the price did not rise, when other items have become
more expensive. This condition can be defined more formally as follows.
Definition 5. A bid function b satisfies the gross substitutes property if for
all price vectors p 6 q (according to a point-wise comparison) and all sets
S ∈ D(p), there exists a set T ∈ D(q) such that {i ∈ S : pi = qi} ⊆ T .
The gross substitutes property is stronger than submodularity, since Gul &
Stacchetti (1999) show that each bid function that satisfies the gross sub-
stitutes condition is also submodular, whereas the converse is not true. Gul
& Stacchetti (1999) also prove that in an auction where each bidder has
a bid function that satisfies the gross substitutes property, there exists a
price vector and an allocation such that every bidder receives a set of items
that is in his demand set given these prices. This situation is known as a
Walrasian equilibrium. Kelso & Crawford (1982) develop a fully polynomial
approximation scheme for finding this Walrasian equilibrium (see also Nisan
& Segal (2006)).
Assuming that a bid function b has the gross substitutes property leads
to a number of interesting results. Indeed, the LP-relaxation of the set
packing formulation (see (1.1)-(1.4)) for the winner determination prob-
lem of a combinatorial auction where all bidders have bid functions that
satisfy the gross substitutes condition has an integral solution (Kelso &
Crawford 1982, Bikhchandani, de Vries, Schummer & Vohra 2002). Fur-
thermore, Murota & Tamura (2003) and Fujishige & Yang (2003) show
that given a valuation function that satisfies the gross substitutes property
and a price vector, the bidder’s demand set can be computed in polyno-
mial time. Using the equivalence of separation and optimization (Gro¨tschel,
Lova´sz & Schrijver 1981), it follows that in this setting, the winner deter-
mination problem can be solved in polynomial time. Ausubel & Milgrom
(2005) show that if every bidder has gross substitutes bid functions, the
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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction does not suffer from a number weaknesses as
e.g. vulnerability to the use of multiple bidding identities by a single bidder.
The fact that the definition of the gross substitutes property is based on
prices that should be paid for each item is somewhat awkward, since a matrix
bid specifies bids, and the price for a set of items is simply the winning bid
for that set. However, Reijnierse, Potters & van Gellekom (2002) formulated
the following equivalent characterization of the gross substitutes property,
which is independent of prices. A bid function b satisfies the gross substitutes
property if for all S ⊆ G and x, y, z ∈ G the following conditions hold:
b(S ∪ {x, y})− b(S ∪ {x}) 6 b(S ∪ {y})− b(S), and (6.7)
b(S ∪ {x, y}) + b(S ∪ {z})
6 max(b(S ∪ {x, z}) + b(S ∪ {y}), b(S ∪ {y, z}) + b(S ∪ {x})). (6.8)
Reijnierse et al. (2002) also show that it can be checked whether a bid
function satisfies the gross substitutes property in a time complexity of
O(K log3(K)) where K is the number of subsets of G, which equals 2m.
For matrix bids, however, this can be done in a time which is polynomial in
the number of items, as witnessed by the following theorem.
Theorem 20. Verifying whether a matrix bid b satisfies the gross substitutes
property can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. From the equivalence result by Reijnierse et al. (2002) it follows that
a matrix bid b has the gross substitutes property if and only if conditions
(6.7) and (6.8) are satisfied. Moulin (1988) shows that condition (6.7) is
in fact equivalent with submodularity. According to theorem 19, checking
whether a matrix bid b is submodular can be done in polynomial time. As for
condition (6.8), it suffices to consider the setting where x, y, z /∈ S. Indeed,
the matrix bid auction is a single-unit auction, implying b(S ∪ {x}) = b(S)
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if x ∈ S. Using this, it is trivial to see that condition (6.8) where any subset
of {x, y, z} is in S, is satisfied for any submodular matrix bid. In the re-
mainder of this proof, we will show that solving a shortest path problem on
an acyclic graph suffices to check whether a matrix bid b satisfies condition
(6.8) with x, y, z /∈ S. We will first assume that rx < ry < rz (i.e. item
x is ranked higher than item y, which is ranked higher than item z) and
afterwards we will discuss the other settings.
First, we show that for the setting with rx < ry < rz, the following is true:
b(S ∪ {x, z}) + b(S ∪ {y}) = b(S ∪ {y, z}) + b(S ∪ {x}). (6.9)
Indeed, all items i in S that are ranked higher than item x contribute
b(i, k(i, S)) to each of the four terms in equation (6.9), where k(i, S) is the
rank i has amongst the items in S. Item x adds b(x, k(x, S ∪ {x, z})) to the
left-hand side of equation (6.9), which equals b(x, k(x, S ∪ {x})), added to
the right-hand side. Items i ∈ S that are ranked between x and y contribute
b(i, k(i, S))+b(i, k(i, S)+1) to both sides of the equation. Items i ∈ S ranked
between y and z contribute 2b(i, k(i, S)+1) to both the left-hand and right-
hand side of equation (6.9). Furthermore, also item y adds equal amounts to
both sides of the equation, namely b(y, k(y, S∪{y})) and b(y, k(y, S∪{y, z})).
The same goes for item z, adding the equal terms b(z, k(z, S ∪ {x, z})) and
b(z, k(z, S ∪ {y, z})) to the left-hand and the right-hand side respectively.
Finally, items i ∈ S ranked lower than z add b(i, k(i, S)+2)+b(i, k(i, S)+1)
to both sides of the equation. Using this result, condition (6.8) can be re-
formulated as
b(S ∪ {x, y}) + b(S ∪ {z}) 6 b(S ∪ {x, z}) + b(S ∪ {y}). (6.10)
Consider a graph containing a source, a sink and nodes, indexed by (i, s, q).
The index i refers to item i and ranges from 1 to m, whereas s ranges from
0 to ri and q ranges from 0 to 3. There are arcs from each node (i, s, q)
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Table 6.1: Cost on the arcs from (i, s, q) to (i′, s + 1, q) and to (i′, s, q + 1), de-
pending on the value for q.
(i, s, q)→ (i′, s+ 1, q) (i, s, q)→ (i′, s, q + 1)
q = 0 bi′,s+1 + bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+1 = 0 bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+1 = 0
q = 1 bi′,s+2 + bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+2 − bi′,s+1 = 0 bi′,s+2 − bi′,s+1
q = 2 bi′,s+3 + bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+2 − bi′,s+2 bi′,s+1 − bi′,s+2
q = 3 bi′,s+3 + bi′,s+2 − bi′,s+3 − bi′,s+2 = 0 (no such arc exists)
to (i′, s + 1, q) and to (i′, s, q + 1), for all items i′ ranked lower than i and
insofar q+1 6 3. Furthermore, there are arcs from the source to each node
(i, 1, 0) and (i, 0, 1), and there are arcs from each node (i, s, 3) to the sink.
Depending on the value for q, the arc from (i, s, q) to (i′, s + 1, q) and the
arc from (i, s, q) to (i′, s, q + 1) have costs as presented in table 6.1. The
arcs from the source to each node (i, 1, 0), and(i, 0, 1), and also all arcs to
the sink have a cost equal to zero.
The graph can be interpreted as follows. Each node (i, s, q) represents a
state where s items ranked at least as high as item i are in set S. The index
q keeps track of how many of the items x, y, and z are ranked at least as
high as item i, and should be understood as follows.
q = 0 : rx > ri
q = 1 : ry > ri > rx
q = 2 : rz > ri > ry
q = 3 : ri > rz
Each path from source to sink determines which items are to be added to
set S and which items are selected to play the role of x, y and z. If the path
contains an arc from (i, s, q) or from the source to (i′, s+1, q), this indicates
that item i′ is added to the set S, as the (s + 1)-th highest ranked item.
An arc from (i, s, q) or from the source to (i′, s, q + 1) indicates that item i′
is selected as item x, y or z, for q = 0, q = 1, or q = 2 respectively. The
fact that there are only arcs from nodes (i, s, 3) to the sink, guarantees that
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items x, y and z are selected in each path from the source to the sink.
We now show that the length of a path from source to sink in this graph
equals b(S∪{x, y})+b(S∪{z})−b(S∪{x, z})− b(S∪{y}). Each path from
source to sink has exactly one arc that selects an item x (namely the arc
where q increases from 0 to 1), one arc that selects an item y (q increases
from 1 to 2), and one arc that selects an item z (q increases from 2 to 3).
The other arcs in the path can be divided into four types: those arcs that
add an item i ranked higher than x to the set S, those arcs that add an
item i ranked between x and y to S, those arcs that add an item i ranked
between y and z to S, and those arcs that add an item i ranked lower than
z. From the costs in table 6.1, it follows that the length of a path from
source to sink equals
∑
i∈S:rx>ri
(bi,k(i,S∪{x,y}) + bi,k(i,S∪{z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{x,z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{y}))
+
∑
i∈S:ry>ri>rx
(bi,k(i,S∪{x,y}) + bi,k(i,S∪{z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{x,z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{y}))
+
∑
i∈S:rz>ri>ry
(bi,k(i,S∪{x,y}) + bi,k(i,S∪{z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{x,z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{y}))
+
∑
i∈S:ri>rz
(bi,k(i,S∪{x,y}) + bi,k(i,S∪{z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{x,z}) − bi,k(i,S∪{y}))
+bx,k(x,S∪{x,y}) − bx,k(x,S∪{x,z}) + by,k(y,S∪{x,y}) − by,k(y,S∪{y})
+bz,k(z,S∪{z}) − bz,k(z,S∪{x,z})
=
∑
i∈S∪{x,y}
bi,k(i,S∪{x,y}) +
∑
i∈S∪{z}
bi,k(i,S∪{z})
−
∑
i∈S∪{x,z}
bi,k(i,S∪{x,z}) −
∑
i∈S∪{y}
bi,k(i,S∪{y})
= b(S ∪ {x, y}) + b(S ∪ {z})− b(S ∪ {x, z})− b(S ∪ {y}).
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Thus, if this graph has a shortest path with non-negative length, then condi-
tion (6.8) is satisfied for every S and every x, y, z /∈ S such that rx < ry < rz.
Moreover, a similar reasoning can be used to prove that this result is also
valid if ry < rx < rz.
We now show that for the setting with rx < rz < ry, condition (6.8) is
satisfied for any matrix bid, since
b(S ∪ {x, y}) + b(S ∪ {z}) = b(S ∪ {y, z}) + b(S ∪ {x}). (6.11)
Observe that all items i in S that are ranked higher than item x con-
tribute b(i, k(i, S)) to each of the terms in equation (6.11). Item x adds
b(x, k(x, S ∪ {x, y})) to the left-hand side of equation (6.11), which equals
b(x, k(x, S∪{x})), added to the right-hand side. Items i ∈ S that are ranked
between x and z contribute b(i, k(i, S))+b(i, k(i, S)+1) to both sides of the
equation. Also item z adds an equal to term to both sides of the equation,
namely b(z, k(z, S ∪ {z})) and b(z, k(z, S ∪ {y, z})) to the left-hand and the
right-hand side respectively. Items i ∈ S ranked between z and y contribute
2b(i, k(i, S)+1) to both the left-hand and right-hand side of equation (6.11).
Furthermore, also item y adds equal amounts to both sides of the equation,
namely b(y, k(y, S ∪ {x, y})) and b(y, k(y, S ∪ {y, z})). Finally, items i ∈ S
ranked lower than y add b(i, k(i, S) + 2) + b(i, k(i, S) + 1) to both sides of
the equation. A similar reasoning can be used to show that equality (6.11)
is also valid for a setting with rz < rx < ry. Obviously, condition (6.8) is
satisfied for any matrix bid that satisfies equality (6.11).
An analogous proof can be developed to show that condition (6.8) is also
always satisfied for the settings with ry < rz < rx or rz < ry < rx, since
b(S ∪ {x, y}) + b(S ∪ {z}) = b(S ∪ {x, z}) + b(S ∪ {y}). (6.12)
We can conclude that it can be verified in polynomial time whether a matrix
bid satisfies conditions (6.7) and (6.8) by solving a shortest path problem
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on two graphs, with a number of nodes and arcs that is polynomial in the
number of items (O(m4) and O(m5), and O(m2) and O(m3) respectively). If
the shortest paths in both graphs have a non-negative length, then the ma-
trix bid has the gross substitutes property. Otherwise, if one of the shortest
paths has a negative length, the matrix bid does not have the gross substi-
tutes property. ¤
6.4 Expressing arbitrary bids as a matrix bid
The matrix bid auction fits in the scope of the restricted preference approach,
which accepts that bidders cannot fully express their preferences in order to
solve the winner determination problem more efficiently. In section 6.4.1, we
describe an algorithm that answers the question whether a given collection
of bids can be represented in a matrix bid. If the answer is no, we need to
find a matrix bid that offers a good approximation of the bids. This is what
is done in section 6.4.2, by generalizing the algorithm of section 6.4.1.
6.4.1 Exact expression of a bid function using a matrix bid
From the description in section 6.1, it is clear that not every bid function
can be represented by a matrix bid. This is due to the fact that there is
in general only one entry available to express the added value of an item
to many sets. Indeed, whereas there is only one set corresponding to the
entries on the first column and to those on the diagonal, this is not the case
for the other entries. Day (2004) shows that for each entry bik, the number
of sets containing k − 1 items ranked higher than i corresponds to Pascal’s
triangle1, which implies that the entries towards the middle and the bot-
tom depend on the largest number of sets (notice that we drop the index
j again, since this section deals only with the bid function of a single bidder).
1see http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PascalsTriangle.html
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As mentioned in section 6.1, an arbitrary bid function can be represented
as a matrix bid if and only if the incremental value an item adds to a set is
determined only by the number of higher ranked items in that set. Although
a list of bidder types that can be represented in a matrix bid (see section
6.2) gives some insight in the expressiveness of the matrix bid language, a
test to determine whether a given collection of bids can fit into a matrix bid
would be useful as well. Indeed, in practice, bidders do not necessarily bid
according to a well-known structure, but often simply express a number of
bids on various sets of their interest.
Consider a given set of items G, with |G| = m, and bids v(S) with S ⊆ G.
A naive way of verifying whether the given bids can fit into a matrix bid
involves checking every possible ranking of the items; this has a time com-
plexity of O(m!2m). The following procedure FIT(p,G, v) tries to fill the
first p rows of the matrix bid with items in G, such that the bids that follow
from this matrix bid correspond with the given bids v. In other words, if such
a matrix bid exists, FIT(m,G, v) returns YES and produces the ranking of
the items and entries bik. Otherwise, FIT(m,G, v) returns NO, indicating
that the given bids cannot be represented in a matrix bid.
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Algorithm 1 FIT(p,G, v)
STEP 1:
L← G; A← {};
Go to STEP 2;
STEP 2:
Pick an item i from L;
L← L \ {i}; k ← 1;
Go to STEP 3;
STEP 3:
∃bik ∈ IR : v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = bik for all sets S ⊆ G \ {i} with |S| = k − 1?
if YES then
if (k < p) then
k ← k + 1;
Go to STEP 3;
else
A← A ∪ {i};
if (L 6= {}) then
Go to STEP 2;
else
Go to STEP 4;
end if
end if
end if
if NO then
if (L 6= {}) then
Go to STEP 2;
else
Go to STEP 4;
end if
end if
STEP 4:
if (A = {}) then
return NO;
else
for (i ∈ A) do
ri = p;
Fill row p with bik with 1 6 k 6 p;
p← p− 1;
end for
if (p = 0) then
return YES;
else
FIT(p,G \A, v);
end if
end if
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Theorem 21. FIT(m,G, v) recognizes whether a bid function b, defined on
subsets of a set G, containing m items, can be expressed as a matrix bid.
Proof. The algorithm FIT(p,G, v) searches for items in G that can be
placed on the p-th row of the matrix bid. To keep track of these items, the
algorithm uses the set A, which is initialized to the empty set in step 1.
Furthermore, the algorithm initializes the set L of items that still need to
be assigned to a row p. In step 2, an item is picked from L. In step 3, we
verify whether a value can be found for an entry k on row p that satisfies
the requirements that follow from the given bids v. By repeating step 3 for
every entry of row p, we find out whether item i can be placed on row p;
if this is the case, we add it to A. From the way a bid is computed from a
matrix bid (see 6.1), it follows that the key condition is indeed:
∃bik ∈ IR : v(S∪{i})−v(S) = bik,∀S ⊆ G\{i} : |S| = k−1, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., p}?
This condition is checked for all items that have not yet been placed on a
row of the matrix bid. If we find a non-empty set A in step 4, we can use the
items in A to fill rows p− |A|+1 to p, with the bik values that are obtained
in step 3. Indeed, if an item can be placed on row p, it can also be placed
on a higher ranked row (i.e. p− 1, p− 2, etc.) since the sets for which the
condition in step 3 needs to be valid on such a row are a subset of the sets
that need to satisfy the condition for row p. Notice that the choice of which
item of A should be placed on which row from p− |A|+1 to p has no effect
on choices made regarding rows lower than p or higher than p − |A| + 1.
At this point, we perform the FIT algorithm again, in order to place the
remaining G \ A items on the remaining p − |A| rows. If we can continue
the algorithm until all rows have been filled with an item, then clearly the
given bids can be represented by a matrix bid.
If at some stage in step 4, the set A is empty, then we conclude that there
is no way to represent the bids in a matrix bid. Indeed, this means that we
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found at some row q a set Q of items (with |Q| = q) that cannot be placed
at that row q. We also know that none of these items can be placed at a row
ranked lower than q (i.e. q + 1, q + 2, etc.), since otherwise this would have
been clear at an earlier stage of the algorithm. Therefore, we can conclude
that if the algorithm returns NO, no matrix bid exists that represents the
given bids. ¤
In order to verify whether there exists an entry for item i on column k of
row p, we need to check all sets of size k − 1 that do not contain item i.
Thus, verifying whether an item fits on a row requires processing at most 2m
sets. As a result, this algorithm has a time complexity of O(m22m), which
is exponential in the number of items m, but polynomial in the input, being
the number of bids, i.e. 2m.
6.4.2 Approximate expression of a bid function using a ma-
trix bid
In this section, we focus on the question how we can approximate a given
collection of bids by a matrix bid. Day (2004) points out that such an ap-
proximation should ideally be safe and effective. An approximation is safe
if it does not expose the bidder to paying more than he is willing to for any
set. An approximation consisting of entries aik is effective if there exists no
other safe approximation with entries bik such that bik > aik for all i ∈ G
and all k ∈ {1, ..., ri} and bik > aik for at least one i ∈ G and k ∈ {1, ..., ri}.
Day (2004) also points out that the entries in the first column and on the
diagonal can always be filled in exactly, since they correspond to only one
set. However, no advice is given on how to choose one of the m! possible
rankings of the items.
The following algorithm APPROX(m,G, v) is an adaptation of the FIT al-
gorithm, such that if no item is found that fits on some row of the matrix
122 6.4. Expressing arbitrary bids as a matrix bid
bid, an item q is selected and a safe approximation is constructed. Indeed,
if no item fits on some row, there is for each item at least one entry on that
row for which there is no single value that represents the marginal value of
that item for all relevant sets. The selected item q is that item for which
the sum of absolute values of the difference between the highest and the
lowest marginal value is minimal. In case there are multiple such items, the
algorithm makes an arbitrary choice among these items.
Algorithm 2 APPROX(m,G, v)
for (p = m downto 1) do
for (i ∈ G) do
for (k = 1 to p) do
high(i, k)← maxS⊆G\{i}:|S|=k−1(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S));
low(i, k)← minS⊆G\{i}:|S|=k−1(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S));
end for
d(i)←∑pk=1 |high(i, k)− low(i, k)|;
end for
Q← argmini d(i);
Pick an arbitrary q ∈ Q;
G← G \ {q};
rq = p;
for (k = 1 to p) do
bqk ← low(q, k);
end for
end for
Notice that the notion of a safe approximation is especially important when
the matrix bid is expressed by the bidder and communicated to the auction-
eer. However, it may also be the case that the bidder does not communicate
his bids as a matrix bid, but that the auctioneer translates them to a matrix
bid. The auctioneer might do this in order to benefit from the fact that the
winner determination problem of a matrix bid auction can be solved more
efficiently than that of a general auction (see Day & Raghavan (2006)). If
this is the case, the approximation need not necessarily be safe, since the
auctioneer could use it only to determine the allocation, and use the original
bids to determine the actual prices. In this case, the choice for the average
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of the highest and the lowest marginal value (or even the highest marginal
value) as an approximate entry bqk in the matrix bid could be motivated as
well.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focussed on the matrix bid auction, which is a combina-
torial auction where a restriction is imposed on the preferences that can be
expressed by a bidder. We investigated the structure on the bids implied by
this auction and revealed the relationship between a matrix bid and concepts
like free disposal, complement freeness, decreasing marginal valuations, and
gross substitutes. Finally, we developed tools that should facilitate the use
of the matrix bid auction in practice. Given a number of bids, we found
a way to determine whether these bids can be expressed as a matrix bid.
Finally, we also show how to approximate these bids in a matrix bid if an
exact representation is not possible.
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Chapter 7
Exact algorithms for the
matrix bid auction
In this chapter, we focus on solving the winner determination problem for
the matrix bid auction (see chapter 6) exactly. In section 7.1, we discuss
the computational complexity of the special case of the matrix bid auction
winner determination problem that arises if all bidders have the same rank-
ing of the items. Section 7.2 deals with two mathematical programming
formulations for the general matrix bid auction winner determination prob-
lem. Based on one of these formulations, we develop two branch-and-price
algorithms to solve the winner determination problem in section 7.3. Fi-
nally, in section 7.4, we present computational results for these algorithms
and compare them with results from the branch-and-cut approach by Day
(2004).
7.1 Computational complexity
In the matrix bid auction, the key assumption is that for each bidder, the ex-
tra value an item adds to a set depends only on the number of higher ranked
items in that set, according to the ranking of that bidder. This assumption
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does not prevent the bidder from expressing a bid on any combination of
items, but restricts what these bids can be. Despite this restriction, the win-
ner determination problem of the matrix bid auction isNP -hard (Day 2004).
Even if each bidder has the same ranking of the items, the matrix bid auc-
tion winner determination problem remains NP -hard. Moreover, unless
P = NP , there exists no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS)
for this problem.
Theorem 22. There exists no polynomial-time approximation scheme for
the winner determination problem for the matrix bid auction where all bid-
ders have an identical ranking of the items, unless P = NP .
Proof. We consider the winner determination problem for the matrix bid
auction where all bidders have an identical ranking. We refer to this problem
as MBI. The reduction is from the 3-dimensional matching (3DM) problem.
The 3DM problem is described as follows: given a set M ⊆ X × Y × Z of
triples, where each of the sets X, Y and Z has exactly q elements, find the
largest matching in M . Kann (1991) shows that it is NP -hard to decide
whether there exists a matching of size q, or whether every matching has a
size of at most (1− δ)q for some fixed δ > 0 (see also Petrank (1994)).
Every instance of 3DM can be reduced to an MBI instance in polynomial
time. Suppose that the 3q elements of the sets X, Y , and Z correspond to
3q items and that each 3-element subset in M corresponds to a bidder. We
pick an arbitrary ordering of the items and let this be the ranking of the
items for each bidder. Each bidder thus has a matrix bid with this ranking
and with the following entries. The highest ranked item of the triple cor-
responding to the bidder gets a value of 1 in the first column, the second
highest ranked item gets a value of 2 in the second column, and the third
highest ranked item gets a value of 3 in the third column. All other entries
get a value of zero.
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If an instance of 3DM has a matching of size q, then the corresponding in-
stance of MBI has a solution of value 6q. Indeed, a solution of 3DM consists
of q pairwise disjoint 3-element subsets, corresponding to q bidders in MBI.
Each supplier has a bid of 6 for the 3 items represented by the 3-element
subset. Accepting these bids leads to a sum of winning bids equal to 6q.
Since every element of X∪Y ∪Z occurs exactly once in the solution of 3DM,
every item will also be auctioned exactly once in the MBI solution.
If our instance of 3DM has a matching of size at most (1 − δ)q, at most
(1 − δ)q entries with value 3 in the matrix bids can be used, resulting in a
MBI solution value of (1− δ)6q. Notice that for a maximal solution value,
we need to use a maximal number of entries with value 3. The number of
items remaining is 3q − 3(1 − δ)q = 3δq. Each pair of these items adds at
most 3 to the solution value, resulting in a maximal solution value for MBI
of
(1− δ)6q + 9δq
2
= (6− 3
2
δ)q.
Consequently, a polynomial-time approximation scheme for MBI would im-
ply that we could distinguish between instances of 3DM with a matching of
size q and instances where every matching has a size of at most (1 − δ)q,
which is an NP -hard problem (Kann 1991). ¤
Notice that it follows from theorem 22 that the winner determination prob-
lem for the matrix bid auction where bidders have an identical ranking of
the items is NP -hard. In this theorem, the number of bidders is part of
the input. In the case that the number of bidders is fixed (and we still as-
sume identical rankings), the winner determination problem can be solved
in polynomial time.
Theorem 23. The winner determination problem for a matrix bid auction
with a fixed number of bidders, all having an identical ordering of the items,
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can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We will show that the winner determination problem for a matrix
bid auction with a fixed number of bidders, say n, all having an identical
ranking r of the items, say 1, 2, ...,m, can be solved by solving a longest
path problem on an acyclic graph involving O(mn+2) nodes and O(nmn+2)
arcs.
This graph contains nodes indexed by (i, s1, s2, ..., sn, k), a source, and a
sink. The index i refers to item i and ranges from 1 to m. The indices sj ,
with j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, and k range from 0 to ri, with
∑
j sj + k = ri. There
are arcs from each node (i, s1, s2, ..., sn, k) to (i+1, s′1, s′2, ..., s′n, k′), provided
that s′j > sj for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, and that k′ > k. Furthermore, there is
an arc from the source to each node (1, s1, s2, ..., sn, k), and an arc from each
node (m, s1, s2, ..., sn, k) to the sink. The arc from node (i, s1, s2, ..., sn, k)
to (i+1, s′1, s′2, ..., s′n, k′) has a cost of bi+1,j,s′j where j is the index for which
s′j = sj + 1, if k
′ = k. If k′ = k + 1, then this arc has a cost of zero. All
arcs to the sink also have a cost of zero. The graph is depicted in Figure 7.1
for a setting with 2 items and 2 bidders. All arcs without indication of the
corresponding cost have a cost equal to zero.
The graph described above should be interpreted as follows. Each node
(i, s1, s2, ..., sn, k) corresponds to a state where a decision has been made on
the allocation of item i and all items ranked higher than i, with each bidder
j receiving sj items and k items remaining with the auctioneer. Selecting an
arc from (i, s1, s2, ..., sn, k) to (i + 1, s′1, s′2, ..., s′n, k′) therefore corresponds
to allocating item i+1 to that bidder j for which s′j = sj +1. If there is no
such bidder, then item i+1 remains with the auctioneer (and k′ = k+1). In
this way, each path from source to sink determines how the items are to be
allocated, and there is a path from the source to the sink for each possible
allocation.
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(1,1,0,0)
(1,0,1,0)
(1,0,0,1)
(2,2,0,0)
(2,0,2,0)
(2,0,0,2)
(2,1,1,0)
(2,1,0,1)
(2,0,1,1)
source
sink
b1,1,1
b1,2,1
b2,1,2
b2,1,1
b2,2,1
b2,2,2
b2,1,1
b2,2,1
Figure 7.1: Illustration of the graph for 2 items and 2 bidders
We now sketch the equivalence between the length of a path in the graph
and the value of an allocation of the items. We know that in a matrix bid,
the value of adding an item i to a set is determined only by the number of
higher ranked items. Since the graph contains only arcs from higher ranked
items to lower ranked items, the effect of adding an item i to a set on the
bid for this set can be determined, regardless of whatever items are added
to the set further down the path. The cost of an arc is nothing else but
the appropriate entry from the matrix bid of the bidder receiving the item.
This means that the length of any path from source to sink corresponds to∑
j bj(Sj), where Sj is the set of items allocated to bidder j, according to
that path. Therefore, the winner determination problem for a matrix bid
auction with a fixed number of bidders, all having an identical ordering of
the items, can be solved by solving a longest path problem. This can be
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done in polynomial time, since the underlying graph is acyclic. ¤
7.2 Mathematical formulations
In this section, we present two mathematical formulations for the matrix
bid auction winner determination problem. The first formulation (see also
Day (2004)) is inspired by the assignment problem, the second by the set
packing problem. We show that the LP-relaxations of both formulations are
equally strong.
We define the binary variable xijk to be 1 if bidder j receives item i as the
k-th best item, and 0 otherwise. This leads to the formulation below, to
which we refer as the assignment formulation.
maximize
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈B
rij∑
k=1
bijkxijk (7.1)
subject to
∑
j∈B
rij∑
k=1
xijk 6 1 ∀i ∈ G (7.2)∑
i∈G:rij≥k
xijk 6 1 ∀j ∈ B,∀k ∈ {1, ..., rij} (7.3)∑
l∈G:k≤rlj≤rij
xljk 6
∑
l∈G:k−1≤rlj<rij
xljk−1 ∀i ∈ G,∀j ∈ B,∀k ∈ {2, ..., rij}
(7.4)
xijk ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ G,∀j ∈ B,∀k ∈ {1, ..., rij}
(7.5)
Constraints (7.2) enforce that each item can be assigned to at most one
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bidder, while constraints (7.3) make sure that for each bidder, at most one
item is the k-th best item in the set this bidder gets. Finally, constraints
(7.4) impose that a bidder cannot get an item as the k-th best item in a
set, unless a higher ranked item was assigned to this bidder as his (k−1)-th
best item in this set. Constraints (7.5) are the integrality constraints.
Notice that the formulation (7.1)-(7.5) is not the minimal correct formula-
tion for the matrix bid winner determination problem. Indeed, constraints
(7.3) for k ∈ {2, ..., rij} are redundant in (7.1)-(7.5), since they are already
enforced by constraints (7.3) for k = 1 and constraints (7.4). Also, replac-
ing constraints (7.4) with the following (weaker) constraints still results in
a correct formulation:
xijk 6
∑
l∈G:k−1≤rlj<rij
xljk−1 ∀i ∈ G,∀j ∈ B, ∀k ∈ {2, ..., rij}.
However, with this formulation, all constraints (7.3) remain necessary.
The set packing formulation below makes use of binary variables y(S, j),
which equals 1 if bidder j wins set S, and 0 otherwise. The first set of
constraints (7.7) enforces that each item is awarded to at most one bidder.
The second set of constraints guarantees (7.8) that no bidder receives more
than one set. The integrality constraints are (7.9).
maximize ∑
j∈B
∑
S⊆G
bj(S)y(S, j) (7.6)
subject to ∑
S⊇{i}
∑
j∈B
y(S, j) 6 1 ∀i ∈ G (7.7)
∑
S⊆G
y(S, j) 6 1 ∀j ∈ B (7.8)
y(S, j) ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ G,∀j ∈ B (7.9)
132 7.2. Mathematical formulations
Notice that this set packing formulation is identical to the formulation (1.1)-
(1.4) for the winner determination problem of a general combinatorial auc-
tion, with Ωj = 2G. Indeed, the matrix bid auction only differs from a
general combinatorial auction in the way bj(S) is computed. Notice also
that the assignment formulation is polynomially sized in the number of bid-
ders and the number of items. This is not the case for the set packing
formulation. In the following theorem, we prove that the LP-relaxation of
the set packing formulation and the LP-relaxation of the assignment formu-
lation are equally strong.
Theorem 24. The LP relaxation of the assignment formulation and the LP
relaxation of the set packing formulation are equally strong. Moreover, if the
assignment formulation has an integral solution that is optimal with respect
to the LP-relaxation, this is also the case for the assignment formulation,
and vice versa.
Proof. In order to prove the first part of this theorem, we need to show
that the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation is at least as strong
as the LP-relaxation of the assignment formulation and vice versa. In order
to prove the first relation, we need to show that any solution yˆ of the LP-
relaxation of the set packing formulation can be transformed to a solution xˆ
of the LP-relaxation of the assignment formulation with the same objective
function value. This is accomplished by the following procedure. For the
remainder of this proof, if we mention a formulation, we mean in fact its
LP-relaxation.
First, we initialize all variables xˆijk to 0, for all i ∈ G, j ∈ B, and k ∈
{1, ..., rij}. We consider each variable yˆ(S, j), with S ⊆ G and j ∈ B once,
and set for each item i in S
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xˆi,j,k(i,j,S) ← xˆi,j,k(i,j,S) + yˆ(S, j). (7.10)
Thus, in this procedure, the value of each variable yˆ(S, j) is added to |S|
xˆijk variables, namely those with item i ∈ S, and k = k(i, j, S). It follows
that the following equality is valid:
rij∑
k=1
xˆijk =
rij∑
k=1
∑
S:i∈S∧k=k(i,j,S)
yˆ(S, j) =
∑
S⊇{i}
yˆ(S, j) ∀i ∈ G, j ∈ B.
(7.11)
Using this equality, we verify that (7.2) holds for xˆ:
∑
j∈B
rij∑
k=1
xˆijk =
∑
j∈B
∑
S⊇{i}
yˆ(S, j) 6 1. (7.12)
Notice that the last inequality follows from the feasibility of yˆ (see (7.7)).
We also establish for j ∈ B, and k ∈ {1, ..., rij}:
∑
i∈G:rij>k
xˆijk =
∑
i∈G
∑
S:i∈S∧k(i,j,S)=k
yˆ(S, j)
=
∑
S:|S|>k
yˆ(S, j)
6
∑
S⊆G
yˆ(S, j) 6 1, (7.13)
which shows that xˆ satisfies (7.3). Finally, we have that for each i ∈ G,
j ∈ B, and k = 1, ..., rij :
∑
l∈G:k≤rlj≤rij
xˆljk =
∑
l∈G:rlj6rij
∑
S:l∈S∧k(l,j,S)=k
yˆ(S, j). (7.14)
Thus we can write for each i ∈ G, j ∈ B, and k = 2, ..., rij :
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∑
l∈G:k≤rlj≤rij
xˆljk −
∑
l∈G:k−1≤rlj<rij
xˆljk−1 =
∑
l∈G:rlj6rij
∑
S:l∈S∧k(l,j,S)=k
yˆ(S, j)−
∑
l∈G:rlj6rij
∑
S:l∈S∧k(l,j,S)=k−1
yˆ(S, j).
(7.15)
Consider some yˆ(S, j) occurring in the first term. The corresponding set S
has at the k-th position (k > 2) some item l, rlj 6 rij . It follows that there
must be some other item, say l′ with rl′j 6 rlj at position k− 1. Hence this
yˆ(S, j) also occurs in the second term. It follows that the expression (7.15)
cannot have a positive value, and hence (7.4) is satisfied. Notice also that
the transformation procedure (7.10) does not affect the objective function
value. Moreover, it transforms any integral solution yˆ to an integral solution
xˆ.
Hence, we have shown that the set packing formulation is at least as strong
as the assignment formulation and if the set packing formulation has an
integral solution that is optimal with respect to the LP-relaxation, this is
also the case for the assignment formulation. In the remainder of this proof,
we show that the assignment formulation is at least strong as the set pack-
ing formulation. In order to prove this second relation, we show that any
solution xˆ of the LP-relaxation of the assignment formulation can be trans-
formed to a solution yˆ of the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation
with the same objective function value. This is accomplished by the follow-
ing procedure, CONVERT(xˆ).
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Algorithm 3 CONVERT(xˆ)
for (j ∈ B) do
Initialize yˆ(S, j)← 0 for all S ⊆ G;
Step 1:
for (i ∈ G) do
yˆ({i}, j)← xˆij1
end for
Step 2:
for (k = 2 to m) do
for (i ∈ G: rij = k to m) do
Step 2a:
T = {S ⊆ {i′ : ri′j < rij} : |S| = k − 1};
while (xˆijk > 0) do
Pick a set S from T and remove S from T ;
if (xˆijk > yˆ(S, j)) then
yˆ(S ∪ {i}, j)← yˆ(S, j);
xˆijk ← xˆijk − yˆ(S, j);
yˆ(S, j)← 0;
else
yˆ(S ∪ {i}, j)← xˆijk;
yˆ(S, j)← yˆ(S, j)− xˆijk;
xˆijk ← 0;
end if
end while
end for
end for
end for
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The CONVERT procedure translates any solution for the assignment for-
mulation to a solution for set packing formulation. First, we argue that the
CONVERT algorithm terminates.
The crucial step in the CONVERT algorithm is step 2a, which has to be
performed for each bidder j, for each k from 2 to m, and for each i ∈ G with
rij > k. Let us consider now a bidder j, item i, and rank k, for which step
2a is to be performed, and let y˜(S, j) be the solution as it is constructed by
the CONVERT algorithm so far. In order to guarantee that the while loop
in step 2a terminates, we need:
xˆijk 6
∑
S:S⊆{i′:ri′j<rij}∧|S|=k−1
y˜(S, j). (7.16)
Notice that in CONVERT, so far, each variable y˜(S, j), with |S| = k − 1
and l being the lowest ranked item in S, has been increased at most once,
namely with (a fraction of) xˆl,j,k−1. Furthermore, the total value of xˆl,j,k−1
has been added exclusively over variables y˜(S, j) with |S| = k − 1 and l the
lowest ranked item in S. Therefore, we have that the total fraction that has
been added to variables y˜(S, j) with S containing k− 1 items ranked higher
than i equals:
∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k−1. (7.17)
Notice that the value of each variable y˜(S, j) may also have been decreased
in CONVERT. Indeed, variables y˜(S, j) with S containing k − 1 items and
the one with the lowest rank being l, can be decreased only with (a fraction
of) variables xˆi′,j,k with i′ ranked higher than l, and lower than i (since step
2a has not yet been performed for rank k and item i or items ranked lower
than i). Furthermore, the total value of xˆl,j,k has been subtracted only from
variables y˜(S, j), with S containing k − 1 items, all ranked higher than l.
Therefore, we have that the total fraction that has been subtracted from
variables y˜(S, j) with S containing k− 1 items ranked higher than i equals:
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∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k. (7.18)
Thus,
∑
S:S⊆{i′:ri′j<rij}∧|S|=k−1
y˜(S, j) =
∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k−1 −
∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k.
(7.19)
Further, it follows from (7.4) that
xˆijk 6
∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k−1 −
∑
i′:k6ri′j<rij
xˆi′,j,k (7.20)
for each bidder j, for each k from 2 to m, and for each i ∈ G with rij > k.
From (7.19) and (7.20) we conclude that (7.16) is true and hence the CON-
VERT algorithm terminates.
We now argue that solution yˆ is indeed feasible with respect to constraints
(7.7), (7.8), and the relaxation of (7.9).
For each bidder j and each item i, it is clear that after step 1,
∑
S⊇{i} yˆ(S, j) =
xˆij1. In step 2, each value xˆijk is spread over one or more variables yˆ(S, j)
with S containing item i. Also, for each variable yˆ(S, j) that is increased,
a variable yˆ(S \ {i}, j) is decreased with the same value. Therefore, af-
ter step 2,
∑
S⊇{i} yˆ(S, j) 6
∑rij
k=1 xˆijk. Summing over the bidders gives∑
j∈B
∑
S⊇{i} yˆ(S, j) 6
∑
j∈B
∑rij
k=1 xˆijk. Given (7.2), this implies that con-
straints (7.7) are satisfied.
For each bidder j, it is clear that after step 1 of CONVERT,
∑
S⊆G yˆ(S, j) =∑
i∈G xˆij1. In step 2, for every variable yˆ(S, j) whose value is increased, there
is some other variable yˆ(S′, j) whose value is reduced by the same amount.
Given (7.3), this implies that constraints (7.8) are satisfied.
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Each variable yˆ(S, j) is increased by at most one variable xˆijk. Therefore, it
follows from the relaxation of constraints (7.5) that yˆ(S, j) 6 1 for all S ⊆ G
and each bidder j. By construction of the algorithm, no variable yˆ(S, j) will
have a value less than zero. Thus, yˆ satisfies the relaxation of constraints
(7.9).
Further, the objective function value of both solutions xˆ and yˆ is the same.
Consider any bidder j. After step 1, the objective function of solution yˆ
has a value equal to
∑
i∈G bij1xˆij1, since b({i}, j) = bij1. Every time step
2a is performed, the objective function value is increased by (b(S ∪{i}, j)−
b(S, j))xˆijk. Since set S contains only items ranked higher than item i, we
have b(S∪{i}, j)−b(S, j) = bijk, where k is the number of items in S plus one.
Therefore, after step 2 the objective function equals
∑
i∈G
∑rij
k=1 bij1xˆij1.
Summing over all bidders j shows that the CONVERT(xˆ) procedure pro-
duces a solution yˆ with the same objective function value as xˆ.
Finally, it is easy to see that if the CONVERT procedure is confronted with
an integral solution xˆ, it will produce an integral solution yˆ. Thus, we can
conclude that the assignment formulation and the set packing formulation
are equally strong, and that if one formulation has an integral optimal so-
lution, this is also the case for the other formulation. ¤
7.3 Branch-and-price algorithms for solving the
matrix bid auction
Theorem 24 shows that the set packing formulation (7.6)-(7.9) is equally
strong as the assignment formulation (7.1)-(7.5). Here we outline an algo-
rithm based on the set packing formulation. Solving the LP-relaxation of
the set packing formulation is however not trivial, given the huge amount of
variables (n2m). Considering that only a small percentage of these variables
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are nonzero in an optimal solution, column generation suggests itself as an
efficient solution technique. Column generation was proposed by Dantzig
& Wolfe (1960) and starts by solving the LP-relaxation considering only a
restricted subset of the variables. This problem is also called the restricted
master problem. Notice that this problem can be restricted to m + n vari-
ables, whereas the assignment formulation requires nm(m+ 1)/2 variables,
which may still be large. The next step is to verify whether any of the
variables that were not considered could improve the current solution. In
other words, we search for a variable with a non-negative reduced cost. This
problem is called the pricing problem. If we find such a variable, we add
it to the restricted master problem and solve it again. This re-optimizing
and pricing is to be repeated until the pricing problem fails to produce new
variables, indicating that the LP-relaxation has been solved to optimality.
Notice that the column generation procedure does not guarantee to find
an integral solution. In case of a fractional solution, a branching decision
needs to be made, partitioning the solution space in order to create a num-
ber of smaller subproblems. With branch-and-price, this results in a search
tree where column generation has to be applied in every node. In this way,
branch-and-price can be seen as a generalization of the column generation
technique for integer programming. Combining the column generation ap-
proach with a branching scheme may not be straightforward. The key to
an efficient branch-and-price algorithm is an easy-to-solve pricing problem.
The branching rule should therefore not destroy the structure of the pricing
problem or increase its complexity when moving deeper down the search tree.
Branch-and-price has proven to be successful for solving huge integer pro-
grams arising from a number of combinatorial problems (see Barnhart, John-
son, Nemhauser, Savelsbergh & Vance (1998) for an overview). We refer to
Vanderbeck & Wolsey (1996) for a more elaborate description of the branch-
and-price technique. In section 7.3.1, we show how the LP-relaxation of the
set packing formulation for the matrix bid auction winner determination
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problem can be solved efficiently using column generation. Next, the column
generation approach is used as a building block for two branch-and-price al-
gorithms to solve the matrix bid auction. The algorithm in section 7.3.2
makes use of a branching rule based on assigning items to bidders, whereas
in section 7.3.3, branching is done by deciding on the succession of items in a
winning set. Finally, in section 7.3.4, we comment on some issues that turn
out to be important while implementing both branch-and-price algorithms.
7.3.1 Column generation for the matrix bid auction
In this section, we show how the LP-relaxation of the set packing formula-
tion of the matrix bid winner determination problem can be solved using
column generation. We also prove that the pricing problem can be solved
in polynomial time, since it can be solved by solving a shortest path problem.
If we define ui for each item i ∈ G as the dual price associated with the
corresponding constraint of (7.7), and vj for each bidder j ∈ B as the dual
price associated with the corresponding constraint of (7.8), we can write the
dual of the set packing formulation (7.6)-(7.9) as follows:
minimize ∑
i∈G
ui +
∑
j∈B
vj (7.21)
subject to ∑
i∈S
ui + vj > bj(S) ∀S ⊆ G,∀j ∈ B (7.22)
ui > 0, vj > 0 ∀i ∈ G,∀j ∈ B (7.23)
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We start by finding an optimal solution for the restricted master problem, i.e.
the LP-relaxation of (7.6)-(7.9) considering only a limited number of vari-
ables y(S, j). This solution is also an optimal solution for the (unrestricted)
LP-relaxation of (7.6)-(7.9) if its corresponding dual variables form a feasible
solution for (7.21)-(7.23), which has a constraint for every variable y(S, j).
Consequently, we need to add a new column or variable to the restricted
master problem if a constraint of (7.22) is violated. The pricing problem
thus boils down to determining the existence of a set S of items and a bidder
j such that
∑
i∈S
ui < bj(S)− vj . (7.24)
Theorem 25. The pricing problem, i.e. finding a set S of items and a
bidder j such that a constraint of (7.22) is violated, can be solved by solving
a shortest path problem.
Proof. We construct a graph with a source and a sink, and a subgraph for
each bidder j. Such a subgraph contains rij nodes for each item i, called
item nodes. We will refer to an item node as (i, j, k), where i stands for
the item and k ranges from 1 to rij . There are arcs from each node (i, j, k)
to each node (i′, j, k + 1) where item i′ is ranked lower than item i (i.e.,
ri′j > rij). These arcs have a cost equal to ui′ − bi′,j,k+1. Notice that there
are no arcs between nodes corresponding to different subgraphs. Further-
more, for each subgraph, there are arcs from the source node to node (i, j, 1)
for each item i with a cost equal to ui − bij1 and there are arcs from each
item node (i, j, k) to the sink with cost vj . A schematic representation of
this graph is given in Figure 7.2 for a setting with a single bidder j and
three items.
From the structure of this graph, it follows that all nodes of a path from the
source to the sink correspond to the same bidder and each path contains at
most one node per item. Moreover, exactly one arc with cost vj is included
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item 1
item 2
item 3
source
sink
(1,j,1)
(2,j,1) (2,j,1)
(3,j,1) (3,j,2) (3,j,3)
vj
u1-b1j1
u3-b3j2
Figure 7.2: The pricing problem as a shortest path problem
in the path. Therefore, the length of a path containing nodes (i, j, k) of the
items i ∈ S of bidder j in this graph equals
∑
i∈S
(ui − bijk) + vj (7.25)
Furthermore, the graph ensures that an item i is in the path using its k-th
node only if a higher ranked item is in the path through its (k− 1)-th node.
We can therefore state that
∑
i∈S bijk = bj(S) and it follows that the ex-
istence of a path with negative length corresponds to a violated constraint
in the dual. Consequently, we need to solve a shortest path problem on an
acyclic graph in order to solve the pricing problem.
Thus, if the shortest path has a negative length, we can add a column for
the corresponding bidder j containing the items in set S determined by the
item nodes traversed in the path. Naturally, bidder j’s bid for this set S is
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bj(S). Notice that since the pricing problem is solvable in polynomial time,
the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation for the matrix bid auction
can also be solved in polynomial time.
Corollary 3. The LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation (7.6)-(7.9)
for the matrix bid auction winner determination problem can be solved in
polynomial time.
7.3.2 Branching on an item-bidder pair
The solution of the LP-relaxation of the matrix bid winner determination
problem found by column generation may not be integral. If this is the case,
we need to partition the solution space to eliminate this fractional solution.
In this approach, we partition the solution space by the branching decision
whether or not to assign an item to a bidder. We first prove that in a
fractional solution, there always exists an item that has been fractionally
assigned to one or more bidders.
Lemma 1. For any fractional solution to the relaxation of (7.6)-(7.9),
∃i ∈ G, j ∈ B : 0 <
∑
S:S⊇{i}
y(S, j) < 1 (7.26)
Proof. We will prove this theorem by showing that a solution must be
integral if it does not satisfy (7.26). Consider a solution for which prop-
erty (7.26) is not valid. This means that each item has been assigned fully
or not at all to each bidder. In this case, no items are split over multiple
bidders. An item p for which
∑
S:S⊇{p} y(S, j) = 1 could, however, still be
split over multiple sets of the same bidder j. It is easy to see that if bidder
j is awarded a set S containing next to p any other item q, that this item
then should occur in each set containing p in order to have the sum of the
fractions of sets containing p equal 1. In other words, the sets of bidder j
are identical, and we have, in fact, an integral solution.
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The branch-and-price algorithm can, however, only be valid if in every node
of the search tree, all generated columns satisfy the previously made branch-
ing decisions. Prohibiting that an item is awarded to a certain bidder in the
pricing problem can be done by simply removing the vertices correspond-
ing to that item for that bidder from the graph. Enforcing that an item
is awarded to a certain bidder in the pricing problem is less obvious. For
that bidder, the arcs from the source to any lower ranked item need to be
removed. Also the arcs from any higher ranked item to any item ranked
lower than that item need to be deleted. Finally, the arcs from the higher
ranked items to the sink must be removed as well. Clearly, all nodes that
can no longer be reached as a consequence of these removals can now also
be deleted, as are the arcs leaving those nodes, and so on. For all other
bidders, we need to remove the vertices of that item from the graph. Fig-
ure 7.3 shows the pricing problem where item 2 is forced to be awarded to
the bidder whose item nodes are depicted. In this graph, we made sure that
every path from the source to the sink of that bidder must include a node
corresponding to item 2.
Notice that this branching rule does not destroy the structure of the pric-
ing problem: in all branches, the pricing problem remains a shortest path
problem. It is easy to see that this shortest path problem can be adjusted
to produce columns that comply with a series of branching decisions. More-
over, when moving deeper down the tree, more and more arcs and nodes
will be removed. Thus, we have described a valid branching rule where the
pricing problem remains solvable as a shortest path problem throughout the
search tree.
7.3.3 Branching on a pair of successive items
Ryan & Foster (1981) suggest a branching rule for the set partitioning prob-
lems where two constraints are covered together or not at all by the variables
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item 1
item 2
item 3
source
sink
(1,j,1)
(2,j,1) (2,j,1)
(3,j,2) (3,j,3)
Figure 7.3: The pricing problem where the bidder must get item 2
in one branch, whereas in the other branch, each variable can cover at most
one of these constraints. This rule can easily be generalized to set packing
problems and can be translated to a combinatorial auction context as two
items needing to go to the same bidder in one branch and to different bid-
ders in the other branch. However, forcing two arbitrary items to go to the
same bidder, but also forbidding that these items go to the same bidder,
is not straightforward to achieve in the shortest path problem described in
section 7.3.1. Therefore, we modify this branching rule, such that it takes
into account the ranking of the items specified in the bidder’s matrix bid.
A similar modification has been applied for example in a pallet loading ap-
plication (Moonen 2005).
We partition the solution space by branching on a pair of items p and q. In
one branch, we enforce that if item p is present in a bidder’s set, then item q
must be directly successive to p in this set, when the set is sorted according
to this bidder’s ranking of the items. In the other branch, no bidder can
have items p and q as direct successors in a set, according to his ranking.
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We first prove that there always exists a pair of items such that the sets in
which these items occur as direct successors according to the corresponding
bidder’s ranking, have been fractionally assigned to one or more bidders. We
introduce the notation p →j q to denote that item p is directly succeeded
by item q in a set, according to the ranking of bidder j.
Lemma 2. For any optimal, extreme fractional solution to the relaxation
of (7.6)-(7.9),
∃p, q ∈ G : 0 <
∑
j∈B
∑
S:S⊇{p,q}∧p→jq
y(S, j) < 1 (7.27)
Proof. Assume that we have an optimal, extreme fractional solution for
which (7.27) is not satisfied. This means that for each pair of items, each
bid on a set in which these items are direct successors according to rank-
ing of the bidder that made the bid, has been assigned to that bidder
for a total fraction of 0 or 1. Thus, for any items p and q for which∑
j∈B
∑
S:S⊇{p,q}∧p→jq y(S, j) = 1, we can conclude that if item p is present
in a set, that then also item q is present in this set. Therefore, each pair
of sets to which a positive fraction has been assigned is disjoint or identi-
cal. Since there is a single variable y(S, j) representing identical sets of the
same bidder j, we conclude that identical sets must be split over multiple
bidders. This leaves us with the problem of assigning a number of disjoint
sets among one or more bidders, where each assignment of a set to a bidder
has its profit, namely the bid of this bidder for this set. This problem is a
maximum weighted assignment problem on a bipartite graph, where each
node on one side of the partition represents a set, and each node on the
other side of the partition represents a bidder. It follows that each opti-
mal, extreme solution is integral. Consequently, for any optimal, extreme
fractional solution to the relaxation of (7.6)-(7.9), property (7.27) is true.
The above theorem shows that it is always possible to find a pair of items p
and q on which to branch. However, we still need to enforce that the pricing
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problem will generate columns that satisfy the constraint imposed by the
branching decision. In the branch where we impose p→j q, for each bidder
j, we need to remove all arcs from nodes corresponding to p to any node not
corresponding to q. Notice that for a bidder that ranks q higher than p, this
comes down to removing all nodes related to p from the graph. This leaves
us with a graph where if one arrives in a node related to p, the only option
is to take an arc to a node related to q. In the branch where p should not
be directly succeeded by q, it suffices, for each bidder, to remove the arcs
going from a p-node to a q-node, if they exist.
Notice this branching rule does not destroy the structure of the pricing
problem either, even when we consider a sequence of branching decisions.
Indeed, it is not hard to verify that when going deeper into the search tree,
the pricing problem can still be solved as a shortest path problem on an
increasingly smaller graph.
7.3.4 Implementation issues
Both branch-and-price algorithms were implemented using Visual C++ 6.0.
The set packing problems were solved using Ilog Cplex 8.1. The LEDA
libraries (version 5.0.1) allowed us to solve the shortest path problems in
linear time. In the remainder of this section, some of the most important
implementation issues are discussed.
Solving the root node
A first issue that needs to be solved is determining which columns will be
used in the very first restricted master problem. Using many columns obvi-
ously increases the computation time needed to solve the restricted master
problem. On the other hand, this may result in a solution that is closer to
the optimal solution, such that less iterations for solving the pricing prob-
lem and re-optimizing are needed. In our case, after experimenting with a
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number of settings, it turned out that including a rather large number of
variables to start the column generation process pays off. We constructed
a set for every strictly positive entry in the matrix bid by taking the item
corresponding to this entry and completing the set with the k highest ranked
items, where k is the entry’s column in the matrix bid.
After the restricted master problem has been solved and the corresponding
dual solution has been obtained, new columns with a non-negative reduced
cost need to be added. The question remains how many such columns we
should add. Again, adding too many new variables increases the computa-
tion time for solving the resulting restricted master problem, whereas adding
too few variables can result in a large number of iterations for solving the
pricing problem and re-optimizing. The strategy that proved to be the most
efficient consists of adding for each bidder those variables whose reduced
cost is at most 2% less than the most positive reduced cost for a variable
from that bidder. Furthermore, the number of such variables that is added
for each bidder cannot exceed the number of items. Notice that finding
these variables demands very little extra computation time, since the LEDA
libraries provide the distance from the source to each node in the graph,
after having solved the shortest path problem.
Finally, when re-optimizing the restricted master problem, we start from the
optimal base of the previous iteration. In order not to drag along too many
columns for the remainder of the search tree, those columns that were added
at some iteration, but never made part of any base solution are removed from
the model. We keep the other columns, assuming that they will be useful
again later.
A selection rule when branching on an item-bidder pair
The major issue in implementing this branching rule is to choose the item
on which to branch and the bidder(s) to assign it to. We chose to branch
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on the item that is fractionally assigned to the highest number of bidders.
For each of these bidders, a branch is constructed in which the bidder is
assigned the item. A final branch is added where none of these bidders is
allowed to receive the item. We opted for a depth-first strategy, where the
branch where the item is assigned to the bidder with the highest fraction is
explored first. Thus, the branch where bidders are disallowed to receive an
item always comes last.
A selection rule when branching on a pair of successive items
With this branching rule, each node that needs further partitioning of the
solution space leads to two branches. In the first branch, we enforce that
for each bidder, if item p is present in a bid, q should be the next item in
that bid, according to the ranking of that bidder. The second branch con-
siders only bids for which p and q are no direct successors according to the
bidder’s ranking. We again chose a depth-first strategy, where the branch
where p →j q is imposed is explored first. The question remains how to
select the items p and q. We opted to pick those items p and q for which∑
j∈B
∑
S:S⊇{p,q}∧p→jq y(S, j) is closest to 0.5.
Solving a tree node
Before we can start solving a node of the tree, we remove all columns that
do not satisfy the latest branching decision. In case of backtracking, this
branching decision expires and those columns are re-entered into the model,
since we experienced that they often turn out to be useful in other branches
of the tree.
The LP objective value of the node can be used as an upper bound to the
integral solution that could be found further down the tree. Clearly, if this
value is lower than the incumbent found so far, the node can be pruned. It
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may, however, require a large number of iterations to prove LP optimality.
Vanderbeck & Wolsey (1996) show that the Lagrangian relaxation can also
be used as an upper bound. The Lagrangian upper bound can be computed
as (see e.g. Belie¨n (2006))
δ +
∑
j∈B
max
S⊆G
(RC(S, j), 0) (7.28)
where δ is the objective value of the restricted master and RC(S, j) is the re-
duced cost of variable y(S, j). Notice that the computation of this bound re-
quires little additional computational effort, since the pricing problem, which
is solved for every bidder j anyway, finds the variable with the highest re-
duced cost. This upper bound is referred to as the Lagrangian upper bound,
since it equals the bound obtained by Lagrange relaxation (Lasdon 1970).
If at any iteration in the column generation process, the Lagrangian upper
bound is lower than the incumbent, we can prune the node, without any
risk of missing the optimal solution.
Obviously, when we re-optimize the restricted master problem, we also start
from the optimal base of the previous iteration. The first restricted master
problem is solved starting from the base solution of the parent node. Fur-
thermore, as in the root node, we delete the added columns that turned out
not to be useful.
7.4 Computational results
In this section, we elaborate on how we generated the instances on which
the branch-and-price algorithms were tested. We also give an overview of
the computational results and compare them with results from a branch-
and-cut approach performed on the assignment formulation.
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7.4.1 Structure of the instances
Unfortunately, real-life data for combinatorial auctions are not abundantly
available for the public. It is therefore not uncommon in combinatorial auc-
tion literature to turn to randomly generated data (see for instance Leyton-
Brown et al. (2000), Sandholm (2002), and Parkes (1999)). For a thorough
discussion on the empirical hardness of several data distributions commonly
used for combinatorial auctions, we refer to Leyton-Brown, Nudelman &
Shoham (2005).
The randomly generated data we use, are due to Day (2004). Each matrix
bid is composed according to a bid type, randomly chosen out of the six
possibilities discussed in section 6.2 (additive preference bids, single-minded
bids, nested flat bids, nested k-of bids, partition bids, and add-on bids) and
a bid type that has non-increasing rows and columns. In order to avoid
auctions for which the exact solution of the winner determination problem
is obvious, the matrix bids are constructed such that they are competitive.
Furthermore, there is a parameter H that bounds the highest incremental
value an item brings to a set. For more details on the bid types or on how
the instances were generated, we refer to Day (2004).
We performed experiments on matrix bid auctions with 5, 10, 25 or 50 items
and 5, 10, 25, 50, 75 or 100 bidders. For each combination, 10 instances were
generated and solved to optimality. The highest incremental value per item
(H) was limited to 10. We have no indication that the branch-and-price
algorithm performs differently with other settings for H. All computational
experiments were done on a desktop computer with a Pentium IV 2 GHz
processor, with 512 MB RAM.
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7.4.2 Results
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 give an overview of the average computation times needed
to solve the matrix bid auction winner determination problem using branch-
and-price with branching on an item-bidder pair (BOI) and branch-and-price
with branching on a pair of successive of items (BOS) respectively. In Table
7.3, we give the average computation times that resulted from solving the
assignment based formulation (7.1)-(7.5) with the Ilog Cplex 8.1 branch-and-
cut algorithm with standard settings (B&C), which is basically the approach
followed in Day & Raghavan (2006). Horizontally, the number of bidders n
varies from 5 to 100, while the number of items m auctioned ranges from 5
to 50 vertically. All computation times are expressed in seconds.
As could be expected, the computation time is determined more by the num-
ber of items in the auction, than by the number of bidders. All instances
with up to 10 items are solved in less than a second by all algorithms; here
the branch-and-price algorithms clearly perform better. Auctions with 50
items are also solved in less than 20 minutes on average by all algorithms.
The branch-and-cut algorithm seems on average the fastest way to solve
these instances. Perhaps surprisingly, for the branch-and-price algorithms,
the computation times for the 25 and 50 item instances do not always in-
crease when more bidders come into play. This can be explained by the
fact that the computation times for the individual instances tend to vary
considerably.
One way to get a more accurate view on what the underlying trend is, is to
consider a larger sample set. Also, it is not uncommon in literature on com-
binatorial auctions to study the median instead (see for instance Sandholm
et al. (2005) and Hoos & Boutilier (2000)). Tables 7.4 to 7.6 give an overview
of the median computation times needed to solve the winner determination
problem. The tables shows a clear trend of how the computation times rise
with the number of bidders and the number of items, since the median is
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n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.027 0.038
10 0.027 0.038 0.053 0.088 0.118 0.169
25 0.636 0.597 1.157 4.292 12.704 49.155
50 247.224 60.711 437.951 557.083 622.591 802.483
Table 7.1: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOI
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.027 0.038
10 0.033 0.037 0.044 0.067 0.104 0.182
25 0.698 0.767 1.194 3.814 16.300 97.122
50 76.598 67.584 843.435 259.079 645.632 983.539
Table 7.2: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOS
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.030 0.027 0.049 0.052 0.070 0.102
10 0.050 0.069 0.140 0.278 0.524 0.748
25 0.757 1.391 3.598 10.689 17.584 31.940
50 57.676 28.333 91.230 215.083 355.785 811.960
Table 7.3: Average computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using B&C
less affected by extreme values. It is also confirmed that the branch-and-
price algorithms manage to solve the majority of the instances with many
items a lot faster than reflected by the average computation times. The
branch-and-cut algorithm seems to suffer less from instances with extreme
computation times, since the median computation time is much closer to
the average computation time. The results show that computation times
for the branch-and-price algorithm with branching on an item-bidder pair
rise more severely with an increasing number of items than those of the
branch-and-cut algorithm. On the other hand, the branch-and-price algo-
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n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040
10 0.015 0.020 0.055 0.055 0.105 0.130
25 0.480 0.460 0.760 2.445 9.480 16.825
50 20.855 29.105 45.605 129.870 227.370 353.970
Table 7.4: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOI
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040
10 0.015 0.020 0.040 0.055 0.100 0.130
25 0.485 0.495 0.815 2.445 6.790 13.605
50 20.855 29.215 37.970 129.870 238.785 514.370
Table 7.5: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using BOS
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.020 0.025 0.040 0.050 0.070 0.105
10 0.040 0.060 0.140 0.260 0.535 0.740
25 0.530 1.235 3.245 10.595 18.120 28.960
50 14.665 22.615 73.035 191.670 350.340 589.940
Table 7.6: Median computation times [s] for n bidders and m items using B&C
rithm with branching on an item-bidder pair handles an increasing number
of bidders better than the branch-and-cut algorithm. Furthermore, apart
from a couple of exceptions, the median computation times are lower with
branch-and-price than with branch-and-cut.
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 give the average computation times for solving the LP-
relaxation of the set packing formulation (7.6)-(7.9) and the assignment
formulation (7.1)-(7.5) respectively. Recall that the former is used in both
branch-and-price algorithms, while the latter is used in the branch-and-cut
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n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.01 [8] 0.01 [8] 0.01 [7] 0.02 [9] 0.03 [10] 0.04 [10]
10 0.01 [6] 0.02 [9] 0.03 [4] 0.05 [8] 0.09 [8] 0.14 [7]
25 0.31 [3] 0.41 [7] 0.80 [8] 2.12 [8] 3.29 [5] 4.71 [4]
50 14.02 [5] 14.96 [6] 32.93 [4] 74.46 [7] 124.29 [5] 116.19 [4]
Table 7.7: Average computation times [s] for the LP-relaxation of the set packing
formulation for n bidders and m items
n = 5 10 25 50 75 100
m = 5 0.01 [8] 0.02 [9] 0.02 [8] 0.03 [8] 0.04 [10] 0.04 [9]
10 0.02 [6] 0.03 [9] 0.05 [5] 0.09 [7] 0.14 [7] 0.20 [8]
25 0.28 [5] 0.51 [8] 1.61 [7] 4.47 [9] 6.03 [5] 8.35 [5]
50 9.40 [5] 20.01 [6] 43.93 [3] 159.46 [6] 313.76 [4] 461.91 [4]
Table 7.8: Average computation times [s] for the LP-relaxation of the assignment
formulation for n bidders and m items
algorithm. The tables might be influenced by the fact that the LP-relaxation
of both formulations can be solved in polynomial time. Furthermore, with
two exceptions, the LP-relaxation of the set packing formulation is solved
faster than the the LP-relaxation of the assignment formulation. Between
brackets, the number of instances out of 10 for which the LP-relaxation
resulted in an integral solution is indicated. Notice that Theorem 24 does
not imply that these numbers should be at least as high for the assignment
formulation than for the set packing formulation. Indeed, if there exists an
integral optimal solution, the algorithms may not find it as there may be
fractional solutions with the same objective value. Further, the number of
instances for which an integral optimal solution was found remains more
or less constant over the bidders, while it drops for instances with more
items. Not surprisingly, instances with an integral LP-relaxation have low
computation times. Therefore, the figures in Table 7.7 partially explain the
fluctuations in average computation times for the instances with 25 or 50
156 7.5. Conclusion
items (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).
Finally, Table 7.9 gives an overview of the performance details of the three
algorithms. Column A gives the average number of nodes in the branching
tree that were explored. Column B represents the average number of pricing
rounds, and column C gives the average number of variables that were gen-
erated (these columns are not applicable for the branch-and-cut algorithm).
On the rows, we find the instances, where the first number indicates the
number of items and the second gives the number of bidders. There seems
to be no systematic difference between the branch-and-price algorithms for
any of the three parameters described in this table. The branch-and-cut
algorithm solves very little nodes in its branching tree, compared to the
branch-and-price algorithms. In many cases, the branch-and-cut algorithm
prefers generating valid inequalities in the root node to branching.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the winner determination problem for the ma-
trix bid auction. We first looked at a special case of the matrix bid auction,
namely where all bidders have an identical ranking of the items. For this
auction, the winner determination problem is still NP -hard, although there
exists a polynomial time algorithm in the case the number of bidders is fixed.
Then, we compared two mathematical formulations for the winner determi-
nation problem of the general matrix bid auction. One assignment is based
on the assignment problem, while the other is based on the set packing
problem. We found that both formulations are equally strong. Moreover,
an integral solution for one formulation can always be translated to an inte-
gral solution for the other formulation. We used the set packing formulation
as a basis for a column generation approach where the pricing problem can
be solved as a shortest path problem. This means that we are able to solve
the LP relaxation of the set packing formulation in polynomial time. We
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BOI BOS B&C
Inst. A B C A B C A
5-5 2.2 3.9 33.3 2.4 4.7 34.4 1.0
5-10 1.3 3.7 68.4 1.4 3.4 68.3 1.0
5-25 2.5 4.5 142.2 1.6 3.2 141.6 1.0
5-50 1.3 3.2 266.9 1.2 3.1 266.9 1.0
5-75 1.0 2.4 435.9 1.0 2.4 435.9 1.0
5-100 1.0 2.0 565.0 1.0 2.0 565.0 1.0
10-5 7.6 18.3 124.2 9.4 27.5 93.7 1.2
10-10 7.6 16.5 201.8 5.4 16.8 193.8 1.5
10-25 4.9 10.2 363.8 2.8 8.4 352.0 1.0
10-50 3.7 8.0 788.9 1.8 5.4 782.2 1.0
10-75 2.3 6.9 1,117.7 1.6 6.0 1,113.8 1.0
10-100 2.3 7.0 1,459.5 2.6 8.4 1,455.4 1.0
25-5 7.7 72.3 1,017.7 6.4 89.4 723.1 1.2
25-10 2.0 37.8 990.7 6.8 51.7 864.5 1.5
25-25 4.4 31.2 1,793.3 3.8 33.2 1,752.1 1.0
25-50 8.6 59.7 3,703.2 5.2 55.1 3,602.4 1.0
25-75 30.0 123.5 5,402.7 32.8 143.1 5,412.7 1.0
25-100 96.8 349.3 7,564.0 163.0 635.3 7,895.2 1.3
50-5 21.4 3,095.8 4,745.9 37.9 1,279.2 2,872.6 11.8
50-10 12.2 592.6 3,963.3 27.9 611.7 4,112.8 1.0
50-25 315.1 1,494.0 11,752.4 1,029.6 2,806.7 10,141.0 1.2
50-50 361.6 938.5 16,278.1 67.6 468.4 14,359.3 1.0
50-75 102.5 828.5 20,773.4 106.7 852.0 20,776.0 1.0
50-100 96.0 839.5 30,538.0 100.4 995.4 31,120.3 5.7
Table 7.9: Performance details for the three algorithms (BOI, BOS, B&C)
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then extended this approach to two branch-and-price algorithms. In one
algorithm, we branch on the items, while in the other, branching is done
on the succession of the items. The pricing problem for these branch-and-
price algorithms remains solvable as a shortest path problem throughout the
search tree. These algorithms are tested on randomly generated instances
with up to 50 items and 100 bidders, which they solved within 20 min-
utes (on average). Finally, the branch-and-price algorithms withstood the
comparison with a branch-and-cut algorithm, based on Day & Raghavan
(2006). The algorithms perform better on instances with up to 10 items,
but are outperformed by the branch-and-cut algorithm on some of the larger
instances. The increase in computation time, however, seems favorable for
the branch-and-price algorithms, which indicates that they form at least a
viable approach to solve instances of the matrix bid auction winner deter-
mination problem.
Chapter 8
Topics for future research
To conclude this thesis, we elaborate on a number of topics for future re-
search. In section 8.1, we discuss potential improvements for solving the
winner determination problem of the total quantity discount auction, and
in section 8.2, we present some future research topics for the matrix bid auc-
tion. All computational experiments in this chapter were done on a desktop
computer with a Pentium IV 2 GHz processor, with 512 MB RAM.
8.1 The total quantity discount auction
In chapters 2 to 4 we discussed the total quantity discount auction. With re-
spect to the computational side of this research, the main result was that the
winner determination problem allowed a formulation with an LP-relaxation
that can be solved by solving a min-cost flow problem. Moreover, we were
able to generalize this result to a setting in which a number of bids are ac-
cepted beforehand (see section 2.5.2). This allowed us to develop a branch-
and-bound algorithm where every node of the branching tree is be solved as
a min-cost flow problem (see section 4.2).
Given the efficiency with which a min-cost flow problem can be solved, it
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should not be surprising that the min-cost flow branch-and-bound algorithm
solves a node of its branching tree on average 10 times faster than the lin-
ear programming based branch-and-bound algorithm, and up to 2000 times
faster than the branch-and-cut algorithm. This advantage makes the min-
cost flow based algorithm the fastest algorithm on all instances with up to
20 bidders. However, for the instances with 50 bidders, the min-cost flow
algorithm is outperformed by the LP-based branch-and-bound algorithm,
and even more by the branch-and-cut algorithm. For these instances, the
min-cost flow approach needs to solve 10 to 60 times more nodes than the
LP-based approach. In other words, the min-cost flow approach loses the
advantage it has in terms of node solution time because of an inefficient
branching strategy.
Variable selection Computation time [s] Number of nodes
Highest priority 59.55 65,241
Min. integer feas. 983.12 240,464
Max. integer feas. 1,984.41 419,591
Pseudo costs 25.11 5,882
Strong branching 125.75 1,869
Pseudo reduced costs 61.73 15,352
Table 8.1: Average computation times [s] and number of nodes for various variable
selection strategies in a depth-first search
The node selection strategy that is used in the min-cost flow based algo-
rithm is depth-first search. To determine the variable on which to branch,
we determine the highest priority bidder as the bidder for which the num-
ber of volume intervals minus the index of the LP-interval is maximal. The
LP-interval is then the first interval to fix, followed by the interval directly
above this interval, the interval directly below, and so on (see section 4.2).
This highest priority strategy is not readily available in Ilog Cplex, which
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presents minimum integer feasibility, maximum integer feasibility, pseudo
costs, strong branching, and pseudo reduced costs as its variable selection
strategies. Table 8.1 gives an overview of the performance of these strategies
in a depth-first search, as tested on (structured and random) instances with
50 bidders, 100 items, and at most 3 bids per bidder. In terms of number
of nodes that need to be searched, strong branching seems the best choice.
However, in terms of computation time, a pseudo cost variable selection
strategy is the better option. In conclusion, this table suggests that plug-
ging in a pseudo costs rule in the min-cost flow algorithm could decrease the
number of nodes in the branching tree substantially, possibly improving the
computation times by a factor of 10.
Node selection Computation time [s] Number of nodes
Depth-first search 25.11 5,882
Best-bound search 14.37 3,300
Best-estimate search 14.51 3,282
Alternate best-estimate search 15.25 3,385
Table 8.2: Average computation times [s] and number of nodes for various search
strategies using a pseudo costs variable selection rule
Furthermore, Ilog Cplex presents other search strategies than depth-first
search, which was used in the min-cost flow based algorithm. Assuming a
pseudo costs variable selection rule, the performance of these search strate-
gies on instances with 50 bidders, 100 items, and at most 3 bids per bidder
is represented in Table 8.2. The table points to best-bound search as the
best strategy. Furthermore, the table suggests that implementing this search
strategy in the min-cost flow approach can lead to an additional decrease in
computation time of over 40%.
Implementing the min-cost flow based branch-and-bound algorithm with a
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pseudo costs variable selection rule and a best-bound search strategy, and
verifying whether and to what extent this improves the computation times
remains a topic for further research.
8.2 The matrix bid auction
In chapter 7, we developed two branch-and-price algorithms for the winner
determination problem of the matrix bid auction. We tested the perfor-
mance of these algorithms on instances with various numbers of bidders and
items. Each instance consists of matrix bids that were randomly chosen out
of seven possible types: additive preference bids, single-minded bids, nested
flat bids, nested k-of bids, partition bids, add-on bids, and a bid type that
has non-increasing rows and columns (see also section 6.2 and Day (2004)).
The question arises though how the algorithms would perform on instances
that are composed out of only one single bid type. To this end we generated
10 instances for every bid type with 10 bidders and 50 items. We also inves-
tigated a random bid type, where the entries in the matrix bid are simply
randomly picked numbers between 0 and 10.
Table 8.3 gives an overview of the average computation time needed to solve
instances with bids of the mentioned bid types, using branch-and-price with
branching on an item-bidder pair (BOI), branch-and-price with branching
on a pair of successive of items (BOS), and the Ilog Cplex 8.1 branch-and-cut
algorithm with standard settings (B&C). The last line in the table repeats
the computation times mentioned in section 7.4 for instances with 50 items
and 10 bidders and a combination of various bid types. The table clearly
shows that the difficulty of the various bid types is diverse. Additive pref-
erence bids, single minded bids, nested flat bids and non-increasing bids are
indeed solved much faster than the other bid types. For most of these bid
types, branch-and-price with branching on a pair of successive of items is the
fastest algorithm. On the other hand, the instances with nested k-of bids and
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Bid type BOI BOS B&C
Additive preference bid 12.71 7.88 5.91
Single-minded bid 0.13 0.13 9.75
Nested flat bid 0.14 0.14 12.11
Nested k-of bid * * *
Partition bid * * 61.11
Add-on bid 73.49 85.34 82.14
Non-increasing bid 0.43 0.43 2.94
Random bid 81.72 106.43 282.02
Mixed bid types 60.71 67.58 28.33
Table 8.3: Average computation times [s] for various bid types (*not all instances
could be solved)
partition bids are a hard nut to crack for the branch-and-price algorithms,
since not all instances could be solved (due to a lack of memory). The lat-
ter bid type turns out to be very difficult for the branch-and-cut algorithm
as well, since for some instances, even over 80 hours of computation time
did not suffice to solve them to optimality. Finally, instances with add-on
bids and random bids also require quite some computation time. For these
instances, branch-and-price with branching on an item-bidder pair performs
best; especially for the random instances, the difference with branch-and-cut
is considerable.
Finally, Table 8.4 gives an overview of the performance details of the branch-
and-price algorithms. Column A gives the average number of nodes in the
branching tree that were explored. Column B represents the average num-
ber of pricing rounds, and column C gives the average number of variables
that were generated. The table supports the differences in computation time
for the various bid types that are mentioned in Table 8.3.
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BOI BOS
Bid type A B C A B C
Additive preference bid 3.3 52.9 11,752 2.3 24.8 12,111
Single-minded bid 1.0 1.3 11 1.0 1.3 11
Nested flat bid 1.0 1.3 292 1.0 1.3 292
Add-on bid 17.3 813.4 2,312 46.6 789.9 5,134
Non-increasing bid 1.0 4.4 203 1.0 4.4 203
Random bid 24.0 383.9 13,127 117.0 447.4 14,881
Mixed bid types 12.2 592.6 3,963 27.9 611.7 4,113
Table 8.4: Performance details for the branch-and-price algorithms (BOI, BOS)
Another issue is that the bid functions that can be represented in a single
matrix bid seem restrictive. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend the
matrix bid auction to a setting where multiple matrix bids per bidder can
be submitted. However, we would have to ensure that at most one bid per
bidder can be accepted. For the branch-and-price algorithm, this could be
done as follows. We create a dummy item for each bidder. This dummy item
is to be inserted in each matrix bid of this bidder as the highest ranked item.
The first column of each matrix bid has a zero in the entry corresponding
to the dummy item, and a highly negative value for all other entries. Obvi-
ously, each positive bid will have to include the dummy item, and thus the
constraint that each item can be auctioned at most once will avoid that bids
from different matrix bids by the same bidder are accepted. In this way,
the branch-and-price algorithms can still be applied for this variant with
multiple matrix bids per bidder.
Notice that any bid function can be represented by a series of such matrix
bids, although this may require a number of matrix bids that is exponential
in the number of items. Indeed, a matrix bid like the one described above
could be created for each bid on a subset of items. An interesting topic for
further research would be to develop a way to represent an arbitrary set of
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bids using as few matrix bids as possible. If this number turns out to be
small, the resulting winner determination problem may still be efficiently
solvable in practice.
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